Subramaniam s/o Marie v Superintendent, Selarang Park Drug Rehabilitation Centre

• Judgment Date: 15 January 1981
• Date: 15 January 1981
• Docket Number: Originating Motions Nos 67 to 69 of 1980
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Subramaniam s/o Marie and others

Plaintiff

and

Superintendent, Selarang Park Drug Rehabilitation Centre

Defendant

[1981] SGHC 3

Wee Chong Jin CJ

,

T Kulasekaram J

and

T S Sinnathuray J

Originating Motions Nos 67 to 69 of 1980

High Court

Administrative Law–Administrative discretion–Suspected drug addicts ordered for medical examination and detention for treatment and rehabilitation–Whether director of Central Narcotics Bureau acted fairly and in good faith in exercise of power–Whether court should interfere with director's decision–Sections 33 (1) and 33 (2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973)–Administrative Law–Habeas corpus–Suspected drug addicts ordered for medical examination and detention for treatment and rehabilitation–Whether director of Central Narcotics Bureau acted fairly and in good faith in exercise of power–Whether court should interfere with director's decision–Sections 33 (1) and 33 (2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973)–Words and Phrases–“Appears”–Meaning of–Section 33 (2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973)–Words and Phrases–“Result”–Meaning of–Section 33 (2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973)

Subramaniam (“the first applicant”) was suspected of being a drug addict and was arrested by the police. That same day, the director of the Central Narcotics Bureau caused the applicant to undergo a medical examination under s 33 (1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Act 5 of 1973) (“the Act”). The second and third applicants were drug supervisees. When they reported at the police station for their urine tests, they were also arrested and sent for medical examinations.

The director in exercise of his powers under s 33 (2) of the Act made orders that the applicants be admitted to the drug rehabilitation centre to undergo treatment and rehabilitation. The three applicants applied forhabeas corpus. The first complaint was that the director had no grounds to reasonably suspect that the applicant was a drug addict and that the other applicants had relapsed into consuming heroin. The second complaint was that the reports of the medical examination of the applicants did not contain sufficient facts on which it could have appeared to the director that it was necessary for the applicants to undergo treatment and rehabilitation at the drug rehabilitation centre.

Held, dismissing the applications:

(1) The court could not undertake an investigation as to the sufficiency of the material which made the director “reasonably suspect” the applicant. Once the director made an order requiring a person, whom he reasonably suspected to be a drug addict, to be medically examined, the only question left was whether the director had exercised his power under s 33 (1) of the Act in good faith: at [14].

(2) In construing s 33 (2) of the Act, the key word in the subsection that had to be construed was “result”. The rule of construction was that words in a statute had to be given their ordinary and natural meaning. On a plain reading of s 33 (2), the meaning of “result” was the effect or outcome of the medical examination or observation, or, in the case of a urine test, its effect or outcome. The Legislature had not required of the government medical officer or a scientific officer of the Department of Scientific Services to furnish the director with detailed facts and analysis of his examination, observation or test. If that had been the intention of the Legislature, it would not have used the clear and precise word “result” in the subsection: at [18] and [19].

(3) In the absence of any other finding before the director, he was entitled to accept the result of the medical examinations. As a layman, the director was entitled to be guided by the findings of medical and scientific facts, the sufficiency of which was a matter only for him: at [20].

(4) The word “appears” in the s 33 (2) was obviously there for the purpose of making the director the sole judge on the question whether it was necessary for any person to undergo treatment and rehabilitation at an approved institution. As long as the director acted fairly, in good faith and followed properly the procedure set out in...