Tan Hin Leong v Lee Teck Im

• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 30 January 2001
• Neutral Citation: [2001] SGCA 7
• Court: Court of Three Judges (Singapore)
• Citation: [2001] SGCA 7
• Defendant Counsel: James Ponniah and CP Lee (CP Lee & Co)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 2001
• Plaintiff Counsel: Cheong Yuen Hee and Sum Chong Mun (CM Sum & Co)
• Subject Matter: If so, whether terminable by notice,Land,Whether licence contractual,Licences,Licence to occupy property,Whether licence terminable

(delivering the grounds of judgment of the court): This was an appeal from the decision of GP Selvam J, in which he held that the respondent, Lee Teck Im, has a contractual licence to occupy the property known as 4, Jalan Lada Puteh (`the property`) for the duration of her life, and that the appellant, Tan Hin Leong, who is the owner of the property, was not entitled to terminate her licence. [See [2000] 3 SLR 85.] We dismissed the appeal and now give our reasons.

Background

One Tan Choon Swee (`Tan`) was the father of the appellant. Tan had three `wives`, one of whom was the respondent. The respondent met Tan in 1954, when she was 21 years old. Their relationship blossomed and they began living together. Tan bought the property in 1962, and thereafter he and the respondent lived there. The respondent is now 67 years old. She is not the appellant`s mother.

In 1965, Tan bought a property known as 75, Ming Teck Park (`the Ming Teck Park property`) in the sole name of the respondent. This Ming Teck Park property was rented out after the purchase. Later, an undivided half share of that property was transferred to Tan, and the respondent and Tan became the owners of the Ming Teck Park property as tenants-in-common in equal shares.

In 1983, the property (No 4 Jalan Lada Puteh) was transferred by Tan to the appellant by way of gift, and a deed of gift dated 29 December 1983 was executed by Tan. It was intended to be a marriage gift from Tan to the appellant. Notwithstanding the transfer, Tan and the respondent continued to reside at the property. The appellant at that time was studying in the United States of America and apparently still resides there.

In 1987, two important transactions were effected which eventually gave rise to the present dispute. First, Tan transferred his half share in the Ming Teck Park property to one Madam Ang Ah Bak (`Madam Ang`), his other co-habitant and one of his `wives`. In consequence, the respondent and Madam Ang became the owners of the Ming Teck Park property as tenants-in-common. Thereafter, Madam Ang and her family moved into the Ming Teck Park property and resided there. Madam Ang was also not the appellant`s mother.

The second transaction was the execution of a deed made between the appellant and the respondent dated 5 December 1987 (`the deed`) at the instance of Tan. The deed stipulates the terms upon which the appellant would allow the respondent to remain in occupation of the property. As we shall discuss in a moment, the construction of this deed was the central issue in this appeal.

Tan died in 1988 and Madam Ang died in 1989. Upon Madam Ang`s death, one Tan Hin Teng (`Hin Teng`), the son of Tan and Madam Ang, inherited Madam Ang`s share in the Ming Teck Park property. Hin Teng and his family continued to reside at the Ming Teck Park property. This remained the position for some eight years. Then in 1996, the respondent applied to the High Court for an order that the Ming Teck Park property be sold and the proceeds of sale be divided equally between her and Hin Teng. The order was granted on 21 February 1997. Pursuant to the order the Ming Teck Park property was sold and the respondent received her share of the proceeds of sale which amounted to about $1.305m.

Apparently the sale of the Ming Teck Park property and the receipt of her share of the proceeds of sale by the respondent triggered the events that followed. The appellant took the view that with her share of the proceeds the respondent could afford to purchase, and should purchase, a house to stay in and should not continue to reside at his property. He therefore took steps to terminate the respondent`s occupation of the property. He consulted his solicitors and on his instructions they issued and served two notices to quit on the respondent, one on or about 28 December 1996 and the other on 18 June 1998. However, the respondent refused to vacate the property; she claimed that she was entitled to occupy the property for the duration of her life.

Proceedings below

Thereupon, the appellant initiated proceedings against her in OS 1466/98 which was later converted into a writ action. The appellant in his statement of claim did not assert that the respondent had breached any of the terms or covenants contained in the deed or any of her obligations thereunder. His case was that the respondent was a bare licensee, and the licence had been revoked by the notices to quit, and accordingly she had no right to remain on the property. By continuing to remain in occupation, she had become a trespasser. He sought an order that the respondent deliver up vacant possession of the property and for damages for trespass.

The respondent denied that she was a bare licensee. Her defence was that she was a contractual or equitable licensee. She relied on the deed and claimed that the deed entitled her to occupy the property until her death, as long as she did not breach any of the terms or covenants in it.

The judge held that the respondent`s right of occupation of the property was created by the deed which was a formal document executed by the parties, and that both of them had acted on the terms of the deed for more than ten years. There were reciprocal rights and obligations under the deed. The respondent provided consideration by forgoing her right to make any claim adverse to the interests, rights and title of the appellant; by undertaking to expend money to keep the property in good repair; and by undertaking to pay an annual rent of $12. The judge held that the deed gave to the respondent a contractual licence to occupy the property, but the licence was not for an indefinite and indeterminable period terminable with reasonable notice, because the deed defined the extent and character of her right of occupation. It also defined the circumstances under which her right of occupation could be terminated. Subject to those circumstances, the respondent had a contractual licence to occupy the property for the duration of her life. Therefore, the notices to quit had no effect and the respondent was entitled to remain in occupation of the property.

The appeal

Before us, Mr Cheong Yuen Hee for the appellant challenged the judge`s conclusion that the respondent had a contractual licence to occupy the property. He submitted that the appellant allowed the respondent to occupy the property purely out of goodwill and that what the respondent had was only a bare licence and a bare licence could be revoked at will.

The deed

Before we turn to the construction of the deed, it is necessary to say a word on the factual matrix in which the parties were when the deed was executed. Tan, while he was alive, and the respondent had all along been residing in the property since the purchase thereof in 1962. After Tan had transferred it to the appellant in 1983, he and the respondent continued to live there. It appeared to us that, so far as Tan was concerned, he probably still regarded the property very much as the home for both of them, although he had given it to the appellant. This was partly induced by the fact that at all material times the appellant and his family lived in the United States and did not require a place of abode in Singapore. Tan passed away in February 1988, but before that happened, he must have formed the intention of providing a permanent place of abode for the respondent, with whom he had cohabited for over 30 years. Of course, he was not unmindful of the fact that he had given the respondent an undivided half share of the Ming Teck Park property; but that property was occupied, and had been so occupied for some years, by his other co-habitant, Madam Ang and her children by Tan. It was obvious that he did not intend that the respondent should live with Madam Ang under one roof. A separate place of abode had to be provided for the respondent. It seemed to us that probably it was for this reason that in 1987 he caused and procured his son, the appellant, to execute the deed; and that was duly executed by the appellant in December 1987. At that time, Tan was not in good health. The appellant said that Tan was suffering from cancer. He...