Sarika Connoisseur Cafe Pte Ltd v Ferrero Sp A

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 16 October 2012
• Date: 16 October 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 102 of 2011
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Sarika Connoisseur Cafe Pte Ltd

Plaintiff

and

Ferrero Sp A

Defendant

[2012] SGCA 56

Chao Hick Tin JA

,

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA

and

V K Rajah JA

Civil Appeal No 102 of 2011

Court of Appeal

Tort—Passing off—Damage—Restriction of respondent's expansion into Singapore drinks business—Whether actual damage to be shown to establish damage element

Trade Marks and Trade Names—Infringement—Respondent alleging appellant's sign infringing respondent's registered word mark—Inherent distinctiveness of respondent's registered word mark—Whether respondent's sign similar to appellant's word mark—Whether goods to which appellant's sign and respondent's word mark applying similar—Applicable test for determining similarity of goods under s 27 (2) (b) Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 2005 Rev Ed)—Whether likelihood of confusion existing on the part of the relevant public—Whether ‘extraneous factors’ to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion—Section 27 (2) (b)Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 2005 Rev Ed)

Trade Marks and Trade Names—Infringement—Well-known trade mark—Respondent alleging appellant's sign diluting by blurring respondent's registered trade marks—Whether conceptually incongruous to find both trade mark infringement and dilution by blurring—Requirements to establish claim of dilution by blurring—Section 55 (3) (b) (i) Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 2005 Rev Ed)

Trade Marks and Trade Names—Infringement—Well-known trade mark—Respondent alleging appellant's sign infringing respondent's registered trade marks—Restriction of expansion of respondent into Singapore drinks business—Whether infringement by damaging connection established—Section 55 (3) (a) Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 2005 Rev Ed)

Trade Marks and Trade Names—Infringement—Well-known trade mark—Respondent alleging appellant's sign infringing respondent's registered trade marks—Section 55 (2) Trade Marks Act (Cap 322, 2005 Rev Ed)

The respondent (‘the Respondent’) was the registered proprietor of the ‘Nutella’ trade marks, including the ‘Nutella’ word mark, in Class 30 of the International Classification Goods and Services in Singapore (‘ICGS’). The Respondent manufactured and retailed confectionary, which included the cocoa-based hazelnut spread marketed under the brand name ‘Nutella’.

The appellant (‘the Appellant’) was a retailer in the food and beverage business owning and operating a chain of café outlets. It introduced a new gourmet hot coffee beverage served in a shot glass under the ‘Nutello’ sign in its cafes. The ingredients in the ‘Nutello’ drink comprised espresso, milk foam, cocoa powder and ‘Nutella’ spread, amongst others. It was described in the Appellant's café menus as ‘Espresso with lashings of nutella - perfect for cocoa lovers!’ The Appellant used the ‘Nutello’ term in various forms in its promotional material such as its menu, booklet and website to effect sale of the ‘Nutello’ drink.

The Respondent objected to the use of the ‘Nutello’ sign and the menu description of the ‘Nutello’ beverage. It sued the Appellant in the High Court claiming trade mark infringement under s 27 (2) (b) Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) (‘TMA’), infringement of well-known trade mark under s 55 (2) TMA, infringement by damaging connection of well-known trade mark under s 55 (3) (a) TMA, dilution by blurring of well-known trade mark under s 55 (3) (b) (i) TMA, unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character of the Respondent's well-known trade mark under s 55 (3) (b) (ii) TMA, and passing off. The High Court judge (‘the Judge’) found in favour of the Respondent for all its claims, save for the s 55 (3) (b) (ii) TMA claim. Save for that claim, the Appellant appealed against the entirety of the Judge's decision.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) Three aspects of similarity, ie, visual, aural and conceptual, would be considered by the court in determining whether a sign and a trade mark were similar under s 27 (2) (b)TMA: at [16].

(2) The distinctiveness of a trade mark was a factor to be considered in the visual, aural and conceptual similarity analysis under s 27 (2) (b)TMA to determine if a sign and a trade mark were similar. Distinctiveness was not another aspect of or an element of the similarity analysis: at [20].

(3) The ‘Nutello’ sign and the ‘Nutella’ word mark were visually similar. The length, structure, and letters used (save one letter) in both, were the same. Given the distinctiveness of the word ‘Nutella’, the word mark and the sign remained visually similar regardless of the font, typeface or design of the ‘Nutello’ sign. Imperfect recollection of consumers should be considered: at [23] to [26].

(4) The ‘Nutello’ sign and the ‘Nutella’ word mark were aurally similar. The majority of two out of three syllables in both words were common. For both words, the first syllable would likely be emphasised in pronunciation and Singaporeans would likely pronounce the words as ‘nut-ello’ and ‘nut-ella’ respectively. Imperfect recollection of consumers and careless pronunciation and speech should be considered: at [28] to [32].

(5) The ‘Nutello’ sign and the ‘Nutella’ mark were not conceptually similar. The words ‘Nutello’ and ‘Nutella’ were invented and meaningless, with no particular idea underlying either of them: at [34].

(6) For a highly distinctive trade mark, a substantially modified sign would still possibly be regarded as similar to it. There was a high threshold to be met in creating a sign or a mark sufficiently dissimilar to a highly distinctive trade mark: at [36].

(7) The ‘Nutella’ word mark was an invented word and possessed high inherent distinctiveness. Mere change of the last letter of the ‘Nutella’ word mark from ‘a’ to ‘o’ to form the ‘Nutello’ sign would not suffice to meet the high threshold to render the ‘Nutello’ sign dissimilar: at [36].

(8) In the present case, the visual and aural aspects of similarity were relatively more important than conceptual similarity. This was because the ‘Nutella’ word mark and the ‘Nutello’ sign were word-only marks and could effectively only be engaged visually or verbally. Given the significance of visual and aural similarity of the ‘Nutella’ word mark and the ‘Nutello’ sign and the inherent distinctiveness of the former, similarity of marks had been established: at [38] and [39].

(9) A finding by the court that goods were non-identical would not preclude a finding that the goods were similar: at [44].

(10) In determining similarity of goods under s 27 (2) (b) TMA, according to the express wording of this subsection, the comparison to be made was not between the alleged infringing goods and the actual goods of the trade mark owner, but between the alleged infringing goods and the products in respect of which the trade mark was registered for: at [46].

(11) While there was a certain logical attractiveness for the proposition that goods which fell within the same class in the ICGS classification system ought be regarded as similar, this should not be determinative of the question of similarity of goods on a given set of facts: at [51].

(12) In the present case, the proper comparison for the similarity of goods analysis was that between the ‘Nutello’ drink and the ‘chocolate product’ registration specification. Many of the British Sugar factors were not applicable as these were premised on comparing two actual products and would not be entirely helpful in so far as the specification of the ‘Nutella’ trade mark extended to products not yet produced by the Respondent. The ‘Nutello’ drink was similar to a ‘chocolate product’: at [53].

(13) The test for determining likelihood of confusion was whether a substantial portion of the relevant public would be confused. There had to not be an insubstantial number of the relevant public being confused. This standard was above de minimis and had to be appreciable, though it was unnecessary to show confusion of a majority of the relevant public: at [57].

(14) Where a product was commonly available and purchased by the general public, the average consumer would be the general public. In the present case, the ‘relevant public’ would be the general public as both parties' products were generally available for the public to purchase and consume: at [59].

(15) The term ‘extraneous factors’ had been used to encompass matters outside and beyond the marks and the goods themselves. The court had to take a holistic view of all the circumstances - including the ‘extraneous factors’ - to determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed on the facts of each case: at [60] and [62].

(16) In the present case, there was a real likelihood that a substantial portion of the general public of these goods would be confused, in that they would think that the parties were related or had business links between them. The parties' surveys showed that 30% of the relevant public were confused and this figure constituted a substantial portion of the relevant public. The s 27 (2) (b) TMA claim was established: at [64] to [68].

(17) The slight difference in wording between s 55 (2) TMA and s 27 (2) (b) TMA could be due to an oversight during legislative drafting, given that the wording of both provisions were adopted from two different sources without much amendment. The former was modelled after Art 4 (1) (b) of the World Intellectual Property Organisation's Joint Recommendations Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well known Marks, while the latter was closely modelled after the UK Trade Marks Act 1994: at [70].

(18) Assessing the ‘essential part’ of the trade mark was only an alternative and not mandatory requirement to establish a s 55 (2) TMA claim: at [71].

(19) In the present case, the well-known trade mark infringement claim under s 55 (2) TMA was established: at [73].

(20) In the present case, there was the requisite confusing connection under s 55 (3) (a) TMA. The test for the ‘connection’ requirement...