Southeast Asia and China: balancing or bandwagoning?

• Author: Roy, Denny

Introduction

There is little doubt that China is rising to a level of unmatched prominence in the Asia-Pacific region. How other states in the region are reacting to the growth of Chinese power, however, is a matter of some debate. (1) In theory, two of the common responses of smaller states in the shadow of a potentially dominant or threatening power are balancing and bandwagoning. Some observers see a pattern of bandwagoning with China (Kang 2003, p. 58). Others believe the stronger tendency is for Asian states to balance against China (Acharya 2003, pp. 150-52). For students of Southeast Asian politics, this is an important question with huge consequences for the future of international relations in the region. This article will explore this question, arguing that, while hedging and engagement are the principal Southeast Asian strategies toward China, the hedging involves a significant component of what may be termed "low-intensity balancing" with the United States against China along with efforts to maintain a working relationship with Beijing.

Terms of Analysis

The range of policy choices for small and medium-sized states facing a potential regional hegemon is broader than balancing and bandwagoning (Schweller 1999, pp. 7-16). Southeast Asian states in fact employ a mix of elements from four strategies. One of these strategies, the most general, is hedging, which means keeping open more than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security threat. A second strategy is engagement, whereby a state uses inclusion and rewards to attempt to socialize a dissatisfied power into accepting the rules and institutions of the pre-existing international order.

Balancing and bandwagoning are the remaining two strategies. A state balances against a perceived potential adversary either internally, by shifting resource allocations to strengthen its defensive capability, or externally, by cooperating with another state that fears the same potential adversary. (This article will focus on external balancing.) Balancing may involve different levels of intensity. In the case of low-intensity balancing, the balancing state attempts to maintain a constructive relationship with the targeted state, in the case of high-intensity balancing, the relationship between the balancing state and the targeted state is more openly adverserial, and many forms of cooperation between them are precluded by political tensions.

It is important to clarify the relationship between hedging and balancing. This writer has classed both hedging and balancing as strategies against hegemonic domination, but hedging is a general strategy that may or may not include balancing. Balancing is one but not the only strategy a government may employ to keep open a future strategic option. Similarly, some balancing, but not all, is motivated by a desire to keep open a future option in case it is needed. Hedging implies a present condition of strategic uncertainty. Balancing is sometimes the response, for example, to a certain and compelling threat, in which case hedging is not involved.

"Bandwagoning" has at least two distinct definitions in the international relations literature. The first is aligning with a threatening country to avoid being attacked by it (Walt 1987, p. 17). The second understanding of bandwagoning is "being on the winning side" in the hope of realizing economic gains (Schweller 1994, pp. 72-107).

An assessment of whether or not Southeast Asian states are bandwagoning with China essentially hangs on which of these two definitions is employed. Under the first definition of aligning with a threatening state to avoid being attacked, no states in Southeast Asia are bandwagoning with China. The conditions implied by this interpretation of bandwagoning are simply not present. China is not behaving aggressively toward any states in Southeast Asia; quite the contrary, Beijing's recent diplomacy aims to reduce tensions with China's neighbours, inspire confidence that China upholds the values of peaceful negotiation, multilateralism, and respect for sovereignty that ASEAN extols, and convince Asia that "China will never seek hegemony", as Chinese leaders have proclaimed on countless occasions (Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Shambaugh 20(/4/05). Even the South China Sea front is relatively calm, and in any case this issue has never generated bandwagoning with the PRC.

The second definition of bandwagoning as "being on the winning side" would seem to include any case of a state making an effort to establish or maintain a favourable relationship with a strong country out of respect for the latter's power and influence, in the hope that this relationship will open the door to future economic opportunities. By this definition, all the countries of Southeast Asia are bandwagoning with China to some degree. The entire region recognizes that China is an increasingly important political player and the potential economic powerhouse of Asia, and every government prefers to avoid the opportunity costs of antagonizing Beijing if possible.

This second interpretation of bandwagoning as profit-seeking is broad and divorced from security considerations, allowing for bandwagoning to be equated with economic cooperation. David Kang takes this approach, citing economic ties as the main evidence to support his contention that Asian countries are bandwagoning with China (Kang 2003, pp. 58, 69, 80, 81). The weakness of this definition of bandwagoning hereby becomes apparent: it says nothing about political alignment or security considerations, unlike the first definition. Economic cooperation is not predicated upon political alignment with China (Acharya 2003, p. 152). Indeed, a strong trading relationship may exist amidst significant bilateral political tensions, and will not necessarily prevent the outbreak of military conflict. Trade and investment may even be a strategy for undermining or, in the extreme case, facilitating the overthrow of a hostile government. Used in this sense, bandwagoning becomes a synonym for economic engagement and loses the relevance in a strategic analysis that the notion of bandwagoning-for-survival retains.

Region-wide Tendencies

Each state in Southeast Asia has unique characteristics that bear on its policy toward China. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few generalizations about the region as a whole. The principal foreign policy of Southeast Asian states is to preserve their autonomy and sovereignty. They seek to keep larger outside countries from using their relative military strength or political influence to dominate regional affairs or to undermine the freedom of action of the region's individual states. This fundamental goal is comparable in importance with the desires for peace and prosperity (Chung 2004, p. 35). The key ASEAN documents, including the Bangkok Declaration of August 1967, the November 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN), and the February 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), are replete with denunciations of interference in the region by external powers. (2)

Southeast Asia has particular fears of China stemming from geography and historical experience. China's sheer size and proximity. the longevity of Chinese civilization, the tributary relationship of antiquity, and the presence of disproportionately wealthy ethnic Chinese communities have all contributed to fears of-China dominating the region. The PRC's economic development and military modernization raise the possibility that for the first time in the modern era, China will soon have the wherewithal to impose its agenda upon the region. Some Southeast Asian observers see in Beijing's threat to use force against Taiwan a harbinger of how China may deal with future disputes involving Southeast Asian states. The region took note of China's disturbing show of force aimed at Taiwan in 1995-96. More recently, Hu Jintao's expansion of the Central Military Commission to 11 members, including the chiefs of the PLA Navy and Air Force, suggested to some analysts that power projection will be a more prominent feature of future Chinese military planning (Montaperto 2004, pp. 79-80).

The Chinese recognize these fears and have tried to address them. Beijing began publishing Defence White Papers in response to criticism that the PRC military lacked transparency. In November 2004 China served as host of the ARF Security Policy Conference for the first time, illustrating how China has moved from suspicion about multilateralism to a willingness to discuss even high politics issues multilaterally.

Even more important in this regard has been China's recent approach to the dispute between Beijing and several other Asian governments over ownership of islands and other island-like features in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian observers have seen this dispute as a litmus test for a newly-strong China's relations with its smaller neighbours--whether China would use its formidable military power to attempt to intimidate the other claimants, or settle the matter peacefully through good-faith negotiations. The 1995 Mischief Reef incident did much to heighten the sensitivity and significance of the South China Sea dispute. In early 1995, the Philippines discovered China had built military structures on Mischief Reef, one of the Spratly Islands over which Manila claims ownership. During the March 1995 China-ASEAN meeting, the ASEAN countries united in their opposition to China's Mischief Reef actions. Alarmed by ASEAN's hardening attitude, Beijing soon announced that China would thenceforth base its South China Sea claims on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since 1998 Beijing's actions evince a shift for the time being to a minimalist strategy of maintaining the Chinese claim while avoiding further provocation over the issue. China won substantial favour from ASEAN by signing the...