QU v QV

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong CJ
• Judgment Date: 10 March 2008
• Neutral Citation: [2008] SGCA 9
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 35 of 2007
• Date: 10 March 2008
• Year: 2008
• Published date: 12 March 2008
• Plaintiff Counsel: Koh Tien Hua (Harry Elias Partnership)
• Citation: [2008] SGCA 9
• Defendant Counsel: Yap Teong Liang (T L Yap & Associates)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Order 45 r 5(1)(a) Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed),Statutory Interpretation,Judgments or orders which need not specify time within which act was to be done,Contempt of Court,Relationship between O 42 r 6(2) and O 45 r 5(1)(a) of Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed),Rules of court,Whether s 52 of Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) could be applied to court judgments or orders for purposes of committal,Civil Procedure,Whether party subject to order could be committed for non-compliance,Order of court failing to specify time for compliance,Civil contempt,Interpretation act

10 March 2008

Chan Sek Keong CJ (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

1 This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in QU v QV [2007] 4 SLR 588 (“the GD”) affirming a committal order made by the District Court (“the Committal Order”) in QV v QU [2006] SGDC 290.

2 This appeal raised a very simple but important issue, namely, whether a person could be committed for contempt of court for not obeying an order of court which did not specify a time for compliance with its terms. At the conclusion of the hearing, we allowed the appeal and ordered the Committal Order to be set aside on the ground that it was predicated upon the breach of a court order which did not specify a time for compliance. We now give the full reasons for our decision.

The facts

3 Sometime in early 2004, the respondent in this appeal commenced divorce proceedings against his wife, the appellant. A decree nisi was granted in July 2004. On 24 January 2005, the respondent obtained an ancillary order of court (“the Ancillary Order”) which provided, inter alia, as follows:

The [respondent] be granted sole custody, care and control of the child of the marriage … and the [appellant] to surrender the child’s passport and birth certificate to the [respondent]. The [appellant] shall be at liberty to apply for access.

4 The appellant came to know about the Ancillary Order in August 2005 and applied to set it aside. Prior to that, in June 2005, the respondent had applied, via Originating Summons Family No 98 of 2005 (“OSF 98/05”), for an order that the appellant return the child to his lawful custody, care and control pursuant to the Ancillary Order. At the hearing of OSF 98/05 on 22 August 2005, District Judge Shobha Nair adjourned the application pending the outcome of the appellant’s application to set aside the Ancillary Order (“the setting-aside application”), and also ordered that the status quo be preserved in the interim, subject to the appellant giving the respondent daily access to the child.

5 Sometime in March 2006, District Judge Nair clarified that her earlier order of 22 August 2005 was to continue only until the outcome of the setting-aside application and not until the next hearing of OSF 98/05. On 7 March 2006, the setting-aside application was dismissed by District Judge Carol Ling. The appellant appealed against District Judge Ling’s decision to the High Court, which dismissed her appeal on 26 April 2006.

6 Even after the High Court had dismissed her appeal, the appellant did not comply with the Ancillary Order. On 28 April 2006, the respondent applied for leave to commit the appellant for breach of the Ancillary Order. Leave was granted. Prior to the hearing of the committal application, the appellant handed the child’s passport to her solicitors on 5 May 2006 to hold as stakeholders. She also handed custody of the child to the respondent on 10 May 2006, but continued to retain the child’s birth certificate.

The decisions below

7 The committal application was heard on 16 May 2006 by the same district judge who made the Ancillary Order (“the District Judge”). The District Judge held that the appellant had committed contempt of court in refusing to obey the said order. She fined the appellant $1,000 and ordered her to pay the respondent costs fixed at $1,500.

8 The appellant appealed to the High Court. The Judge dismissed her appeal for the reasons set out below (see the GD at [23]–[24]):

I do not accept the wife’s [ie, the appellant’s] submissions relating to the absence of a time frame within which she was required by the [Ancillary Order] to comply with its terms. An order of court takes effect from the date it is pronounced unless the court specifies otherwise in the said order or decides subsequently to stay the same. Although O 42 r 6(1) of the Rules of Court states that a judgment or order which requires a person to do an act must specify the time after service of the judgment or order, or some other time, within which the act is to be done, that is subject to O 42 r 6(2) which exempts orders requiring payment of money, giving of possession of immovable property or delivery of movable property. The handing over of the child’s passport and birth certificate would fall within the last category of exempted orders and, by logical extension, so could [the handing over of custody of] the child himself. Even if the child was excluded from the exemptions, there was still no excuse for not handing over the documents timeously.

Order 45 r 5 of the Rules of Court does not mean that where a judgment or order did not specify a time frame, contempt proceedings could never be taken out. In such a situation, it behoves the applicant in contempt proceedings to prove that a reasonable time for compliance had elapsed. Similarly, s 52 of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), which relates to the construction and interpretation of written law, states:

Where no time is prescribed or allowed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises. [emphasis added]

Alternatively, the applicant can apply under O 45 r 6(2) for the court to fix a time within which an act is to be done, but that is really quite unnecessary here because compliance required no more than bringing the child and the documents to the husband [ie, the respondent] or asking him to go to [the appellant’s] home to pick [the child] up together with the documents in issue. That could have been done on the day that [the High Court] dismissed the wife’s appeal [against District Judge Ling’s decision] if the wife had genuine regard for all orders of court and not just those in her favour. If the wife’s submissions were correct, it would mean that she could ignore with impunity the [Ancillary Order] until the husband took the further step of applying for a time frame for compliance. In my view, that cannot be correct.

[emphasis in original]

The parties’ contentions on appeal

9 The appellant’s main argument was that O 45 r 5(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) clearly stated that committal proceedings for disobeying a judgment or order could only be commenced, with the leave of the court, where the judgment or order had specified a time within which it had to be complied with. Absent such a stipulation, no leave could be given, and the party wishing to enforce the judgment or order must apply to court to amend the judgment or order to specify the time frame for compliance.

10 In his reply, counsel for the respondent supported the reasoning of the Judge in holding the appellant to be in contempt of court by reason of O 42 r 6 of the Rules of Court and also s 52 of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed).

Our decision

11 At the conclusion of the hearing, we allowed the appeal and set aside the Committal...