Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie v The National University of Singapore

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tan Siong Thye J
• Judgment Date: 21 November 2014
• Neutral Citation: [2014] SGHC 247
• Plaintiff Counsel: Violet Netto and Colin Phan (L F Violet Netto)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 699 of 2014
• Date: 21 November 2014
• Hearing Date: 27 October 2014,29 September 2014,20 October 2014
• Subject Matter: Civil procedure,judgments and orders,Constitutional law,equal protection of the law
• Year: 2014
• Citation: [2014] SGHC 247
• Defendant Counsel: Chia Voon Jiet and Kelly Lua (Drew & Napier LLC)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 18 August 2015

Tan Siong Thye J: Introduction

The plaintiff, Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie, was a Masters of Arts (Architecture) (“the MA degree”) candidate at the National University of Singapore’s (“the defendant”) School of Design and Environment. The crux of her complaint was that the defendant refused to award her the MA degree despite her meeting the academic requirements. As a result, the plaintiff sued the defendant for loss and damage. She alleged that the defendant had wrongly terminated her candidature and her claim was grounded in the following: breach of contract; the tort of misfeasance in public office; the tort of intimidation; and the tort of negligence.

In the course of the proceedings, the plaintiff lodged a discovery application, Summons No 3299 of 2013 (“SUM 3299”), against the defendant for a large number of documents. The interlocutory application was heard by the Assistant Registrar (“AR”) who dismissed it. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the AR’s decision and appealed against it. I dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, Registrar’s Appeal No 320 of 2013 (“RA 320”), and also dismissed her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, Summons No 5875 of 2013 (“SUM 5875”).

Subsequently, in Originating Summons No 699 of 2014 (“OS 699”), the plaintiff applied for my written grounds for RA 320 and SUM 5875. I dismissed her application as the parties were fully aware of the arguments. I had orally explained my decision to the parties in the course of their submissions in both RA 320 and SUM 5875 although these were not reflected in my notes. Nevertheless, she insisted on having my written grounds. Now, dissatisfied with my decision in OS 699, she seeks to appeal against it.

I shall first summarise the events leading up to OS 699, because they are important for a full appreciation of this case, before addressing the main issue at hand.

RA 320

RA 320 was an appeal by the plaintiff against the order of the AR who disallowed her discovery application for many documents. The AR had released his written grounds of decision to explain why he refused to allow the plaintiff to have access to those documents. His reason was that she had not satisfied the threshold of relevance and necessity. At the appeal, I reminded the parties during oral submissions that it was trite law that the test for the discovery of documents was for the plaintiff to show relevance and necessity. This test depended on the issues and pleadings of the case. In the circumstances, I ruled that the plaintiff had not satisfied this test. This was explained to the parties although it was not recorded in my written notes.

SUM 5875

The plaintiff was dissatisfied with my decision to dismiss her appeal in RA 320. Accordingly she sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in SUM 5875.

Before the parties began their submissions, the plaintiff’s counsel made a preliminary application for her to be present at the hearing. The defendant’s counsel strenuously objected to the application as in normal practice, chamber proceedings were conducted in the absence of the parties’ respective clients. The plaintiff’s counsel did not provide any compelling reason that warranted a deviation from the norm. Nevertheless, I allowed the plaintiff to be present. This was for two reasons. First, I realised that the plaintiff had taken a very keen personal interest in the case and in the interest of transparency, I allowed her to be present. Second, she would be given a first-hand opportunity to observe and hear the arguments presented to the court. This would perhaps give her a better understanding of the court’s decision and the reasons the court decided in a particular manner.

In deciding whether to grant her leave to appeal, I considered the following three criteria (see Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 at [16]): whether there was a prima facie factual error made; whether there was a question of general principle to be decided for the first time; and whether there was a question of importance on which the public interest would be served by having further arguments presented and a decision rendered by a higher tribunal.

The plaintiff’s case failed to satisfy any of the three criteria. Accordingly, I did not grant leave to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s request for my written grounds

The plaintiff wrote in to the Supreme Court Registry (“the Registry”) on 31 December 2013 to request my written grounds of decision for RA 320 and SUM 5875. Subsequently, the Registry replied on 23 April 2014 that there was “no need for Grounds of Decision for this case”.

The plaintiff’s complaint to the Chief Justice and V K Rajah JA

On 22 April 2014 the plaintiff then sent an email to the Chief Justice. The contents of the email are set out as follows:

Dear Honourable Chief Justice Menon,

I am the Plaintiff in Suit No. 667/2012/W.

It is with great reluctance that I write this letter to you. However I do not know what else I could do. I believe that Judicial Commissioner Tan Siong Thye did not give me a fair hearing on 15 January 2014. This hearing was for my application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Judicial Commissioner’s decision, following a hearing on 5 November 2013, to dismiss my appeal against an Assistant Registrar’s decision to deny my application for discovery in my lawsuit.

The hearing for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on 15 January 2014 was not a fair hearing because the Judicial Commissioner did not provide me with the reasons for his decision in the appeal hearing on 5 November 2013. Without knowing these reasons, my lawyer could not properly prepare arguments for the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on 15 January 2014.

My lawyers have formally requested for Judicial Commissioner Tan Siong Thye’s reasons for his Grounds of Decision on the hearing on 5 November 2013 at least three times, both in writing (three letters to the Court) and orally during Pre-Trial Conferences, but the Judicial Commissioner has still not provided his reasons as of today, over five months after the hearing last November. The last two letters also contained requests for the Grounds of Decision of the 15 January 2014 hearing. However, I have not received the Grounds of Decision of either hearing so far.

Even if Judicial Commissioner Tan Siong Thye does provide his reasons someday, it will not change the fact that the hearing for my application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on 15 January 2014 was not a fair hearing, since I did not have the benefit of knowing the Judicial Commissioner’s reasons regarding my hearing on 5 November 2013, when he turned down my appeal against the Assistant Registrar’s decision.

I believe that Judicial Commissioner Tan Siong Thye’s failure to provide reasons for his decision regarding my hearing on 5 November 2013 is contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 65. In this decision, the Court of Appeal ruled (at [14]) that judges have a “crucial judicial duty to give reasons” and that this duty “prevails in both civil and criminal cases.” The Court of Appeal also stated (at [22]) that: “The duty ordinarily applies even where there can be no appeal against that decision.” The Court of Appeal stressed that the judicial duty to state reasons applies even to decisions for which there is no possibility of appeal, stating (at [44]) that: “… The need for justice to be done and seen to be done should not be dampened by the absence of an avenue for appeal. On the contrary, the inability to alter the decision may make it all the more compelling for the parties to understand how it was reached …”

While the Court of Appeal in Thong Ah Fat acknowledged that there are exceptions to the judicial duty to provide reasons for decisions (at [32]-[33] and [45]), these exceptions (as defined by the Court of Appeal) clearly do not apply in my case.

In addition to not giving me a fair hearing on 15 January 2014, I believe that Judicial Commissioner Tan Siong Thye’s failure to provide reasons for his decision regarding my hearing on 5 November 2013 also violated my Constitutional rights under Article 12 of the Constitution, which says that “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.” If all persons are “equal before the law,” then I should enjoy the benefit of being informed about the reasons for the judge’s decisions, just like other plaintiffs. I know that other plaintiffs have had the benefit of being informed about the reasons for decisions of the High Court regarding appeals against decisions of Assistant Registrars regarding applications for discovery. Two recent examples are: Elbow Holdings Pte Ltd v Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 26 and Koh Chong Chiah and others v Treasure Resort Pte Ltd and another [2014] SGHC 51. In both of those cases, an Assistant Registrar made a decision regarding an application for discovery; in both cases, the decision was appealed to the High Court; and in both cases, the High Court judge provided written grounds of decision. I do not see why the Court should treat me unequally to the plaintiffs in those cases, who were informed about the Court’s reasons for its decisions in their appeals against Assistant Registrars’ decisions concerning their applications for discovery.

My lawyer has advised me that: “(1) there is no further appeal to the Court of Appeal possible from the dismissal of your application for specific discovery, (2) there is no further appeal possible to the Court of Appeal from the refusal to grant you leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the dismissal of your application for specific discovery, and (3) there is no possible application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal to it against the dismissal of your application for specific discovery.”

My...