Tang Tuck Wah v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 01 April 1991
• Date: 01 April 1991
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 353 of 1986
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Tang Tuck Wah

Plaintiff

and

Public Prosecutor

Defendant

[1991] SGHC 194

T S Sinnathuray J

Magistrate's Appeal No 353 of 1986

High Court

Criminal Law–Offences–Property–Criminal breach of trust–Accused charged for criminal breach of trust–Whether prima facie case made out–Section 408 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed)–Criminal Procedure and Sentencing–Statements–Admissibility–Accused charged for criminal breach of trust–Whether self-inculpatory statement made under s 26 Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1985 Rev Ed) admissible in evidence–Whether statement made voluntarily–Whether CPIB officer recording statement had to have rank of at least police sergeant–Section 26 Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1985 Rev Ed)–Section 122 (5) Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed)–Criminal Procedure and Sentencing–Trials–Accused charged for criminal breach of trust–Whether trial judge misdirected on findings of facts–Whether trial judge erred in law by calling for defence at close of prosecution case

The appellant, Tang Tuck Wah (“Tang”) was initially investigated for offences of corruption by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“the CPIB”). A statement was recorded under s 26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the PCA”) which contained admissions on the part of Tang. He was subsequently charged for criminal breach of trust under the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). There was evidence that moneys had been paid to him by the snack bar operators as rental at the premises of the Automobile Association of Singapore (“AAS”). There was also evidence that AAS had not received full payments of the rental made by the operators. Tang was convicted and sentenced in the District Court. He appealed against his conviction. The two issues before the appellate court were concerned with (a) the question of law on the admissibility of the statement made pursuant to s 26 of the PCA; and (b) the findings of fact made by the trial judge, and as to whether he had erred in law when he decided to call Tang for his defence at the close of prosecution case.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The investigative powers of CPIB officers were not restricted to the investigation of corruption offences under the PCA. They could investigate any seizable offence under any written law which came to light in the course of their investigations under the PCA. For Penal Code offences, their investigations were deemed to be police investigations and s 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”) applied in the same manner and to the same extent as if the CPIB officers were police officers. On the facts, CPIB started investigation into a suspected offence of corruption, that was why s 26 of the PCA was brought to the appellant's attention. However, further investigation revealed that offences of criminal breach of trust under the Penal Code were involved. The CPIB was, therefore, bound to investigate: at [94] and [95].

(2) The test to be applied in determining the admissibility or otherwise of a statement given under s 26 of the PCA was the test of voluntariness in that the making of the statement was not caused by any inducement, threat or promise. The mere fact that s 26 of the PCA was brought to the attention of Tang by showing it to him, could not import a threat or inducement rendering his statement inadmissible: at [94] and [97].

(3) A self-inculpatory statement made by a person to a CPIB officer was admissible in evidence provided that there was no threat, promise or inducement offered in the recording of the statement: at [97].

(4) Although the proviso to s 16 of the PCA stated that for the purpose of investigation under the Penal Code, a CPIB officer was deemed to be a police officer, this did not mean that he had to be clothed with the rank of a police sergeant before the statement recorded by him became admissible. Otherwise, it would effectively nullify the investigative powers of CPIB officers except for corruption offences under the PCA: at [101].

(5) The mere fact that a witness had lied on some irrelevant matters did not mean he was not to be believed on other matters. The issue of credibility was a matter for the trial judge to decide and the appellate court was not disposed to disturb the findings made. The trial judge was properly entitled to his findings of fact and on those findings he was bound to call for the defence of the appellant: at [104] and [105].

(6) The admissions made by Tang in his own statement to the CPIB were most damaging to himself. Although the statement contained exculpatory matters, both the incriminating parts and the excuses or explanations had to be considered in determining where the truth laid. It should also be borne in mind that the incriminating parts were likely to be true whereas the excuses need not carry the same weight: at [111] and [112].

Chan Kin Choi v PP [1991] 1 SLR (R) 111; [1991] SLR 34 (folld)

Chua Beow Huat v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 29 (folld)

Chye Ah San v R [1954] MLJ 217 (refd)

Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760; [1967] 1 All ER 177 (folld)

Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR (R) 133; [1980-1981] SLR 73 (refd)

R v Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7; [1988] 1 All ER 65 (folld)

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 122 (consd);ss 18, 123, 258

Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 408 (consd)

Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1985 Rev Ed) ss 16, 26 (consd);ss 17, 19, 21

Richard DuCann QC and Amarjit Singh (Amarjit Rubin & Partners) for the appellant

Lawrence Ang and Geraldine Pang (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the respondent.

Judgment reserved.

T S Sinnathuray J

1 The appellant, Tang Tuck Wah, was tried in the District Court on eight charges of criminal breach of trust in respect of various sums of money which had been entrusted to him in his capacity as the general secretary of the Automobile Association of Singapore (“AAS”) by one Lee Poh Choo at 336 River Valley Road, Singapore, offences punishable under s 408 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). The dates on which the various offences were alleged to have been committed and the sums in question are set out below:

First amended charge	February 1985	$ 2,300.00
Second amended charge	23 May 1985	$ 1,001.85
Third amended charge	23 May 1985	$ 1,159.20
Fourth amended charge	10 July 1985	$ 641.42
Fifth amended charge	24 July 1985	$ 659.20
Sixth amended charge	20 August 1985	$ 779.30
Seventh amended charge	August 1985	$ 1,000.00
Eighth amended charge	September 1985	$ 1,000.00
$ 8,540.97

2 At the conclusion of the trial the appellant was convicted by the learned district judge on all the eight amended charges. He was sentenced to one day's imprisonment in respect of each of the charges and fined a total of $15,500. Pursuant to s 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”), the learned district judge ordered that the sentences of imprisonment in respect of two charges, namely, DAC 1724/1986 and DAC 1725/1986 were to run consecutively, whilst the rest were to run concurrently.

3 The appellant being dissatisfied with the convictions has appealed against them, and the Public Prosecutor has appealed against the sentences imposed on the appellant.

Preliminary

4 Before the appeal proper commenced, counsel for the appellant, Mr DuCann QC, made two applications:

(a) leave to file a supplemental petition of appeal to raise additional grounds of appeal; and

(b) leave to adduce additional evidence under s 258 of the CPC, to give an account concerning a witness for the Defence who had been present in court during the prosecution case.

5 Igranted both the applications in the interests of justice, and shall deal with the latter matter in some detail later.

The prosecution case

6 The appellant was the general secretary of the AAS at the material time. As the general secretary, he reported to the general committee and he was effectively chief executive officer of the AAS. He was in charge of the day-to-day running of the affairs of the AAS.

7 At that time, Milton Tan Hong Moh (“Milton Tan”) was the president of the AAS. The other senior officers who figured at the trial were Jack Cheah Keong Hoe (“Cheah”), the recreation club manager, Jeremy Wong Teck Min (“Wong”), the accounts manager, and Betty Chan Yuen Toh (“Betty Chan”), the appellant's personal assistant.

8 The material facts of the prosecution case are these. Sometime in late 1984, the general committee decided to have a snack bar at the newly-constructed premises of the AAS at 336 River Valley Road. There was no dispute that it was the appellant who had recommended to the general committee that the AAS should run the snack bar. This was accepted by the general committee.

9 As instructed by the appellant, Wong drafted an advertisement which was published in The Straits Times on 12 December 1984 inviting tenders from prospective operators of the proposed snack bar. Sometime later, the appellant told Milton Tan that the advertisement drew only one written response from a restaurant operator and it was the only tender tabled for discussion by the general committee. However, according to Betty Chan, she received a number of replies through the post, and these had been forwarded to the appellant.

Evidence of Lee Poh Choo

10 When Lee Poh Choo saw the advertisement, she approached the appellant and negotiations began between them. The appellant agreed to rent out the snack bar to her and her sister and business partner, Lee Poh Poh, for the sum of $1,500 per month. This took place in early February 1985. As she was to start business that month, she negotiated to pay half the rental for February. The appellant agreed to it.

11 Lee Poh Choo...