Students, soldiers, sports, sheep and the silver-screen: New Zealand's soft power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia.

• Author: Butcher, Andrew
• Position: Essay

Joseph Nye defines soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment ... [arising] from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies". (2) In listing the social indices of America's "soft power" Nye notes, inter alia, the following variables: immigration (specifically, the ability to attract immigrants), film and television, and foreign students. (3) If we were to apply those same indices to New Zealand--a country that is in almost no way comparable to the United States except that it is an English-speaking democracy--we would note the following three factors. First, New Zealand has one of the highest permanent inflows of migrants per capita among countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (4) Second, the New Zealand rate of ten international students per 100 persons aged 20-24 in 2008 was second only to Australia across the OECD (5) and, within the OECD, New Zealand is the eighth largest recipient of international students overall. (6) Third, New Zealand's film industry is undergoing rapid growth and in 2011 grossed NZ$3 billion (US$2.4 billion). (7)

New Zealand has numerous attributes which might enhance its soft power efforts in Southeast Asia, but these attributes do not become soft power qualities or assets just by virtue of their existence. In an era in which both New Zealand's military capabilities and diplomatic presence are being reduced due to budget cuts, soft power becomes all the more important. And it becomes especially important in Southeast Asia. New Zealand's economic security is contingent on the safety of the sea lanes which pass through Southeast Asia, and strategically New Zealand relies on a stable region and a strong ASEAN.

This article is concerned with both Southeast Asia and ASEAN. New Zealand's bilateral relationships with Southeast Asian countries predate its relationship with (and the existence of) ASEAN. Moreover, New Zealand's relationships with Southeast Asian countries differ from one country to the next (economically, militarily and historically) and from its engagement with ASEAN as an institution. Both the multilateral/institutional engagement with ASEAN and the bilateral engagement with Southeast Asian countries are important in their own right. Sometimes this engagement is distinct; other times New Zealand may use its bilateral engagement to influence its institutional engagement with ASEAN.

Quantifying soft power is problematic. The number of international viewers of the Rugby World Cup and foreign students, the value of exported goods and services, the impact of the film industry all tell us something about the individual strengths of these particular soft power assets, but they do not tell us their combined strength or their long-term effects.

By contrast, quantifying hard power is relatively easier. This article begins by briefly noting New Zealand's "small ... but strong" hard power capabilities. Given New Zealand's limited hard power, soft power takes on added importance. Soft power can be aspirational, expressed in New Zealand's national anthem; contextual, in relation to New Zealand's nearest neighbour, Australia; perceived, by New Zealand's allies in Asia; and cultural, through demographic shifts and migration to and from Asia. Soft power can be important for particular contexts and the focus in this article is on Southeast Asia. After a discussion of New Zealand's engagement with Southeast Asia, especially economic engagement, this author goes on to argue why Southeast Asia is important to New Zealand. The final section discusses five of the soft power assets that New Zealand possesses and utilizes in its soft power engagement with Southeast Asia, namely students (international education), soldiers (defence ties), sports, sheep (and what they signify in New Zealand's narrative) and the silver screen (film-making).

Each of these five attributes will draw on different audiences. Sports and the silver screen contribute to a narrative about New Zealand that is aimed at wide appeal: not only rugby players watch rugby and not only fans of Tolkein watch Lord of the Rings. Those who were educated in New Zealand under the Colombo Plan are of a certain (and older) generation. Their children's views of New Zealand will be shaped very differently. Similarly, those who recall fondly New Zealand's military engagement in Southeast Asia are more likely to be older members of the elite. It matters less who is drawn to New Zealand's multifaceted soft power and rather more how it is used to best effect. The Colombo Plan might have generated good experiences of New Zealand for its students but can soft power really have been said to be effective when one of those students can say "[t]he New Zealand training was wonderful" and yet also "[f]unningly enough, I haven't been back to New Zealand"? (8) Nostalgia should not be confused for soft power. Yet there are other graduates of the Colombo Plan, as there are others who watch rugby, the silver-screen, visit New Zealand and recognize its military contribution to Southeast Asia, who do respond with something more than epithets and bouquets. Where those others are among the elite then New Zealand may find doors open where otherwise they would be closed. Where those others are the mainstream then New Zealand can shape public, as well as elite, opinion about itself and its place in the world.

However, data on how New Zealand's soft power in Asia is received is hard to come by. It does not feature at all in the Chicago Council of Global Affairs 2008 Multinational Survey, (9) or in the Pew Global Attitudes Project. This might tell us, negatively, that New Zealand's soft power is so soft it is barely felt; or that New Zealand is so small it is hardly noticed, except by New Zealand's neighbour Australia which, according to polling by the Lowy Institute, likes it much more than it likes many other countries in Asia. (10)

Small ... but Strong: New Zealand's "Hard Power"

New Zealand's hard power, at least in the form of military capabilities, is very small indeed. This is illustrated best by the entry for New Zealand in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 2011 The Military Balance. Compared to pages and pages of data and narrative for most other countries, New Zealand is given just one page. In 2011, New Zealand spent a mere $2.14 billion on defence. (11) The sole paragraph devoted to New Zealand's armed forces has a whiff of "damned with faint praise".

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is small, but it draws on a strong national military tradition. New Zealand forces have been involved in almost every conflict in which the country's larger allies have been involved over the last century, and forces remain deployed overseas. Despite funding shortfalls and capability losses including the withdrawal from service of jet combat aircraft a decade ago, the NZDF is characterised by high training standards, professionalism and morale. The November 2010 Defence White Paper promised to maintain and enhance existing capabilities, and to provide some additional elements (such as short-range maritime air patrol). However, there were no promises of any significant increase to the defence budget. (12) In 2011, New Zealand military personnel were deployed in seven theatres (all of which, except Egypt, were under the banner of the United Nations): Afghanistan (188 as part of the International Security Assistance Force and one observer with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan); Egypt (28 as part of the Multinational Force and Observers, one training unit, one transport unit); Iraq (one observer as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq); the Middle East, which The Military Balance notes separately but does not further define (seven observers as part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization); the Solomon Islands (five personnel as part of Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands); South Sudan (one personnel and two observers as part of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan); and Timor-Leste (80 personnel as part of the International Stabilisation Force, one infantry company and one observer with the United Nations Integrated Missions in Timor-Leste). (13) However, as can be seen, these troops were relatively modest in number.

Outside of military expenditure, hard power takes on other forms: the size of a country's population and economy, its natural resources, military expenditure, social stability, (14) membership of international forums and organizations, the global profile of its political leaders, the historical role that a country has played, and so on. Countries that have extensive hard power assets can use them to apply coercive military pressure or as economic leverage. (15) New Zealand, however, does not have the military power to threaten other countries nor apply economic sanctions, with the possible exception of a small country like Fiji. Indeed, almost by definition, New Zealand has to use soft power to achieve its ends: it is all it has at its disposal. Yet, as explained below, even New Zealand's hard power, such as it is, may be best understood as a soft power tool.

Economic links may also be considered as part of New Zealand's soft power engagement, though clearly they can also form an important part of hard power. The strongest economies in the world, America and China, can use their economic strength as leverage in asserting their interests. However, New Zealand's economy is by no measure one of the strongest in the world. It is not, and will never be a member of the Group of 20, is heavily reliant upon its external markets and is highly vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks. New Zealand holds virtually no economic leverage over its major trading partners. Therefore, part of New Zealand's tightening and deepening web...