Tan Sia Boo v Ong Chiang Kwong

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Choo Han Teck J
• Judgment Date: 16 August 2007
• Neutral Citation: [2007] SGHC 131
• Docket Number: Suit No 485 of 2004 (Summons No 651
• Date: 16 August 2007
• Year: 2007
• Published date: 17 August 2007
• Plaintiff Counsel: Namasivayam Srinivasan (Hoh Law Corporation)
• Citation: [2007] SGHC 131
• Defendant Counsel: Madam Assomull, Vivian Chew and Chong En-Lai (Assomull & Partners)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether Ladd v Marshall principles applicable,Hearing before registrar akin to trial,Whether judge in chambers should allow further evidence,Tortfeasor seeking to adduce further evidence of surveillance conducted after registrar's hearing,Registrar's appeal on assessment of damages to judge in chambers,Appeals,Civil Procedure

16 August 2007

Choo Han Teck J:

1 The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for personal injuries suffered in a road accident. The plaintiff was standing on a road shoulder along the Pan Island Expressway on 13 August 2003 when a taxi driven by the defendant hit him. The defendant consented to interlocutory judgment and the parties proceeded to an inquiry into damages. That was heard before the Assistant Registrar Dorcas Quek (“AR Quek”) on 27 July 2006. The inquiry took four days, namely on 27 and 31 July 2006, and 4 and 12 September 2006. 12 witnesses were examined, including nine expert witnesses, two of which were for the defendant. The plaintiff was represented by Mr Srinivasan and the defendant was represented by Mr Fernandez. On 9 November 2006 AR Quek awarded damages at 65% of liability as follows:

A. General Damages

(a) Pain and Suffering

(i)	head injury	S$65,000.00
(ii)	injury to left knee	S$35,000.00
(iii)	lacerations	S$4,000.00	S$104,000.00

(b) Future Medical Expenses

(i)	manage of vertigo	S$500.00
(ii)	medication	S$9,600.00
(iii)	medical consultation	S$5,760.00	S$15,860.00
(c)	Earnings	S$540,000.00
(d)	Capacity	S$20,000.00
(e)	Earnings	S$102,000.00

B. Special Damages

(a)	Medical expenses	S$14,605.33
(b)	Transport expenses	S$479.85	S$15,085.18

Sub-Total (Damages at 100%) S$796,945.18

Damages at 65% S$518,014.36

C. Interest

(a) Interest on general damages for pain and suffering of S$67,600.00 at 6% per annum from the date of Writ of Summons to date of Judgment.

(b) Interest on pre-trial loss of earnings and special damages incurred before the date of Judgment of S$76,105.37 at 3% per annum from the date of accident to the date of Judgment.

D. Interim Payment

(a) Interim payment made till date in the sum of S$60,000.00 by the Defendant to be deducted from the total sum payable by the Defendant.

2 The defendant then changed solicitors and Mr Assomull took over as the defendant’s new lawyer on 21 November 2006. The plaintiff appealed on 22 November 2006 against the award of damages and the defendant cross-appealed on 23 November 2006. The defendant then employed a private investigator to keep surveillance on the plaintiff and a surveillance report covering four days in February 2007 and one day in March 2007 was recorded by the investigator. The record included video recordings of the plaintiff by the investigator. On 12 February 2007 the defendant applied by summons for leave to adduce the new evidence at the hearing of the appeals. I directed counsel to present written submissions on the question of whether leave ought to be given to the defendant to adduce the fresh evidence. This was done by Mr Srinivasan and Mr Assomull by 25 July 2007. I heard counsel on 26 July 2007. Mr Srinivasan had nothing further to add whereas Mr Assomull submitted that the plaintiff had refused to be further examined by the defendant’s medical experts. That was a legitimate refusal since the inquiry had ended and the court below had handed down its decision. The defendant was not entitled, in any event, to subject the plaintiff to any procedure without his consent or a court order. Mr Assomull also informed the court that the private investigators were instructed on 2 February 2007 after he had been instructed to take over from the defendant’s previous solicitors.

3 The defendant also sought to adduce fresh affidavits of the defendant’s medical experts containing their further comments after viewing the new surveillance video clip. He had also requested that the plaintiff to be examined by these doctors but the plaintiff had refused. The issue before me was whether I ought to grant leave for that evidence, namely the video clip of the surveillance, to be admitted. Mr Assomull cited Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (alias Toh Jeanette) [2004] 2 SLR 392 as the authority for the proposition that “the stringent principles of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 do not apply to Appeals from a Registrar’s Assessment of Damages”. Both counsel also referred to Ang Leng Hock v Leo Ee Ah [2004] 2 SLR 361. The basic principle there was emphasized by the Court of Appeal in WBG Network (S) Pte Ltd v Sunny Daisy Ltd [2007] SLR 1133. Generally, Ladd v Marshall may not be strictly applied in cases concerning appeals from a registrar’s decision. However, where the hearing before the registrar was akin to a trial in which witnesses are examined, the principles in Ladd v Marshall would more readily apply. In any event, as was stated in the cases cited above, the admission of such evidence is still at the court’s discretion. Mr Assomull’s main argument was that the evidence of the plaintiff’s physical condition as recorded by camera after the assessment inquiry was not available during the inquiry, and that the fresh evidence has probative value and would have affected the quantum of damages assessed. The claim that the fresh evidence was not available is not a straightforward point. It is obvious that a footage taken after the assessment could not be shown during the assessment proceedings, but video and other surveillance can be done before the proceedings for use during the proceedings. The pertinent point was whether the defendant ought to have even attempted to conduct surveillance after the proceedings have ended? The defendant would think it right that such evidence should now be admitted to show what he would regard as the true state of the plaintiff’s physical disability.

4 Rules and procedure are designed to facilitate the fair disposal of legal proceedings and every litigant is expected to comply with the rules. Finality is the specific aspect of fairness in issue. It is sometimes said that rules should not be followed “blindly”. I think it equally important that this aphorism is not cited “blindly”, that is to say, that the phrase is not cited merely to make a disregard of rules sound correct. It will be useful to remind ourselves why rules need to be obeyed. Procedural rules are designed to produce a fair result in litigation by making clear what the process is in legal proceedings. If rules are disregarded whenever one party says it is unfair or unjust to follow them, then, in effect, there will be no rules because anyone can make such a claim whenever a rule or result does not suit his purpose. Rules provide finality in the legal process. The public as well as the parties concerned will expect a point when proceedings must end. They will expect that when the rules have been complied with, the court will hand down its decision; and, subject to the rules relating to an appeal to a higher court,...