Re Estate of Siti bte Naydeen

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua F A J
• Judgment Date: 17 October 1984
• Neutral Citation: [1984] SGHC 30
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 237 of 1984
• Date: 17 October 1984
• Year: 1984
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Halimah bte Abdul Jalil (HA Jalil & Associates)
• Citation: [1984] SGHC 30
• Defendant Counsel: Mohamed Kamil Suhaimi (Kamil & Co)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Construction,Whether consent had been given,Daughter-in-law entitled to one-third under Muslim law if consent not been given,Consent of male heir to whole estate being given to daughter-in-law of testator,Succession and Wills,Will of Muslim woman

By this originating summons the plaintiffs seek certain declarations with respect to the will of Siti bte Naydeen and with respect to the estate of Mansor bin Ahdan deceased.

Siti bte Naydeen (the testatrix) died on 11 November 1971, leaving a son Mansor bin Ahdan (Mansor) surviving her. The testatrix left a will dated 16 November 1965, (the Will) appointing the defendant, Zaleha bte Ibrahim, the sole executrix and bequeathing all her real and personal properties to the defendant as the, sole beneficiary of her estate.

The defendant is the daughter-in-law of the testatrix, being the wife of Masdawood bin Ahdan (Masdawood) who died on 24 August 1964.

The testatrix was at the date of her death the owner of the property known as No 117, Lorong H, Telok Kurau, built on Lot 2611 of Mukim 26, Grant No 1, District of Siglap (the said property). That was her only property. The testatrix lived at No 117 with Masdawood and his family. Mansor, his wife and children (who are the plaintiffs in this originating summons) lived at No 117A, Lorong H, Telok Kurau, erected on Lot 2611.

On 7 July 1972, probate of the will of the testatrix was granted to the defendant (Probate No 538 of 1972) as the sole executrix. Pursuant to the provisions of the Will, the defendant conveyed the said property to herself as the sole owner by way of Deed of Assent dated 9 February 1973.

Mansor died on 22 May 1979. His wife died on 7 June 1983.

On 27 January 1984, the defendant sold the said property for $770,000. The third plaintiff, Abdul Rahman bin Mansor, was then living at No 117A and a sum of $100,000 was paid to him as compensation for his delivering up vacant possession of the house so that the defendant could sell the said property with vacant possession.

On the application of the plaintiffs in Probate No 538 of 1972 an order for an interim injunction was granted by the court on 16 March 1984, and served on the defendant which order, inter alia, required the defendant to pay into court the proceeds of the sale of the said property. On 22 March the defendant paid into court the sum of $661,500.

The parties are agreed that under Muslim law the will is valid only to the extent that the defendant is entitled to one-third share of the estate of the testatrix and that the remaining two-thirds share goes to the estate of Mansor unless Mansor in his life time had consented to the whole estate being given to the defendant.

So the sole question for the decision of the court is, did Mansor consent as alleged by the defendant or he did not consent as maintained by the plaintiffs?

The story of the defendant is that before the testatrix made her will she told Mansor in the presence of the defendant and the defendant`s son Abdullah bin Masdawood that she would make a will giving all her properties to the defendant absolutely. Mansor indicated his approval and did not object. After the death of the testatrix the defendant showed the will to Mansor in the presence of defendant`s son, Abdullah bin Masdawood. Mansor advised the defendant to transfer the said property to defendant`s name saying that if he (Mansor) were to die before the transfer there would be problems. After the deed of assent had been executed the defendant showed it to Mansor in the presence of Abdullah bin Masdawood and Mansor indicated his approval and satisfaction as the transfer of the said property to defendant`s name had been completed. Mansor never raised any objection to the will and to the deed of assent nor changed his mind even up to the time of his death which was about eight years after the death of the testatrix and about six years after the execution of the deed of assent. The defendant believed that the plaintiffs, at all material times, knew about the will and also about the consent of their...