Soh Lay Lian Cherlyn v Kok Mui Eng

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Siu Chiu SJ
• Judgment Date: 27 July 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] SGHC 196
• Plaintiff Counsel: Quek Seng Soon Winston (Winston Quek & Company),Patrick Yeo and Lim Hui Ying (Khattarwong LLP)
• Docket Number: District Court Appeal No 55 of 2014
• Date: 27 July 2015
• Hearing Date: 04 March 2015
• Subject Matter: Tort,Res judicata,Issue estoppel,Contributory negligence,Negligence
• Year: 2015
• Citation: [2015] SGHC 196
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 06 August 2015

Lai Siu Chiu SJ:

This was an appeal from the decision of a District Court (“the DC”) in a personal injuries claim arising from a traffic accident that took place on 5 February 2010 (“the Accident”) involving motor vehicles driven by Kok Mui Eng (“the Plaintiff”) and Cherlyn Soh Lay Lian (“the Defendant”). At the conclusion of the trial on 16 September 2014, the court below awarded interlocutory judgment to the Plaintiff at 10% of the damages to be assessed.

The Defendant appealed against the decision of the DC by way of District Court Appeal No 55 of 2014 (“the Appeal”). The Appeal came on for hearing before this court. After hearing the parties, I allowed the Appeal and reversed the decision of the court below. I dismissed the claim of the Plaintiff with costs here and below. As the decision of this court is at odds with another decision of the High Court in Jaidin bin Jaiman v Loganathan a/l Karpaya and another [2013] 1 SLR 318 (“Jaidin’s case”), I now set out the grounds for my decision.

The facts

The Accident occurred at about 12.15pm–12.25pm at the traffic light controlled junction of Havelock Road, Clemenceau Avenue and Upper Cross Street (“the Junction”). The Plaintiff was then at the wheel of vehicle no SFU9453K (“the Plaintiff’s vehicle”) while the Defendant was driving vehicle no SJT5369E (“the Defendant’s vehicle”). When the green turning arrow came on in the Defendant’s favour, the Defendant’s vehicle made a right turn from Upper Cross Street into Clemenceau Avenue. At the same time, the Plaintiff’s car coming from Havelock Road in the opposite direction (travelling in the extreme left lane) crossed the Junction with the result that the Defendant’s vehicle collided into the Plaintiff’s car on its right side.

On 5 January 2011, the Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a charge of inconsiderate driving under s 65(a) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“the RTA”) and was fined $800.00 as well as disqualified from driving for two months.

On 21 March 2011, the Defendant commenced Suit No 189 of 2011 (“the Defendant’s suit”) against the Plaintiff claiming damages for personal injuries and loss arising out of the Accident. Following negotiations between the parties’ motor insurers (who had conduct of the Defendant’s suit), the proceedings were settled between the parties on the basis of 90%-10% liability on the part of the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively. On 14 February 2012, consent interlocutory judgment (“the Consent Judgment”) was entered in favour of the Defendant on the basis of the Plaintiff bearing 90% liability for the Accident. On 1 July 2013, the Defendant obtained final judgment against the Plaintiff by consent in the global sum of $82,000; there was no apportionment of liability for the Accident in the final judgment.

On 31 August 2012, the Plaintiff commenced DC Suit No 2484 of 2012 (“the Plaintiff’s suit”) against the Defendant seeking compensation for injuries sustained by the Plaintiff arising out of the Accident. The Plaintiff did not, in her statement of claim refer to the Consent Judgment.

The Plaintiff’s suit was bifurcated and trial on liability took place on 26 June 2014. At the conclusion of the trial, the district judge felt he was bound by the High Court’s decision in Jaidin’s case. He opined that the Consent Judgment in the Defendant’s suit operated to bind the Defendant (as the Plaintiff had submitted) and the Defendant was therefore held to be 10% liable for the Accident.

The issues

The issues this court had to determine at the Appeal hearing were: whether the principles in Jaidin’s case apply to the Plaintiff’s suit; whether res judicata (as the court below held) precludes the Defendant from denying she was 10% liable for the Accident.

Counsel for the Defendant had submitted to this court that: Jaidin’s case was wrongly decided; Jaidin’s case was distinguishable from the facts of this case; and if res judicata was indeed to apply, then the Plaintiff’s claim should no longer be sustainable once final judgment had been entered in the Defendant’s suit.

Jaidin’s case

At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to Jaidin’s case. In that case, the plaintiff was a pillion rider on a motorcycle which collided with a car. Both the motorcyclist and pillion rider were injured. The pillion rider claimed damages from both the motorcyclist and the driver for injuries sustained from the accident. However, the motorcyclist had earlier filed a claim against the driver in the District Court in respect of the same accident; that claim proceeded for court dispute resolution where the settlement judge indicated preliminary liability apportionment to be 80% as against the driver. The issue in Jaidin’s case, therefore, was whether the consent judgment between the driver and motorcyclist was res judicata or whether apportionment could be determined afresh. At [4], the High Court held:

The relevant principle of res judicata in this suit is issue estoppel … In Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v MSCT Plan No 301 [2005] 3 SLR (R) 157 (“Lee Tat”) at [14]–[15], the Court of Appeal held that the following requirements are necessary to establish issue estoppel: (a) there must be a final and conclusive judgment on the merits; (b) the judgment must be by a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) there must be identity between the parties to the two actions that are being compared; and (d) there must be an identity of the subject matter in the two proceedings.

As stated earlier at [7], the court below held it was bound by the decision in Jaidin’s case and awarded judgment at 10% liability in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant, on the basis res judicata applied to preclude the Defendant from raising any fresh defences to defeat the Plaintiff’s suit. As stated at [2], this court declined to follow Jaidin’s case. This is because two of the four requirements in Lee Tat to found issue estoppel were missing—there was neither a final and conclusive judgment on the merits nor identity of parties. The pillion-rider/plaintiff in Jaidin’s case was not involved in, and was not a party to, the suit or the settlement agreement between the motorcyclist and the car driver.

The court in Jaidin’s case had failed to give due regard to the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2009] 1 SLR(R) 875 on what constitutes issue estoppel. The appellate court there said (at [82]);

… It must be remembered that the doctrine of issue estoppel is predicated upon (inter alia) the basis that the issue which is said to be the subject matter of the estoppel has been decided on the merits. To hold that issue...