Salafi Ulama in UMNO: political convergence or expediency?

• Author: Osman, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed

The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent arrests of members of its Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have cast a negative light on the Salafi interpretation of Islam. Salafi ideology was alleged to have inspired JI members to carry out violent attacks against targets in the region. In Southeast Asia, Salafi scholars and groups came to be viewed with trepidation by governments because of their supposed ideological links with violent movements such as Laskar Jihad and JI. (1) In Malaysia, due to Salafi's puritan interpretation of Shariah (Islamic laws), and its uncompromising attitude in seeking the implementation of these laws, it has been categorized as extremist by the country's religious bureaucracy. Yet despite the Salafi's hardline stance on religion, the group has made inroads within the government. In fact today a group of younger Salafi ulama form the bulwark of the ruling United Malays National Organization's (UMNO) ulama wing (a wing comprising Muslim religious scholars). This seemingly contradictory position of the state vis-a-vis the Salafi ulama is the subject of enquiry of this paper.

This article argues that the Salafi ulama's involvement in UMNO is due both to a convergence of interest with UMNO and as a strategy to expand its influence at both the state and societal levels. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, to examine the beliefs of the Salafis and provide an historical background of the Salafi movement in Malaysia. Second, to identify key religious scholars with an inclination towards Salafism and examine their religious-political thinking and attitudes. In particular their views on issues such as the implementation of Islamic laws and Islamic governance in Malaysia is examined. Third, to analyse the factors that have encouraged Salafi ulama to render their support to UMNO and how the Salafi influence in UMNO is likely to affect future government policies related to Islam. The research for this paper is based mainly on primary sources including speeches by and interviews with Salafi ulama scholars. (2) This article contributes to the existing, but limited, scholarship on the contemporary Salafi movement in Malaysia. (3)

Understanding Salafism

In most of Southeast Asia, the term Wahhabi is used interchangeably with Salafi. While the two groups are similar in most aspects of their religious adherence, there are also important differences between the two. The Wahhabi orientation can be traced to the scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92), a fervent reader of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855), one of the founders of the four schools of jurisprudence that are dominant in Sunni Islam, and Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Al-Taimiyyah (1263-1328), a fourteenth-century scholar known for his strict puritan interpretation of Islam. (4) Al-Wahhab was perhaps best known for his role as the co-founder with Muhammad Ibn Saud (d 1765) of the first Saudi state, and who provided religious legitimacy to Ibn Saud's struggle to form a unitary state on the Arabian Peninsula. In return for his efforts, he was awarded control over the Saudi religious establishment. (5) Al-Wahhab argued that many Muslims at that time had deviated from the teachings of their pious ancestors [al-salaf al-salih) and adopted practices akin to the period of ignorance (jahiliyyah) which precedes Islam. In his view, these practices--such as the reverence of saints practised by Sufis and the doctrines espoused by Shiite Islam--ran counter to the teachings of Islam. However, Al-Wahhab was less clear about where he stood on theological issues. While in theory he was against the tradition of taqlid (blind imitation) of past practices of traditional scholars and advocated the establishment of ijtihad (open interpretation on religious matters), in practice he subscribed to the Hanbali School of jurisprudence which had a more literal reading of the Qur'an. (6) The religious teachings of Al-Wahhab received political support when Muhammad Ibnu Saud, chief of the prominent Ibn Saud tribe on the Arabian Peninsula, swore a traditional Muslim oath whereby he promised to work together with Al-Wahhab to establish a state run according to Islamic principles. By 1765, when the first Saudi kingdom was established, Al-Wahhab consolidated his position as the religious guide to the kingdom. The Wahhabis have thus been loyal to the Ibnu Saud led kingdom since its formation. Outside of the Saudi state, most Wahhabis have generally maintained a quietist position on political matters. (7) Nevertheless, some Wahhabis are privately opposed to the fact that many Muslim governments do not impose strict Islamic laws in their countries, even though they are unlikely to play an active role to change this. (8)

Salafism can be traced to the 1920s reformist movement (Salafi) started by Sayyid Jamal-al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-97) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Both individuals were highly critical of the practice of blind imitation of the past and strict adherence to one particular school of jurisprudence. (9) They viewed the practices of Sufis with disdain and blamed many of the problems of the Muslim world on religious scholars. (10) One of Abduh's students, Rashid Rida (1865-1935) merged reformist religious ideas with anti-colonialism, and was also responsible for transforming Salafism into a more conservative movement akin to Wahhabism. (11) In the religious realm, little separates the Salafis from the Wahhabis. However unlike the Wahhabis, who are generally Hanbalite in matters of jurisprudence, the Salafis reject all schools of jurisprudence arguing instead for individual ijtihad on all matters related to jurisprudence. In the 1960s, Saudi King Faisal gave refuge to many Islamist figures from the Muslim Brotherhood movement as well as Muslim reformist scholars after they were forced to flee their countries following intense repression by Arab nationalist rulers. (12) The anti-establishment political ideas and cultures brought by political figures such as Muhammad Qutb (a key Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader and brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Saeed Hawa' (a key Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader) encountered the strict Wahhabi Islamic doctrine resulting in some Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members adopting Wahhabi's religious doctrines. On the other hand some Wahhabis began to subscribe to more active political positions, as described in the next section of this paper. As a result of this encounter, there was more convergence between the Salafi and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies. This is described by a legalistic interpretation of Islamic law that is inflexible and highly intolerant of differences as well as a rabid anti-Sufi and anti-Shiite position. Those who subscribe to the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology are often harsh in their criticism of other Muslims, even branding many of their co-religionists as infidels. (13)

Another result of this encounter is the myriad of different positions on political engagement that began to emerge among Salafis. The first is the infamous Salafi-jihadi ideology represented by Al-Qaeda. This ideology can be traced to the political position advocated by Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), a key ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. (14) Qutb famously promoted the twin concept of hakimiyyah (God's sovereignty) and jahiliyyah (idolatrous condition) in which he argued that given the fact that most of the regimes in the Muslim world are in a state of jahiliyyah, it is the duty of all Muslims to rebel using violence to uphold hakimiyyah. (15) This ideology has been used to justify rebellions against various governments such as that by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Egypt and the terrorist actions of Al-Qaeda. The second political position of the Salafis emerged from interactions between the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism. This political position is known as the al-Sahwa al-lslamiya (Islamic Awakening). (16) The advocates of this political position, commonly referred to as the Sahwas, include Saudi preachers Safir Al-Hawali and Salman Al-Ouda'. (17) The Sahwas stress the need to attain political power through nonviolent means, including election to public office. The El-Nour party in Egypt is an example of the Sahwa movement. The third position is known as the political quietist Salafism. Much like Wahhabism, these Salafis argue that it is forbidden for Muslims to participate in civil strife and that obedience to a Muslim ruler is religiously mandated. These Salafis tend to focus their attention on education and proselytization. (18) The leading scholars within this school of thought include Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani (1914-99) and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910-99). In this regard, being political quietist does not mean that these Salafis are apolitical. In fact, much like the other Salafis, they seek political power in the long run so as to implement their version of Islamic laws. In general the politically quietist Salafis are also supportive of the Saudi regime.

It must be added that the boundaries between the three political positions are porous and that Salafis can move easily from one group to another. This could be seen from the example of the GIA which began as a Salafi-jihadi group but became quietist after signing a peace agreement with the Egyptian government in 2003 and quickly moved to form a political party following the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak regime in 2011. Similarly the Salafi movement in Indonesia, Laskar Jihad led by the preacher Jaafar Umar Thalib, was a politically quietist movement that quickly transformed itself into a Salafi-jihadist movement following the collapse of the Soeharto government in 1998. (19) While the two doctrines have some differences, as noted earlier, for the purposes of this paper, the term Salafi will be used since both Wahhabis and Salafis describe themselves as Salafis.

Salafism in Malaysia

Salafism first arrived in the...