Sim Chay Koon and Others v NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 20 August 2015
• Date: 20 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 18 of 2015
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Sim Chay Koon and others

and

NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd

[2015] SGCA 46

Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA and Steven Chong J

Civil Appeal No 18 of 2015

Court of Appeal

Arbitration — Stay of court proceedings — Whether it appeared on prima facie basisthat arbitration clause existed

Arbitration — Stay of court proceedings — Court’s discretion under Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed) — Whether sufficient grounds to order proceedings not to be stayed in favour of arbitration — Section 6 Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed)

The appellants and NTUC Income Insurance Co–operative Ltd (“the respondent”) were parties to contracts that included an arbitration agreement, which provided for disputes to be eventually referred to arbitration if disagreements could not be settled through consultation. The appellants subsequently brought a representative action for themselves and on behalf of 34 others against the respondent for an alleged breach of employment terms and wrongful termination. The assistant registrar allowed the respondent’s application to stay the action in favour of arbitration under s 6 of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the Arbitration Act”). The appellants appealed to the High Court judge, who affirmed the stay of proceedings (see Sim Chay Koon v NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd [2015] SGHC 43). The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz meant that as a general rule, where a party sought to avoid its obligation to arbitrate its dispute, the court should undertake a restrained view of the facts and circumstances before it, in order to determine whether it appeared on a prima facie basis that there was an arbitration clause and that the dispute was caught by that clause. As that standard was amply met in the present case, the parties should be held to their duty to arbitrate and to raise any relevant objections before the arbitral tribunal: at [4] to [5].

(2) Should the appellants subsequently consider that the tribunal had taken a wrong view, they could then seek relief from the court through, among other ways, s 48 of the Arbitration Act, which provided for the setting side of an arbitral award: at [6].

(3) The court had the discretion under s 6 of the Arbitration Act not to refer a matter to arbitration. However, this discretion should be exercised sparingly and in a principled way: at [7].

(4) The very existence of an...