Structures, shocks and norm change: explaining the late rise of Asia's defence diplomacy.

• Author: Capie, David

Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy is an increasingly important aspect of regional politics and a burgeoning area of interest for scholarship. The creation of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in May 2006 and the arrival of the ADMM-Plus process in October 2010 has seen the establishment of a major new stream of regional dialogue and diplomacy. These arrangements also have a track two multilateral partner--the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutes (NADI), a parallel arrangement to the long-running and influential ASEAN-ISIS. (1)

These processes are increasingly attracting interest from analysts, although the body of work remains comparatively small alongside the attention lavished on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2012 a special issue of the journal Asian Security examined Southeast Asia's defence diplomacy, including China's activities in the region and the contribution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). (2) Scholars have asked whether there is a "Southeast Asian model" of defence cooperation that might be emulated or referenced by others. (3) The origins and function of the SLD have been the subject of close academic scrutiny, (4) and there is a growing body of research looking at bilateral defence diplomacy (5) and the connection between bilateral and multilateral arrangements. (6)

To date, however, most of this work has been more concerned with describing the evolution of defence diplomacy in the region, its origins and purpose than it has been with considering recent developments in the context of theoretical debates. (7) This article seeks to build on the existing literature by outlining some ways in which Asia's defence diplomacy can inform and challenge contemporary debates in international relations theory. (8) In particular, it looks at the rise of multilateral defence diplomacy against the backdrop of the scholarship concerning norm change and institutional innovation. At its heart are two questions: why was multilateral defence diplomacy so late to arrive in Asia, and what explains its rapid rise?

The article is divided into three parts. The first section briefly defines defence diplomacy and outlines the general trajectory of East Asia's defence and military diplomacy in recent decades. The second part explores why defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. I argue that explanations that stress the "catalytic role" of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats (for example, the rise of China) are underdetermining. Rather, the explanation advanced here focuses on agents and changing norms around multilateral defence cooperation. Using the lens of constitutive localization, I argue that the institutional innovation that has occurred since 2006 reflects a strategic calculation on the part of ASEAN elites, who adopted and adapted ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has been helped by the changing role of militaries in some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article offers a brief assessment of the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy.

Defining Defence Diplomacy

Defence diplomacy is a relatively new arrival in the lexicon of Asia-Pacific security. One study of the vocabulary of regional security published in 2008 includes numerous terms for diplomacy and engagement but notably omits defence or military diplomacy. (9) What then does defence diplomacy mean in Asia? Like many expressions in the security studies lexicon, the origin and meaning of the term are contested.

Anthony Forster describes military and defence diplomacy as "the non-operational use of the armed forces by the government in order to pursue foreign and defence policy objectives". (10) Although the idea that the armed forces have a role beyond the direct use of violence is not new, as a distinct concept, defence or military diplomacy seems to have grown in prominence in the last decade. (11) According to Stephen Blank, the idea emerged in post-Cold War Europe. The belief was that by "establishing relationships of trust and mutual confidence among former rival militaries, confidence could be built, generalized standards could be achieved with regard to the interoperability of militaries and a broader democratization of civil-military relations could take part in what was once the Soviet Bloc". (12)

As a particular policy position, defence diplomacy's origins are often traced to the 1998 British Strategic Defence Review. Britain's Ministry of Defence described the concept as involving the use of military forces "to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution." It said "we require armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and development levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict". (13)

The British approach included three broad sets of activities: arms control, non-proliferation policies, and confidence and security building measures; instruments that were designed to encourage stability, particularly in Russia, through bilateral assistance and cooperation programmes; as well as other assistance programmes aimed at relationships beyond Europe. (14) Within these broad areas, education and training programmes were regarded as particularly important, along with the use of ship and aircraft visits, short-term advisory teams, as well as visits and interactions between ministers, and military and civilian personnel at all levels. According to one analyst, "the philosophy underpinning British defence diplomacy is a cosmopolitan liberal vision of the promotion of western principles and values". The assumption is that through "intensive and sustained military engagement [...] shared knowledge and mutual trust will over a period of time enhance peace and stability". (15)

Not long after the British Review was released, a number of states in the Asia Pacific began to use the concept in their own national security policies. After decades in which regional states had preferred to use the term "defence cooperation", the phrase "defence diplomacy" suddenly became commonplace. In a 2006 statement to Singapore's Parliament, Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean said the objectives of Singapore's defence diplomacy were "to develop positive and mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed forces, [and] to contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment and international order". (16) The New Zealand Defence Force embraced the term, likening defence diplomacy to preventive diplomacy, and describing it as "all the varied activities undertaken ... to promote peace and security through constructive engagement and confidence building. Its aim is to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust". (17)

In her analysis of China's "military diplomacy", Kristen Gunness argues that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is "expected to support the larger foreign, diplomatic, political, economic and security agenda set forth by the leadership of the Party/State". PLA interactions with foreign militaries are seen as a "political undertaking using military means for strategic reasons, not as a freestanding set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons". (18) In terms of specific activities, Gunness lists "high-level strategic security dialogues, military functional exchanges, professional military education exchanges, the import and export of military weapons and equipment, and participation in peacekeeping operations". (19)

Looking at India's defence diplomacy, Saroj Bishoyi stresses the role of education and training "in areas such as defence management, civil-military relations and military justice" as well as a "wide range of military-to-military contacts with other states; foreign military financing in the form of grants and loans; joint combined exchange training of special forces; [and] military sales". (20) Pankaj Jha emphasizes the importance of India's military exercises with countries in Southeast Asia as an assurance strategy, sending a signal of its "benign" intentions. (21)

Clearly then, Asian states quickly picked up on the language of defence diplomacy. However, they did not embrace it without reservations. The British approach was grounded in a set of broader goals around the promotion of democratic civil-military relations. In the 1999 UK Defence White Paper, defence diplomacy was included in a chapter called "Building a better world" associating it with the aims of the so-called "ethical foreign policy". (22) After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, counter WMD proliferation efforts also became an important element of Western defence diplomacy. (23) The East Asian use of the term is, however, much more limited, focusing primarily on building trust and eschewing any role in the internal affairs of participant states. It has none of liberal trappings that elevate the importance of promoting democratic control of armed forces. Tan and Singh have framed this as a distinction between "transformational" European and more "pragmatic" Asian diplomacy, but the same process could also be described as the localization of an imported concept, much in the way that ASEAN has borrowed and adapted earlier European ideas such as common security. (24) East Asian states "pruned" away the aspects of the practice that they found...