Tan Yew Huat v Peh Loo Huat and another

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeChua Wei Yuan
Judgment Date30 July 2018
Neutral Citation[2018] SGMC 46
CourtMagistrates' Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberMC/Magistrate’s Court Suit No 16394 of 2017
Published date12 July 2019
Year2018
Hearing Date10 May 2018,25 April 2018
Plaintiff CounselDoris Chia and Amos Wee (M/s David Lim and Partners LLP)
Defendant CounselandToh Kok Seng and Daniel Chen (M/s Lee & Lee)
Subject MatterTort,Defamation,Defamatory statement,Qualified privilege
Citation[2018] SGMC 46
Magistrate Chua Wei Yuan: Facts

This is a claim in slander by a subsidiary proprietor (“SP”) of a unit in a strata title development (“the Development”), arising from words said at an annual general meeting (“AGM”) of its management corporation (“MCST”). The first defendant is Mr Peh Loo Hock (“Mr Peh”). He is a shareholder-director of the second defendant, Landsfield Property Consultants Pte Ltd (“Landsfield”), which is the managing agent of the Development.

For the SPs familiar with the goings-on at the Development, it is no secret that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the way that the incumbent management committee (“MC”) had been operating, and with the way that Landsfield had been managing the Development and keeping its records. I will address this in detail at the relevant juncture below. For now, it suffices to say that the plaintiff apparently wished to be elected as a member of the next MC. The election was scheduled to take place at the 33rd AGM of the Development on 31 July 2016.

To this end, the plaintiff (through his assistant, Mr Yong Keng Chuyn) delivered to Landsfield’s office (1) a form for the nomination of council members (which listed the plaintiff and five others as nominees), (2) six proxy forms, and (3) a cheque for the maintenance fees and sinking funds in respect of his lot for July and August 2016 (the “Cheque”). The Cheque, it seemed, was intended to ensure that the plaintiff would not be in arrears of contributions (and therefore be denied the right to stand for election). However, the Cheque was unsigned. It was also tendered too late: to be eligible for election, an SP of a lot (among other things) could not be in arrears of contributions or monies recoverable by the MC in respect of that lot on the third day before the date of election (ie, by 28 July 2016) (s 53(7) the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed) (“BMSMA”)). However, the Cheque was delivered only on 29 July 2016.

On this same day, this Cheque (along with others) was brought by Mr Peh to the bank to be deposited. As the Cheque was unsigned, the bank’s counter staff returned it to Mr Peh, who then brought it back to his office. He says that it was only after he examined it in his office that he realised that the Cheque had been issued by the plaintiff.

At the AGM, Mr Peh was present as Landsfield’s representative. His duties included ensuring that the AGM was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the BMSMA. This entailed having to determine, before the voting commenced, which SPs had been nominated and were both eligible and willing to be elected as a member of the incoming MC. At this juncture, the plaintiff reminded Mr Peh of the nomination form he had tendered through Mr Yong. Upon receiving a fresh copy of the form, Mr Peh produced the Cheque, which he had brought to the AGM, as he said the following words (“the offending words”):1

Okay, ah, Mr Tan Yew Huat is not, uh, qualified to be, uh – yes, take a look at his, uh, cheque. Mr Tan Yew Huat is the owner. He sent a cheque – you just look at it, what is missing ah. Ah, sorry ah, so the signature is missing ah. I don’t know what’s his intention lah, you know? Okay ah, okay ah. Sorry, it’s not that we don’t want him to come in. If the House would respect him, want him to come in, why not? But here, unfortunately, the cheque is blank. The – the bank call me up. Lucky he saved his $30.00. Otherwise you – the bank bank in it will charge him $30.00 for admin fee, okay? We went to the counter, they said cannot. Lucky. They hold it back.

It is undisputed that Mr Peh held the cheque up such that it was visible to those present at the AGM. Immediately after the phrase “what is missing ah”, a female voice can be heard in the background saying the word “signature”.2

The plaintiff took the view that Mr Peh had slandered him and, accordingly, he sued Mr Peh, as well as Landsfield, which he considered to be vicariously liable for the alleged slander.

My decision

Briefly, I dismiss the claim on the basis that the offending words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are not defamatory of the plaintiff and that, in any event, the offending words were made on an occasion of qualified privilege. My reasons follow.

Whether slander is established

Both parties accept that that the offending words were said, that they refer to the plaintiff and that they were published to some third parties. However, the defendant disputes the meaning of the words, the exact scope of persons to whom the offending words were published, and whether the slander is actionable without proof of special damage.

Defamatory meaning

Essentially, the plaintiff ascribes five possible meanings to the offending words, namely, that: the plaintiff had deliberately given an unsigned cheque to Landsfield, intending to dupe the other SPs and/or the MCST into allowing him to stand for election at the AGM and to be elected to the MC when he did not pay (or intend to pay) his outstanding maintenance fees and sinking fund; and the plaintiff is not qualified to be elected as a MC member because he: he, by not signing the cheque, was avoiding his debt obligations and therefore acting dishonestly; he, by failing to sign the cheque, should not be respected by the SPs or others present at the AGM; he, by writing a cheque and not signing it, was unable to conduct his banking and financial affairs in a proper manner; and he, by writing the MCST an unsigned cheque, was unable to pay his debts to the MCST and therefore not creditworthy. The plaintiff seems to take particular issue with the phrase “not qualified to be” and the sentence “I don’t know what’s his intention lah, you know”. According to him, they insinuated that he had deliberately, and with an unsavoury intention, left the cheque unsigned.3 Accordingly, the words bear the inferred meanings as pleaded. In particular, he also submitted that Mr Peh gave the impression that the plaintiff should not be respected or allowed to be part of the MC because he intentionally left the cheque unsigned: after questioning the plaintiff’s intentions, went on to talk about how the house could respect him and let him be part of the MC but that “unfortunately, the cheque [was] blank”.4

The defendants deny this. They submit that, to the ordinary reasonable hearer, this sentence, understood in context (without being too analytical or literal in considering the word “intention”) meant simply that Mr Peh did not know why the plaintiff submitted an unsigned cheque.5 They say the offending words, in the context of the AGM, meant that the plaintiff had written a cheque to the MCST for the payment of his management and sinking fund contributions, that the cheque was not banked because it was unsigned, and that the plaintiff, being in arrears of those contributions, did not qualify for election as a MC member.

I broadly agree with the defendant. In my view, the sentence, heard in context, means only that Mr Peh did not know why the plaintiff had tried to stand for election as a MC member after having tendered an unsigned cheque, and that it does not mean that the plaintiff submitted a cheque that was intentionally left unsigned. Neither does it bear any of the other meanings pleaded by the plaintiff.

A statement is defamatory if it tends to (i) lower the plaintiff in the esteem of right-thinking members of society generally; (ii) cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or (iii) expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule (Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1004Peter Lim (HC)” at [81]). For this purpose, the meaning of a statement is its “natural and ordinary meaning”, which is the meaning as conveyed to an ordinary reasonable person, who: is a fair-minded, average, rational layperson of ordinary intelligence (ie, neither brilliant nor foolhardy); takes note of the manner and circumstances of the publication; uses his experience, and his common sense and general knowledge which is relevant to the publication and in the public domain; is neither naïve nor unduly suspicious; not idiosyncratic in his behaviour or disposition; can read between the lines and draw inferences as a layperson would (in the light of his knowledge and experience of worldly affairs), and read in implications more readily than a lawyer and indulge in some loose thinking, but is not avid for scandal or overly cynical and would not select a defamatory meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available; and listens to the offending words in full (in other words, takes the bane with the antidote).

I will apply these principles to determine, from the perspective of a reasonably interested SP at the AGM, the meaning of the offending words and whether they are defamatory.

The most direct and literal meaning of the offending words, in particular the sentence “I don’t know what’s his intention lah, you know”, appears to be that Mr Peh did not know what the plaintiff’s intention was in acting the way that he did. Such a sentence presupposes that the plaintiff acted intentionally, and the words “you know” might have drawn attention to this. What constitutes the plaintiff’s conduct is not absolutely clear but, given that Mr Peh (i) had said the offending words immediately after the plaintiff asked to stand for election as a member of the incoming MC and (ii) had held up the unsigned cheque for those present to see, that conduct in my view would most naturally refer to the fact that the plaintiff nominated himself as a candidate in the MC elections after having tendered an unsigned cheque. If this sentence bears a rhetorical, sarcastic or suggestive quality, then the ordinary reasonable person would not have understood any such intention being referred to be a morally good, worthy or honourable one.

This view is supported by the fact that Mr Peh...

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