SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF LAW ANNUAL LECTURE 14 SEPTEMBER 1994

• Date: 01 December 1994
• Citation: (1994) 6 SAcLJ 241
• Published date: 01 December 1994

“JUSTICE AND THE MASS MEDIA”

BY THE RT. HON. LORD TAYLOR OF GOSFORTH LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND

Chief Justice, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I feel greatly honoured and privileged to have been invited to deliver the first Singapore Academy of Law Annual Lecture. The Academy was established in 1988 by Act of Parliament. Its functions include the promotion of high standards of conduct and learning in the legal profession, the advancement of the knowledge of law, the provision of continuing legal education for its members and the promotion of good relations among the legal community in Singapore. Its membership is over 3,500. Nearly half of those are graduates of British Universities and members of the four Inns of Court; almost all the rest are graduates of the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law.

Since its establishment, the Academy has developed rapidly, promoting not only seminars and lectures, but also a biannual law journal (now in its sixth issue) and, since January 1992, a new series of Singapore Law Reports under the editorial supervision of the Attorney General whom it has been my pleasure to meet. The Academy has also been active in the field of Law Reform, making important recommendations to a number of Government Ministries several of which have led directly to legislative changes. I would like to record my admiration for what has been achieved and express my best wishes for the future success of the Academy. I would also, on a personal note, like to thank all concerned for the extremely warm reception you have extended to me and my wife.

Close legal ties between Singapore and the United Kingdom have a long history. Singapore is an important common law jurisdiction, and one which until very recently retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as its ultimate appellate tribunal. I am delighted, as an ex-officio member of that tribunal, to have been invited to deliver the first in what I hope will be a series of law lectures of some significance both here in Singapore and internationally.

I have chosen as my theme today an issue which confronts every jurisdiction in the free world: the relationship of the justice system to the mass media. I start by setting out three principles which I think are fundamental.

First, it is crucial in a democracy, that justice be administered in public. This principle is encapsulated in the well-known dictum: “Justice must not

only be done but must be seen to be done”. In practice the principle derived from the strictly local administration of justice in early times. Originally, trials (both civil and criminal) were before a judge or jury drawn from the locality, and the hearing itself would be likely to be attended by all interested members of the local community. The principle has survived the widening of that concept of “community” as communications have developed over the centuries. Now, the principle that justice must be seen to be done means not merely by those who can attend the trial but by the wider community via the media. Courts remain properly reluctant to accede to any request that proceedings should be heard in private, but the problem now is to prevent media coverage from not merely reporting proceedings but adversely influencing them.

This threat creates tension and potential conflict with the second fundamental principle, that citizens (including those who comment through the media) should enjoy freedom of expression. The right to free expression is often enshrined in a Country’s constitution when it is written and is specifically recognised by both the European and International Conventions on Human Rights. When the right is exercised not by an individual but by the mass media, its impact on public opinion and on the legal process itself can be very powerful. There are, of course, constraints upon it such as contempt of court, the requirements of national security or the law of libel. But, in general, democratic Governments have been very reluctant to interfere with the freedom of the media to express views or criticism however extreme. This, it has to be said, may not only be through respect for the general principle, but also through fear of provoking the hostility of the press, an ever more influential shaper of public opinion.

Thirdly, there is the overriding importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. This demands that cases which come before a Judicial Tribunal for the determination of the rights and obligations of citizens as against each other, or as against the state, are dealt with entirely objectively. Decisions are to be made only on the basis of evidence put and tested before the Tribunal itself. This principle underpins the whole concept of freedom in a democratic society. If a Tribunal could be prejudiced or influenced in advance by the actions either of the parties, or of others with an interest in the proceedings, the rights of the individual would become more theoretical than real, and the administration of justice would be undermined.

It is against this background that I would like to consider separately the way the media report individual cases, both before they have started and when they are under way; and, flowing on from this, the way they report the legal system as a whole. Both are important questions in understanding the way the mass media influence the perception of the institutions of the law by the public at large.

Well into the second half of this century, the judicial process and its results

were, by and large, reported by the press and accepted by the public uncontroversially. As recently as the 1960s, any criticism of the judiciary was at most muted and tentative. Scandalising the judiciary (or in Scotland “Murmuring Judges” — recently the title of a successful play in London) was a special form of contempt of court. Even today, criticism of judges in both Houses of the British Parliament is constrained by strict conventions, breach of which may lead to suspension from the House.

It is axiomatic that the independence of the judiciary is of fundamental importance. The concern to protect this independence led Lord Chancellor Kilmuir to set out what was the clearly understood practice of the day in 1955 in the “Kilmuir Rules”. They precluded judges from commenting publicly on almost any subject. The “Rules” were embodied in a letter from the Lord Chancellor to the BBC which justified the prohibition in these words:

“So long as a Judge keeps silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality remains unassailable: but every utterance which he makes in public, except in the performance of his judicial duties, must necessarily bring him within the focus of criticism.”

Only the Lord Chancellor (because of his position as a Cabinet Minister) was free to talk to the press.

Though it may seem quaint now, this régime seemed to operate quite satisfactorily for over thirty years: the Kilmuir Rules themselves survived until as recently as 1987. So long...