District Judge Terence Tay:
INTRODUCTION
The accused was a 33-year-old female Singaporean who pleaded guilty to the following charges:
| |
|
| Charge | Brief Particulars |
| 1 | Section 10(1) punishable under section 10(3) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, Rev Ed 2004) (the “ RTA ”) Used a de-registered motor car bearing registration number SGT4325Z (the “Vehicle) on 13 April 2017 at about 6:50 pm on Bencoolen Street when its registration had been cancelled by the Registrar of Vehicles on 11 April 2017. |
| 2 | Section 3(1) punishable under section 3(2) and (3) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, Rev Ed 2000) (the “ MVA ”) Used the Vehicle on 13 April 2017 at about 6:50 pm on Bencoolen Street when there was not in force a policy of insurance in respect of third-party risks. |
| 3 | Rule 22(a) Road Traffic Rules (R 20) (the “ RTR ”) Parked the Vehicle on 11 November 2016 at about 7:46 pm along Mariam Way, between the edge of a roadway and a portion of unbroken double white lines. |
The accused also consented to one charge each under section 15 of the RTA and rule 22(a) of the RTR being taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing (the “TIC Charges”).
The facts in relation to Charge 1 and Charge 2 were unremarkable, a summary of which is as follows: The accused had been the registered owner of the Vehicle since 4 September 2012. The Vehicle’s policy of insurance expired on 21 October 2016. The Vehicle was deregistered on 11 April 2017 as its certificate of entitlement expired. The accused was detected passing through the electronic road pricing gantry on Bencoolen Street on 13 April 2017 at about 6:50 pm.
The facts in relation to Charge 3 were as set out in the charge.
After considering the defence counsel’s mitigation, which asserted special reasons not to impose a disqualification order, I sentenced the accused to a fine of $600 (in default of which 3 days’ imprisonment) for each of the charges proceeded with, and imposed a disqualification order of twelve months for all classes of driving licences for Charge 2.
The accused paid the global fine of $1,800 but filed a notice of appeal, through her defence counsel, against the disqualification order on 27 November 2018.
Pending the appeal, I allowed the defence counsel’s application for a stay of execution on the accused’s disqualification order.
MITIGATION
The prosecution did not address the court on sentence.
The defence counsel tendered a written mitigation plea (the “Written Submissions”) and made further oral submissions (the “Oral Submissions”) (collectively, the “Mitigation”) on behalf of the accused. The Mitigation averred that there were special reasons for the court not to impose a disqualification order or to impose a disqualification order of less than twelve months.
The material portions of the Written Submissions may be summarized as follows: The accused had driven the Vehicle only once on 13 April 2017 and it was for the purpose of surrendering the Vehicle or leaving it with the dealers to renew the policy of insurance. The court had to give effect to the ordinary words used by Parliament and “special reasons” meant out of the ordinary and it should not place an exceptional burden on the accused to raise the defence of “special reason”. The court had the powers to impose a disqualification order of less than twelve months because of the words in parenthesis in section 3(3) MVA: “unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise and without prejudice to the power of the court to order a longer period of disqualification”.
In the Oral Mitigation, the defence counsel added that the accused had “no choice” but to drive in order to rectify the policy of insurance for the Vehicle and it was a “one-off thing”:
| |
|
| Singh: | So, what we are trying to say is, this is just a---a special kind of situation where it was not intentional, Your Honour. And actually she was going to the dealer to either dispose or---or renew the thing, actually, Your Honour, when this thing happened. So, that’s why we are saying it’s a special circumstance, Your Honour. |
| … | |
| Singh: | …[W]hat I’m trying to say Your Honour is, she was at that point in time going to rectify this---this lack of insurance if possible of---in---in case she want to renew the---the---the vehicle or dispose the vehicle completely. That’s what she was going for. So, which is actually di---directly addresses the issue here, Your Honour. Which is the insurance, Your Honour. |
| … | |
| Singh: | …[W]hat we are saying is, at---as---she got no choice but to do this, it’s just a one-off thing. |
The defence counsel also explained that the accused’s car dealer was in Katong but she had driven to Bencoolen Street because she wanted to collect some money from a money lender:
| |
|
| Singh: | …what we are trying to say is actually it’s a one-off incident, Your Honour. She has not been driving from the time when the insurance was off. A---which is October 2016, until April 2017 when she actually had to make the decision whether to renew or dispose the vehicle. Actually she---her dealer is in Katong, Your Honour, Katong Shopping Centre but she was caught at Bencoolen, Your Honour. How she ended up in Bencoolen is actually she went to c---collect some money from the money lender and before going to the dealer, Your Honour. That’s how she ended up there. So this was a ---just a one-off incident, Your Honour. So, we are pleading that mercy be given here and my client actually requires the vehicle for her daily---for job and all these things. |
THE PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO “SPECIAL REASONS”
As a starting point, “special reasons” could only be founded on circumstances that were peculiar to the offence and not the offender:
In this regard, I refer to the decision of Thomson CJ in ordering mandatory disqualification in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Isa [1963] MLJ 135 where he made several useful observations. The appellant had pleaded guilty to a charge of permitting an unlicensed person to drive his motorcycle and...
