Raffles City Pte Ltd v Attorney General

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: L P Thean J
• Judgment Date: 31 July 1993
• Neutral Citation: [1993] SGHC 180
• Date: 31 July 1993
• Subject Matter: Use of a 'storey' in computing the period of concession,Aid to construction where enactment is ambiguous or obscure,Revenue Law,'Each storey of the approved development project',Reference to Parliamentary materials,Words and Phrases,Extrinsic aids,Statutory Interpretation,Property tax,para 5(b) Property Tax Order 1967,Construction of statute,paras 4 & 5 Property Tax Order 1967,s 9A Interpretation Act (Cap 1),Statutory concessions,Period of concession,Building
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 782 of 1992
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Lucy Hangchi, Ang Su-Lin and A Muthuraman (Attorney General)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Sat Pal Khattar and Gurbachan Singh (Khattar Wong & Pnrs)

Cur Adv Vult

The relevant facts which gave rise to the present dispute are these. The plaintiffs are the lessees under two leases for 99 years commencing from 16 July 1979 in respect of two lots of land on which now stands a huge complex called `Raffles City` which is bounded by North Bridge Road, Bras Basah Road, Beach Road and Stamford Road. The whole complex consists of a 7-storey podium with three basement levels and three tower blocks, namely: (i) the `Tower Block A` which is the Westin Plaza, a twin-core building with 21 storeys from the top of the podium; (ii) the `Tower Block B` which is an office building with 35 storeys from the top of the podium, and (iii) the `Tower Block C` which is the Westin Stamford Hotel with 66 storeys also from the top of the podium. Thus the lower parts of all these tower blocks are parts of the large podium below which are the three levels of basement, and the tower blocks are not physically or structurally connected to each other other than at the podium and the basements. It is therefore not possible to gain access from any storey of a tower block (above the podium) to any storey in any of the other tower blocks other than through the podium levels. At this point, it is relevant to mention also that, above the podium, the height of each storey in Tower Blocks A and C, namely the two hotels, is less than the height of each storey in Tower Block B, the office building, with the result that a certain numbered storey in Tower Block B is at different height from the storey bearing the same number in either of the two Tower Blocks A and C. In other words, none of the storeys above the podium level of Westin Stamford Hotel and Westin Plaza coincides with the equivalent numbered storeys of the office building. In addition, though each of the twenty storeys above the podium level of the Westin Plaza is at the same height as the equivalent numbered storey of the Westin Stamford Hotel, the highest storey of the Westin Plaza (ie the 28th floor) is at a different level from the equivalent numbered storey of the Westin Stamford Hotel. Further, all the three buildings (above the podium) are separate and distinct buildings and share no common floor or common sets of rooms.

The podium is a large odd shape multi-section building covering approximately 32,000 square metres of site area. It has seven levels and comprises various public facilities such as restaurants, shops and multi-purpose halls. Some of these areas are operated as part of one or other of the hotels, and some are patronised by the general public without any connection to either of the hotels. The convention centre floor on level 4 has a number of convention rooms, multi-purpose rooms and open areas used for conventions and other purposes. Below the podium is a three-storey basement. The lower two storeys contain car parks, mechanical service and storage areas, locker rooms and offices. The top floor of the basement contains car park lots, locker rooms, banking hall and other service areas.

Raffles City was completed on or about 31 July 1986 and is an approved development project under the Property Tax Order 1967 (`the Order`) and is entitled to property tax concession as provided in paras 4 and 5 of the Order which read as follows:

(4) (1) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph the tax payable for a period of twenty years from the date of expiry of the concession period mentioned in paragraph 5 of this Order in respect of property to which an approved development project relates shall be at the rate of twelve per centum per annum.

(2) If the approved development project is not completed on that date, the tax payable in respect of such property for the period of time between such date and the date of completion of the approved development projects shall be at the rate prescribed in section 8 of the Act.

(3) Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph shall not apply to approved development projects situated within any of the areas set out in the Second Schedule to this Order.

(5) Upon completion of an approved development project the owner may apply for a refund of tax paid in respect of the following periods:

(a) the period of six months from the date of approval of the approved development project; and

(b) a further period of one month in respect of each storey of the approved development project,

notwithstanding that such development project may be completed before or after the end of such concession period.

Prior to 31 July, the plaintiffs on 3 June 1986 wrote to the Comptroller of Property Tax (`the Comptroller`) seeking a refund of property tax under para 5 of the Property Tax Order 1967. The plaintiffs maintained that they were entitled to a refund for the period of 138 months, being:

(i) 6 months from the date of approval, ie 16 July 1979, under para 5(a), and

(ii) 132 months thereafter under para 5(b).

The 132 months were computed on the basis that the development consists of the three basements and the 7-storey podium and multiple storeys in each of the three tower blocks (above the podium), all of which came to a total number of 132 storeys. The total was arrived at as follows:

Basement 3 storeys

Podium 7 storeys

Tower Block A (storeys above podium : 28-7) 21 storeys

Tower Block B (storeys above podium : 42-7) 35 storeys

Tower Block C (storeys above podium : 73-7) 66 storeys

Total 132 storeys

This calculation involves adding up the storeys in the basements, the podium and the storeys of the individual tower blocks which rise above the podium. The Comptroller rejected this computation and allowed a refund of property tax for only 76 months on the basis that the development for the purpose of the Order consists of only 76 storeys. The aggregate of 76 storeys was arrived at by taking only the number of storeys in the highest block, ie the Westin Stamford Hotel, plus the number of storeys making up the podium and the basement. There was a further exchange of correspondence between the plaintiffs and the Comptroller which, however, did not lead to a resolution of their differences on the matter.

On 16 August 1991, the plaintiffs took out this originating summons against the defendant seeking a determination of the following question:

Whether in the circumstances, and in view of the layout and structure of the plaintiffs` aforementioned approved development project [the Raffles City], the refund of property tax due to the plaintiffs under r 5(b) of the Property Tax Order 1967 should be for the period of 76 months calculated on the basis that the project consists of 76 storeys only (as contended for by the Comptroller of Property Tax) or for the period of 132 months on the basis that the project consists of 132 storeys (as contended for by the plaintiffs).

and also for a consequential declaration and an order for refund of the property tax should the determination on the above question be in their favour. The issue before me is centred on the basis of calculation of the number of storeys of Raffles City for the purpose of a refund of the property tax under para 5(b) of the Order and essentially turns on the construction of the phrase `each storey of the approved development project` in that paragraph. Neither the word `storey` nor the word `project` has been defined in the Order or the Property Tax Act (Cap 254)under which the Order was enacted.

Mr Sat Pal Khattar for the plaintiffs contends that in its natural and ordinary meaning the word `storey` refers to a horizontal division of a building containing a room or a set of rooms and having a continuous floor. He points out that the height of each storey in Tower Blocks A and C is less than the height of each storey in Tower Block B, so that a certain numbered storey in Tower Block B is at a different height from the storey bearing the same number in either of the other two tower blocks; it is accordingly not possible to treat them as a single storey as they are not at the same height. Also, all the three tower blocks are separate and distinct buildings and share no common floor or common set of rooms. As for the word `project`, he submits that it connotes an abstract plan or scheme as opposed to a concrete building or structure. Consequently, the relevant words in para 5(b) of the Order should be expanded, by necessary implication, to read `each storey of the building (or buildings) in the approved development project`.

On the other hand, Mrs Hangchi for the defendant argues that the phrase `each storey of the approved development project` means a level or tier of the construction project taken as a whole within the designated area and approved by the Minister, and that it is a measure of the height of the whole project taken as one unit no matter how many parts the project can be divided in terms of `buildings`. She says that the word `project` includes an abstract scheme or undertaking which when completed would be in concrete and material form, and that the use of the word in para 5(b) must refer to a project in its material form.

In relation to the meaning of the word `storey`, both the plaintiffs and the defendant have adduced a substantial amount of evidence seeking to establish the true meaning of the word. In that connection, they have even sought to rely on expert evidence. Such evidence is only admissible and of assistance to me if the word `storey` is to be construed in a technical sense; it is irrelevant and is not admissible if the word is to be construed in its ordinary sense. Whether a word or phrase is to be construed in a technical sense or in an ordinary sense depends on the context in which the word or phrase appears. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (2nd Ed, 1992) states at p 838:

Where an enactment uses a term which has both an ordinary and a technical meaning, the question of which meaning the term is intended to have is determined by the court. If the

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