Tan Yew Huat v Peh Loo Huat and another
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Chua Wei Yuan |
Judgment Date | 30 July 2018 |
Neutral Citation | [2018] SGMC 46 |
Court | Magistrates' Court (Singapore) |
Docket Number | MC/Magistrate’s Court Suit No 16394 of 2017 |
Published date | 12 July 2019 |
Year | 2018 |
Hearing Date | 10 May 2018,25 April 2018 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Doris Chia and Amos Wee (M/s David Lim and Partners LLP) |
Defendant Counsel | andToh Kok Seng and Daniel Chen (M/s Lee & Lee) |
Subject Matter | Tort,Defamation,Defamatory statement,Qualified privilege |
Citation | [2018] SGMC 46 |
This is a claim in slander by a subsidiary proprietor (“SP”) of a unit in a strata title development (“the Development”), arising from words said at an annual general meeting (“AGM”) of its management corporation (“MCST”). The first defendant is Mr Peh Loo Hock (“Mr Peh”). He is a shareholder-director of the second defendant, Landsfield Property Consultants Pte Ltd (“Landsfield”), which is the managing agent of the Development.
For the SPs familiar with the goings-on at the Development, it is no secret that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the way that the incumbent management committee (“MC”) had been operating, and with the way that Landsfield had been managing the Development and keeping its records. I will address this in detail at the relevant juncture below. For now, it suffices to say that the plaintiff apparently wished to be elected as a member of the next MC. The election was scheduled to take place at the 33
To this end, the plaintiff (through his assistant, Mr Yong Keng Chuyn) delivered to Landsfield’s office
On this same day, this Cheque (along with others) was brought by Mr Peh to the bank to be deposited. As the Cheque was unsigned, the bank’s counter staff returned it to Mr Peh, who then brought it back to his office. He says that it was only after he examined it in his office that he realised that the Cheque had been issued by the plaintiff.
At the AGM, Mr Peh was present as Landsfield’s representative. His duties included ensuring that the AGM was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the BMSMA. This entailed having to determine, before the voting commenced, which SPs had been nominated and were both eligible and willing to be elected as a member of the incoming MC. At this juncture, the plaintiff reminded Mr Peh of the nomination form he had tendered through Mr Yong. Upon receiving a fresh copy of the form, Mr Peh produced the Cheque, which he had brought to the AGM, as he said the following words (“the offending words”):1
Okay, ah, Mr Tan Yew Huat is
not , uh,qualified to be , uh – yes, take a look at his, uh, cheque. Mr Tan Yew Huat is the owner. He sent a cheque – you just look at it,what is missing ah . Ah, sorry ah, so the signature is missing ah.I don’t know what’s his intention lah, you know? Okay ah, okay ah. Sorry, it’s not that we don’t want him to come in. If the House would respect him, want him to come in, why not? But here, unfortunately, the cheque is blank. The – the bank call me up. Lucky he saved his $30.00. Otherwise you – the bank bank in it will charge him $30.00 for admin fee, okay? We went to the counter, they said cannot. Lucky. They hold it back.
The plaintiff took the view that Mr Peh had slandered him and, accordingly, he sued Mr Peh, as well as Landsfield, which he considered to be vicariously liable for the alleged slander.
My decisionBriefly, I dismiss the claim on the basis that the offending words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are not defamatory of the plaintiff and that, in any event, the offending words were made on an occasion of qualified privilege. My reasons follow.
Whether slander is establishedBoth parties accept that that the offending words were said, that they refer to the plaintiff and that they were published to some third parties. However, the defendant disputes the meaning of the words, the exact scope of persons to whom the offending words were published, and whether the slander is actionable without proof of special damage.
Defamatory meaning Essentially, the plaintiff ascribes five possible meanings to the offending words, namely, that:
The defendants deny this. They submit that, to the ordinary reasonable hearer, this sentence, understood in context (without being too analytical or literal in considering the word “intention”) meant simply that Mr Peh did not know why the plaintiff submitted an unsigned cheque.5 They say the offending words, in the context of the AGM, meant that the plaintiff had written a cheque to the MCST for the payment of his management and sinking fund contributions, that the cheque was not banked because it was unsigned, and that the plaintiff, being in arrears of those contributions, did not qualify for election as a MC member.
I broadly agree with the defendant. In my view, the sentence, heard in context, means only that Mr Peh did not know why the plaintiff had tried to stand for election as a MC member after having tendered an unsigned cheque, and that it does
A statement is defamatory if it tends to (i) lower the plaintiff in the esteem of right-thinking members of society generally; (ii) cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or (iii) expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule (
I will apply these principles to determine, from the perspective of a reasonably interested SP at the AGM, the meaning of the offending words and whether they are defamatory.
The most direct and literal meaning of the offending words, in particular the sentence “I don’t know what’s his intention lah, you know”, appears to be that Mr Peh did not know what the plaintiff’s intention was in acting the way that he did. Such a sentence presupposes that the plaintiff acted intentionally, and the words “you know” might have drawn attention to this. What constitutes the plaintiff’s conduct is not absolutely clear but, given that Mr Peh
This view is supported by the fact that Mr Peh...
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