Re SS

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: A V Winslow J
• Judgment Date: 14 November 1974
• Neutral Citation: [1974] SGHC 15
• Docket Number: Adoption Petition No 209 of 1973
• Date: 14 November 1974
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1974
• Plaintiff Counsel: V Ramakrishnan (Eugene Phoa & Co)
• Citation: [1974] SGHC 15
• Defendant Counsel: Patrick Koh Keng Boon (State Counsel),Syed Hassan Almenoar (Chor Pee & Hin Hiong)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Consent of natural father,Family Law,Adoption,Whether consent can be dispensed with,s 3(4) Adoption of Children Act (Cap 43, 1970 Ed)

This petition for adoption of the child in question came on for hearing before me in chambers and was heard at the same time as an application on the part of the petitioners to dispense with the father`s consent under para (c) of the proviso to s 3(4) of the Adoption of Children Act (Cap 43, 1970 Ed) which empowers the court to dispense with his consent if the court is satisfied, inter alia, that he is a person whose consent ought, in the opinion of the court and in all the circumstances of the case to be dispensed with.

The undisputed facts are that the female petitioner, who is the natural mother of the girl to be adopted, gave birth to her out of wedlock. The mother married the natural father some eight months thereafter when he reached the age of 21 years, his own father having previously refused to consent to such marriage. The girl is now about eight years and ten months of age.

I find that the marriage from its inception was an unhappy one and after a few years of a most turbulent relationship involving scenes of violence and assault on the mother by the father she left him in October 1970 taking the child with her to stay with her own mother. Eventually she went to live with the male petitioner in early 1971 on discharge from hospital after a nervous breakdown resulting from the distress caused by the removal of the girl from her care by the natural father who shortly afterwards returned the girl to her at her request to allay her distress. He harboured hopes of becoming reconciled with his wife at that stage but instead of doing something constructive about it he drifted away from her life although he now claims that he was deprived by the mother of the opportunity of doing what he could for the child.

She divorced him for cruelty in July 1972 in an uncontested suit, which I have since discovered, was the result of a decree granted by me at that time (Divorce No 249 of 1971). I have verified from my notes that I made a finding then that she had in fact made out a substantial case of cruelty. She had also filed a discretionary statement regarding her adultery with the male petitioner. I exercised my discretion in her favour and gave her custody of the child as well.

No application for access to the child was ever made by the natural father although he was aware of the divorce. He has therefore allowed his desires, as presently expressed, to be frustrated when it was open to him to apply to the court for access rights. He drifted away from his daughter whom he has hardly seen since 1971.

The girl has been living with the petitioners since 1971 although she is at present away on holiday abroad with her mother. She seems to be living quite happily with the petitioners and has been attending a good school. There is no doubt that the male petitioner is a good provider and that if one considers the position from the point of view of the welfare of the child it would be in her best interests to be adopted by the petitioners, one of whom is her own natural mother. The male petitioner is not living in sin, as he did earlier from 1971 onwards, with the natural mother. He has seen fit to regularise his relationship with her by marrying her in 1973 after the decree was made absolute. The child has all along been with them both. Both counsel on behalf of the Attorney General as well as the assistant director of Social Welfare are satisfied that the means and the status of the petitioners will enable them to bring up the child suitably and that she will benefit under their care.

Despite the full report of the investigator, Mr Teo, which records his comments on the facts he elicited during his investigations from all the parties and others, some of which may appear adverse to the application by the petitioners that the consent of the natural father should be dispensed with I have, nevertheless, come to the conclusion, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such consent should be dispensed with as there are important and serious reasons why such consent should be dispensed with. Counsel for the Attorney General took the stand that the natural father`s consent should be dispensed with and although I am not necessarily bound to act on his views alone I am inclined to agree with him after...