Ramu Vanniyar Ravichandran, Next of kin of v Fongsoon Enterprises (Pte) Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 27 March 2008
• Date: 27 March 2008
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 579 of 2007
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Next of kin of Ramu Vanniyar Ravichandran

Plaintiff

and

Fongsoon Enterprises (Pte) Ltd

Defendant

[2008] SGHC 45

Choo Han Teck J

Originating Summons No 579 of 2007

High Court

Agency–Apparent authority of agent–Whether there was authority represented by words or conduct of principal and relied upon by third party–Principal estopped from denying employer-employee relationship where apparent authority was established–Agency–Implied authority of agent–Whether there was authority implied by circumstances–Agency–Principal–Third party and principal's relations–Liability of principal to third party for compensation under s 3 (1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed)–Whether deceased was in employment of company–Whether foreman of company having authority to engage services of deceased on company's behalf–Whether accident happening out of and in the course of that employment–Whether s 17 (1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed) was applicable–Courts and Jurisdiction–Appeals–Right–Right of appeal against decision of Commissioner for Labour–Whether appeal raising a substantial question of law–Section 29 Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed)–Employment Law–Commissioner for Labour–Right of appeal–Right of appeal against decision of Commissioner for Labour–Whether appeal raising a substantial question of law–Section 29 Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed)–Employment Law–Liabilities–Principals–Liability of principal to third party for compensation under s 3 (1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed)–Whether deceased was in employment of company–Whether foreman of company having authority to engage services of deceased on company's behalf–Whether accident happening out of and in the course of that employment–Whether s 17 (1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed) was applicable–Employment Law–Workmen's Compensation Act–Liability for compensation under s 3 (1)–Whether deceased was in employment of company–Whether foreman of company having authority to engage services of deceased on company's behalf–Whether accident happening out of and in the course of that employment–Whether s 17 (1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed) was applicable

The deceased was an Indian national who held a work permit and was employed to do lashing works at the Port of Singapore Authority Pasir Panjang Terminal (“the Terminal”). While working at the Terminal, the deceased approached the foreman of the respondent, Muhamed Yusuff Muhamed Meera (“Meera”), who had overall control of the day-to-day running of the respondent's works at the Terminal, to find a part-time job to supplement his income. Consequently, without the respondent's knowledge or consent, Meera engaged the services of the deceased on four occasions to tighten the bolts and nuts to crane rails. For his services, the deceased was paid $100 on each of the first three occasions (twice from Meera's own money and once from petty cash given by the respondent to Meera for food and supplies). On the fourth occasion, 26 December 2005, at about 2.00pm, the deceased was found drowned in the sea near the Terminal with the respondent's forklift which, according to the evidence of Meera and his supervisor later, he had been operating to either shift a generator or lift rails.

On 18 July 2006, the Commissioner for Labour (“the Commissioner”) issued a notice of assessment of compensation which determined that the respondent was liable to pay compensation of $78,624.00 to the next of kin of the deceased, ie, the appellant. The respondent challenged this assessment and the matter was set for a hearing before the Commissioner where the key issue, for the purpose of establishing the respondent's liability to pay compensation pursuant to s 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed) (“WCA”), was whether the deceased was in the employment of the respondent (this turning on whether Meera had the authority to engage the services of the deceased on the respondent's behalf) and whether the accident happened out of and in the course of that employment. The hearing having been completed, the Commissioner held the deceased was never in the employment of the respondent as Meera had no authority to engage the services of the deceased on the respondent's behalf. The Commissioner also held that even if the deceased had been in the employment of the respondent, his death was not by an accident arising out of and in the course of that employment, as he was not authorised to handle the forklift and he had in fact went on a frolic of his own in using the forklift given that the work the he was asked to do on the day of the accident did not involve the use of a forklift. The Commissioner thus concluded that the respondent was not liable to pay compensation to the appellant.

In the result, the appellant filed the present appeal against the Commissioner's decision pursuant to s 29 of the WCA, which would have allowed for an appeal if, inter alia, a “substantial question of law” would be involved in the appeal. The issues which had to be canvassed on appeal included: (a) whether the appeal raised a “substantial question of law”; (b) whether the Commissioner erred in law in his application of agency principles and in concluding that there was no employer-employee relationship between the respondent and the deceased; (c) whether the Commissioner erred in law in holding that the deceased person's death was not caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the deceased person's employment with the respondent; (d) whether the Commissioner failed to apply the presumptions under ss 3 (4) and 3 (6) of the WCA which would have deemed the accident to have arisen in the course of employment; and (e) whether the Commissioner failed to apply s 17 (1) of the WCA on the liability of principals.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) The appellant had raised questions of law as it was argued that the Commissioner had arrived at the wrong conclusion by the erroneous application of agency principles and the failure to consider and apply the presumptions provided by the relevant provisions of the WCA. These questions of law could be considered to be substantial as the application of agency principles and the presumptions in WCA would be likely to feature in most workmen's compensation cases: at [10].

(2) There was no implied authority. Implied authority would be authority that was implied by the circumstances and the circumstances present did not justify a finding that Meera had implied authority to hire workers on the respondent's behalf. Although Meera was the respondent's foreman and was given petty cash by the respondent, this petty cash was only meant for the purchase of food and supplies and was never meant to pay the wages of workers. Further, Meera had never informed the respondent that he had hired the deceased or other workers and there was no evidence to suggest that the respondent had knowledge of such illegal hiring of workers or had acquiesced to such a practice. In any event, implied authority would be restricted by express authority and Meera's evidence showed that he clearly had no authority to engage workers for the respondent: at [13] and [14].

(3) There was apparent authority. Apparent authority would be authority which was represented by words or conduct of the principal and relied upon by a third party and the evidence showed that the respondent had by, inter alia, representing that Meera had overall control of the day-to-day running of the respondent's works, represented that Meera had the authority to engage part-time workers for the respondent, and the deceased had relied on such representation and approached Meera for work: at [15], [17], [20] to [22].

(4) If there was apparent authority, the respondent would be estopped from raising Meera's lack of express or implied authority to hire workers on the respondent's behalf as a ground for denying that an employer-employee relationship existed between the respondent and the deceased. Therefore, the deceased was, in fact, an employee of the respondent: at [16] and [22].

(5) If the deceased was, in fact, an employee of the respondent, the presumptions set out in ss 3 (4) and 3 (6) of the WCA would have deemed the accident to have arisen in the course of employment. The presumptions were unrebutted on the evidence, which indicated that the deceased had used the forklift for some purpose that was in connection with the respondent's work on 26 December 2005, viz, to either shift a generator or lift rails: at [23], [25], [27] to [29].

(6) Section 17 (1) of the WCA would only be applicable in instances where a principal had subcontracted works to an independent contractor. The provision was therefore not applicable as Meera was at all material times the employee of the respondent and not an independent contractor: at [32].

Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (folld)

Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (refd)

Lee Keng Hiong v Ramlan bin Haron [2002] 1 SLR (R) 281; [2002] 2 SLR 52 (refd)

Pole v Leask (1860) 28 Beav 562; 54 ER 481, CA (refd)

Pole v Leask (1863) 33 LJ Ch 155, HL (refd)

SPP Ltd v Chew Beng Gim [1993] 3 SLR (R) 17; [1993] 3 SLR 393 (refd)

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