Lim Beng Choo v Tan Pau Soon

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Warren Khoo L H J
• Judgment Date: 17 July 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGHC 141
• Docket Number: Divorce Petition No 1848 of 1987
• Date: 17 July 1996
• Year: 1996
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Leong Chooi Peng (Leong & Co)
• Citation: [1996] SGHC 141
• Defendant Counsel: Chan Wai Mun (Low & Robert Yu)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Agreement by wife not to claim share of flat,s 106 Women's Charter (Cap 353),Matrimonial assets,No consideration for agreement,Change in circumstances since agreement made,Division,Court to apply principles Women's Charter,Application for leave to apply for division of proceeds of sale of matrimonial flat,Family Law,Whether agreement precluded court from intervening

Having considered the further arguments put before me, I think I can accede to the wife`s application for leave to apply for a division of the proceeds of sale of the flat in question, for the following reasons. I accept the wife`s evidence that she agreed in November 1987 not to claim a share of the flat as she was anxious to get out of a very unhappy marriage. The agreement to give up the share was not for any consideration, although it was one of a set of terms which the parties arrived at. It has not been suggested that any of these other terms provided a quid pro quo for the giving up of her share. Although the flat could not be sold at that time, it was, needless to say, of value. There is no doubt that the wife would have been entitled to some share by the fact of her contribution in terms of looking after the children, minding the home and helping in the husband`s business. The agreement to give up her share therefore did not give her what she was entitled to, and was for no consideration or no adequate consideration.

An agreement between the parties as to the division of matrimonial property does not oust the jurisdiction of the court under s 106 of the Women`s Charter. See Wee Ah Lian v Teo Siak Weng [1992] 1 SLR 688 at p 698D, per Karthigesu J. See Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601 per Lord Hailsham LC for the position in England. The court will apply the principles set out in that section when its intervention is sought.

So the position is that there has never been any judicial division of this matrimonial asset. There was only the agreement, which, as I said, does not prevent the court from going into the matter and applying the principles set out in s 106. Had the court been asked to intervene at any time after the entering into of the agreement, albeit entered into with advise of solicitors, I am quite certain it would not have sanctioned it without a good reason; if it was asked today to do so, I am even more certain that it would not do so, in view of the vastly changed circumstances of the parties, and the vastly increased value of the asset.

So I hold that the agreement, although it was referred to by the wife in 1992 without qualification when she was applying for an increase in the maintenance, does not prevent the court from considering anew the question of division. I take the view that under the terms of s 106, a court can entertain an application for the division of matrimonial assets within a reasonable time after the...