District Judge Luke Tan:
Introduction
This is case of maid abuse allegedly committed by one Rospidah Bte Tukiman (“the Accused”), a female Singaporean, against two Indonesian domestic maids, Tumijah and Retnaningsih (“Retna”).
Before me, the Accused faced a total of six charges, consisting originally of 4 charges for voluntarily causing hurt (VCH) under section 323 read with (r/w) section 73(2) Cap 224, and two charges for using criminal force under section 352 Cap 224. The first four charges named Retna as the victim (the “Retna charges”), while the 5th and 6th charges named Tumijah as the victim (the “Tumijah charges”).
The offences were allegedly committed by the Accused in late 2015 and early 2016. The first of the alleged offences (5th charge) occurred sometime between August and October 2015 when Tumijah was working as a maid for the Accused. Thereafter, Tumijah went to work for the Accused’s sister, while Retna (who was not known to Tumijah) worked for the Accused. The four Retna charges were alleged to have taken place between 1 January and 18 January 2016 during this period that she was working for the Accused. Retna ran away from the Accused’s household on 19 January 2016 and Tumijah returned to work for the Accused. The 6th charge, involving Tumijah, was alleged to have occurred on 15 February 2016 after she returned. All six offences were alleged to have occurred at the Accused’s home.
The details of the Retna charges were originally as follows: 1st charge (MCN 900575 – 2017): it was alleged that the Accused used criminal force on Retna by spraying her with water using the shower head, wiping her face with a dirty cloth and spitting on her, an offence under section 352 Cap 224; 2nd charge (MCN 900576 – 2017): it was alleged that the Accused used criminal force on Retna by using a vacuum cleaner to vacuum Retna’s face once, an offence under section 352 Cap 224; 3rd charge (MCN 900577 – 2017): it was alleged that the Accused voluntary caused hurt to Retna by kneeing her lower back causing her bodily pain, an offence under section S. 323 r/w s. 73(2) Cap 224; and 4th charge (MCN 900578 – 2017): it was alleged that the Accused voluntarily caused hurt to Retna by pressing her forehead with her fingers and subsequently kneeing her lower back, causing bodily pain, an offence under section S. 323 r/w s. 73(2) Cap 224.
The details of the Tumijah charges were originally as follows: 5th charge (MCN 900579-2017): it was alleged that sometime in August to October 2015, the Accused had forcefully used a fork to poke Tumijah’s left hand near her wrist area, causing her hurt, an offence under section S. 323 r/w s. 73(2) Cap 224.; 6th charge (MCN 900580-2017): it was alleged that on the evening of 15 February 2016, the Accused pushed Tumijah’s head against the toilet wall and used the shower head to hit her head and left hand, causing her to suffer a 2cm abrasion over her right scalp and superficial abrasions over her left third and fourth knuckles, an offence under section S. 323 r/w s. 73(2) Cap 224.
The Prosecution applied for a joint trial of all six charges on the basis that under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Accused may be tried at one trial if these six offences “form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character.” The Defence, through the Accused’s former counsel, objected to the application for joinder, arguing that there should be separate trials for each victim. After hearing arguments from parties, I allowed the Prosecution’s application for a joint trial.
Thereafter, the Prosecution proceeded to call the two victims, Tumijah and Retna, to testify, as well as led evidence from other witnesses such as the former Investigation Officer/recorder of the Accused’s statement, a police officer who recorded the First Information Report from Tumijah, a doctor who examined Tumijah etc.
At the end of the Prosecution’s case, the Prosecution applied to amend two of the six charges (1st and 3rd charges) which involved Retna. At the end of the trial, the court also amended the 6th charge which involved Tumijah. The Accused continued to maintain her innocence and claimed trial to all the amended charges.
After carefully reviewing the testimony of the witnesses, the documentary evidence put forward which included a statement from the Accused, as well as the submissions of both parties, I decided as follows: For the first four charges which named Retna as the victim, I was of the view that the Prosecution had failed to prove any of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and I therefore acquitted the Accused on all four charges. For the 5th and 6th charges which named Tumijah as the victim, I was of the view that the Prosecution had successfully proved them beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Accused was convicted on these two charges.
Following this, and after hearing parties on their respective sentencing positions, I imposed a sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment for the 5th charge, and 11 months’ imprisonment for the 6th charge, with the sentences to run consecutively for a global sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment. I also ordered the Accused to pay a sum of $3,500 in compensation to Tumijah, in default of which she is to serve 3 weeks’ imprisonment.
The Accused has filed an appeal against her conviction and sentence in respect of the 5th and 6th charges. The Prosecution has filed an appeal against the sentence imposed for the same two charges. The Accused is currently on bail pending the hearing of the appeals.
While there was no appeal filed against the order of acquittal in respect of the first four Retna charges, in order to set out in a more comprehensive manner my reasons for finding the Accused guilty on the 5th and 6th charges, I will briefly set out the reasons why I allowed a joinder and why I acquitted the Accused of the Retna charges, only in so far as these matters were relevant to my findings on the Accused’s guilt on the Tumijah charges. I will then briefly outline the evidence put forward by parties for the Tumijah charges before setting out the reasons for my verdict and the sentences that I ultimately imposed.
Brief Discussion of the application for a joint trial
I will start with the Prosecution’s application for a joint trial for all six charges.
Parties’ arguments in brief
In essence, the Prosecution argued that I should have a joint trial since the 6 offences “form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character” within the meaning of section 133 of the CPC, as they were all offences of violence against foreign domestic workers within the Accused’s household. Moreover, the time period of the Retna charges was sandwiched between that of the Tumijah charges, “showing a continuing pattern of behaviour across time”. In addition, the use of a shower head featured in both the 1st charge relating to Retna, as well as the 6th charge relating to Tumijah. Finally, even if the court finds that there would be some prejudice to hearing from both victims at the same trial, the court retained the discretion to decide whether the degree of prejudice presented justified an order for separate trials (citing Yong Pung How CJ at [60] of Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 278 (“Lee Kwang Peng”)).
The Defence objected to a joint trial arguing that separate proceedings were necessary to ensure that the Accused was accorded fair trials and would not be overwhelmed by having to defend several unconnected charges or distinct offences. Further, the Prosecution was unable to satisfy the requirements under section 133 of the CPC for the Retna charges and Tumijah charges to be joined as there was insufficient nexus between the alleged offences, and there would not be an overlap of evidence to be tendered in support of both the Retna charges and the Tumijah charges. Further, even if section 133 of the CPC was satisfied, the court should nevertheless exercise its direction under section 146 of the CPC to direct for separate trials for the Retna and Tumijah charges as this would be in the interests of justice, and would prevent prejudice and embarrassment caused to the Accused in the preparation of her defence to the charges.
Court’s decision on the joinder application
Section 133 of the CPC provides that an accused may be tried at one trial if the offences “form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character.” In Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1971] AC 29 (“Ludlow”), the court gave guidelines as to what is meant by the phrase “series of offences of same or similar character” In essence: There must be some nexus between the offences proceeded with, such as in a case where the evidence of one offence would be admissible on the trial of the other offence (see p 39 of Ludlow, and also p 836 of R v Kray [1969] 3 WLR 831 (“Kray”)); Further, to determine if the offences are of the “same or similar character”, the court would have to consider both the law and the facts of the offences, and factors like the similarity in the nature and ingredient of the offences involved, the location and time interval of the offences are relevant considerations (see p 39 of Ludlow). As for whether a joint trial would be prejudicial or embarrassing to the accused, and whether separate trials would be in the interests of justice, relevant factors to consider include: Whether it would be proper and convenient for the offences to be tried together (p 40 of Ludlow); Whether it would be oppressive to accused, and expensive and inconvenient for the prosecution, to have separate trials when one would suffice (p 41 of Ludlow); Further, the judge has no duty to direct separate trials unless there is some feature to make a joint trial embarrassing or potentially prejudicial to the accused, such as when offences are too numerous and complicated, when it...
