Single party dominance in Sarawak and the prospects for change.

• Author: Woon, Wilson
• Position: Report

Malaysia, an exemplar of single party dominance, experienced a major change in political hegemony at the 2008 General Elections. The incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) government was returned to power but without a two-thirds majority in parliament. It also lost administrative control of five states. Since then much has been said about the 2008 elections. William Case, for instance, after considering the BN's lack of ruling legitimacy and conformation to procedures, concludes that the electorate voted in concerted protest, (1) which resulted in an electoral setback dubbed by some commentators as a "political tsunami". Using quantitative analytical tools to analyse the factors underlying the elections results, Thomas Pepinsky views the results as a "landmark" event. (2) Andreas Ufen echoes this view, declaring the elections to be a "watershed" event in Malaysia's history. (3) Meredith Weiss attributes the outcome of the "political tsunami" to the roles played by civil society activists. (4) These analyses have, to a large extent, given the impression that democratic change has affected the whole of Malaysia. Within the state of Sarawak, however, single party dominance remains intact.

The most recent electoral contest in Malaysia in 2011, which was confined to the state of Sarawak, was held with high anticipation of change. The man at the centre of attention, Chief Minister Taib Mahmud, had been accused of corruption, nepotism, cronyism and mismanaging the state's resources. Against a strong and united opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), which comprises Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS), the election posed a challenge to the incumbent government. Even though a majority of the electorate voted in favour of the BN, there are signs that a political transition is at hand.

This paper focuses its discussion on single party dominance in Sarawak. It provides a detailed analysis of how the BN regime maintains firm control over the state apparatus and examines the factors that may contribute to its downfall. Specifically, it identifies the revolt of urban voters, the emergence of a strong opposition coalition and the absence of a suitable successor to Chief Minister Taib Mahmud as possible factors that may result in a transition from single party dominance.

Sarawak in Turbulent Times

Located on the island of Borneo in East Malaysia, Sarawak is the largest state in the country. Slightly more than half of its 2.5 million people live in major cities such as Kuching, Miri, Sibu and Bintulu. Kuching, the administrative capital, has the largest population of approximately 600,000, followed by Miri (281,300), Sibu (257,800) and Bintulu (199,900). (5) These cities are mainly populated by Chinese-Malaysians. Unlike Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak is rather unique because none of its twenty-seven ethnic groups form a majority. The main ethnic groups include Iban (28.9 per cent), Chinese (23.4 per cent), Malay (23 per cent), Bidayuh (8 per cent) and Melanau (5 per cent). The non-Muslim indigenous groups are collectively known as Dayaks. The two biggest ethnic groups within the Dayak community are the Ibans and Bidayuhs. While the majority of the population are Christians, the state is also home to large numbers of Muslims and Buddhists.

Prior to its entry into Malaysia in 1963, Sarawak was an independent state under British control. As the British considered the future of the state, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, suggested the creation of the Federation of Malaysia comprising Peninsular Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei and Singapore. In order to gain the support of the people of Sarawak for the federation, Tunku Abdul Rahman promised the people of Sarawak that they would enjoy rapid socio-political development as well as "special rights". (6) These rights included, among others, the use of English as the official language for all purposes, no official religion in the state constitution and Bumiputra status would be accorded to all indigenous races. In view of these incentives, the majority of the population in Sarawak supported the idea of federation, paving the way for the formation of Malaysia in September 1963. Brunei, however, rejected the idea of joining the federation while Singapore separated in 1965.

The BN coalition has been ruling Sarawak ever since the first district council elections in 1963. Formerly known as the Alliance, (7) it was formed in 1951 and officially registered as a political organization in 1957. Sarawak politics has always been a local affair without the direct involvement of the three core BN parties, particularly the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). (8) The federal government has, however, indirectly interfered with the state's politics and administration on a number of occasions. Its ultimate aim is to have Sarawak politics modelled after the Malayan pattern of a "dominant Islamic-led native party, with a more or less subservient Chinese partner". (9)

The pursuit of this objective has led to turbulence and crises in Sarawak politics, particularly in the years immediately following its incorporation into Malaysia. The formation of Malaysia was made possible by the success of the Sarawak United Front (SUF) in the 1963 District Council Elections. At that time, the Sarawak United Peoples' Party (SUPP) was the most established and formidable political party in Sarawak. Because of these credentials, the party was expected to form the first state government. However, the British were reluctant to pass the levers of power to SUPP because of the party's opposition to federation and its communist sympathies. Instead, the British resorted to influencing the masses, especially the politically inexperienced Dayaks, (10) to vote for the SUF, which comprised the Sarawak Native People's Front (BARJASA), the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PESAKA), Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA). Modelled after the Malayan Alliance, the SUF, which was established in 1962, did not develop smoothly due to internal power struggles, (11) and this resulted in the withdrawal of PANAS just before the elections. Subsequently, PANAS and SUPP formed a temporary alliance of convenience to challenge the SUF. During campaigning, a delegation from the Malayan Alliance arrived in Sarawak to reunite the SUF coalition so as not to thwart the Malaysia agenda.

The opposition, which comprised PANAS and SUPP, failed to gain power in the 1963 elections, thus allowing the inexperienced and loosely-assembled SUF to form the state government. Owing to the strong support of the Dayaks, two of their leaders, Stephen Ningkan (from SNAP) and Temenggong Jugah (from PESAKA), were elected as Chief Minister and Governor, respectively. The newly formed Sarawak government had to rely on the more experienced European expatriates to handle its day-to-day operations and decision making. The elite Bumiputra Malays, particularly the highly educated Taib Mahmud, were left out of the decision-making process. To remedy this situation, the Malay-Muslims, with the help of UMNO, began a campaign to overthrow the SNAP-led SUF government.

An opportunity to do so was provided by the Land Bill crisis in 1965. The proposed amendments to the bill, which clearly favoured the Chinese, were met with opposition from PESAKA and BARJASA and their withdrawal from SUF. (12) With only SNAP and SCA remaining in government, the coalition was in danger of losing power. The only clear solution was to abolish the amendments to the bill. With that, PESAKA was quickly persuaded to return to SUF, followed by PANAS and BARJASA. (13) As inducement, Ningkan's European advisors gave up their positions to make way for new PESAKA and PANAS ministers.

Although Ningkan had seemingly quelled the rebellion within the SUF, his political downfall came soon after. Many within the coalition were unhappy with his leadership style and his failure to bring economic benefits to the indigenous people. (14) They argued that his policies clearly favoured the Chinese. Ningkan had also offended the Malayan Alliance by resisting the use of Malay as the official lingua franca of the country. (15) At the height of his confrontation with the federal government, Ningkan sacked Abdul Taib Mahmud from his Sarawak cabinet post, saying that he had lost confidence in him. This prompted 21 of the 42 Council Negri members to sign a petition of no confidence in Ningkan. The rebels then brought the issue to Kuala Lumpur, where Tunku Abdul Rahman, as head of the Alliance, announced that Ningkan would be removed from office by the Governor. Ningkan was unhappy with the federal government's blatant interference on a "local" matter and refused to step down. He preferred to deal with the no confidence motion against him before the Council Negri. However, before the matter could be discussed officially within the Alliance and Council Negri, Ningkan was dismissed by the Governor. Unhappy with the poor treatment of Ningkan, SNAP resigned from the SUF and invited PANAS and SCA to do the same. A new Sarawak government, led by Tawi Sli from PESAKA, was sworn in. Thereafter, the process of replacing the remaining expatriates working in the Sarawak government was greatly accelerated. (16) The downfall of Ningkan and the inevitable consolidation of power by the new federal government-backed leadership had prompted PANAS and SCA to remain in SUF, thus isolating SNAP.

The struggle for justice ensued. Ningkan challenged his dismissal in court and won. He was subsequently reinstated as Chief Minister. The rebels reacted by requesting the Governor and Speaker to convene the Council Negri so that a vote of no confidence against Ningkan could be conducted. However, this was not allowed under the Constitution. (17) The federal government then orchestrated what appeared to be...