Public Prosecutor v Joye Goh Hui Ci

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Shawn Ho
• Judgment Date: 22 May 2023
• Neutral Citation: [2023] SGDC 99
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: District Arrest Case No. 912262 of 2022 & Ors
• Hearing Date: 17 May 2023
• Citation: [2023] SGDC 99
• Year: 2023
• Plaintiff Counsel: Mr Chin Jincheng (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Defendant Counsel: Mr Cory Wong (Invictus Law Corporation)
• Subject Matter: Criminal Law,Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Disqualification,Special Reasons
• Published date: 27 May 2023

District Judge Shawn Ho: Introduction

The Accused, Ms Joye Goh Hui Ci, pleaded guilty to one charge under s 3(1) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed).

The sole issue was whether there were special reasons regarding the driving disqualification. The Defence sought a driving disqualification of not more than 11 months for four reasons: Given her Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and a previous abusive relationship, the Accused’s culpability had to be seen in context.¹ She had “permitted Desmond to drive (the car) as she was in a relationship with Desmond and was afraid of rejecting his request”² (“Fear argument”) (see [37]-[42]). She had just given birth on 1 February 2023 and being a young and unwed mother, it was a particularly stressful period³ (“Compassionate Grounds argument”) (see [43]-[45]). She had been remanded for at least 5 days⁴ (“Remand argument”) (see [46]-[51]). She was untraced and had not reoffended⁵ (“Clean Record argument”) (see [52]-[61]).

All things considered, while I empathised with the Accused’s personal circumstances, there was no special reason to dispense with the 12-month disqualification. She was fined $500.

No appeal has been lodged. I set out my reasons.

Charges

The Accused pleaded guilty to one charge under s 3(1) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (“the Act”).

The charge was as follows:

You, are charged that you, on 20 December 2021, at about 8.31pm, at the vicinity of Blk 165 Stirling Road, did permit one Desmond Tee Guo Quan to use a motor vehicle bearing registration number SMU3796C, whilst there was not in force in relation to the use of SMU3796C by the said Desmond Tee Guo Quan a policy of insurance or a security in respect of third-party risks that complied with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (“MVA”), and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 3(1) of the MVA punishable under Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the MVA.⁶

The Accused consented for 6 other charges to be taken into consideration for sentencing purposes. These charges comprised: 2 charges under s 3(1) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Act for permitting Desmond Tee Guo Quan (“Desmond”) to use a motorcar, whilst there was not in force for the use of the vehicle, such an insurance policy or a security for third-party risks that complied with the Act’s requirements;⁷ 3 charges under s 35(2) punishable under s 35(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, Rev Ed 2004) for permitting Desmond to drive a motorcar when he did not hold a Singapore Class 3 driving license;⁸ and 1 charge under s 182 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) for giving false information to a public servant, viz. an auxiliary police officer.⁹

Statement of facts

The Accused is Joye Goh Hui Ci, a 24-year-old female Singaporean.¹⁰

The involved party is Desmond Tee Guo Quan, a 30-year-old male Singaporean. At the time of the offences, the Accused was in a relationship with Desmond.¹¹

Sometime before 20 December 2021, the Accused rented a black-coloured motorcar bearing registration number SMU3796C (“SMU3796C”).¹²

On 20 December 2021, sometime before 8.31p.m., the Accused permitted Desmond to drive SMU3796C. At the material time, Desmond did not possess a valid Class 3 driving license. In her own investigative statements, the Accused admitted to knowing that Desmond did not possess a valid Class 3 driving license, but permitted Desmond to drive SMU3796C as she was in a relationship with Desmond and was afraid of rejecting his request.¹³

On 20 December 2021, at about 8.31p.m., Desmond drove SMU3796C to the vicinity of Blk 165 Stirling Road with the Accused’s permission. The Accused and three other individuals were in SMU3796C together with Desmond. Desmond drove SMU3796C to the vicinity of Blk 165 Stirling Road in order to commit acts of harassment on behalf of unlicensed moneylenders. At the material time, there was not in force in relation to the use of SMU3796C by Desmond a policy of insurance or a security in respect of third-party risks that complied with the requirements of the Act.¹⁴

The Accused and Desmond were subsequently arrested on suspicion of having committed acts of harassment on behalf of unlicensed moneylenders.¹⁵

By virtue of the foregoing, the Accused has committed an offence under s 3(1) punishable under section 3(2) and section 3(3) of the Act.¹⁶

Legislative Intent behind the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act

The Act’s preamble states that it was enacted to “provide against third-party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles and for the payment of compensation in respect of death or bodily injury arising out of the use of motor vehicles and for matters incidental thereto” (see also Poh Chu Chai, The Motor Insurer and Third-Party Rights, 19 Mal.L.R. 135 at 136, 143, and footnote 9).

Historical Background

At the second reading of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Bill, the Minister for Labour and Law, Mr K.M. Byrne, said [Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 January 1960) vol. 12 at col 16]:

This Bill re-enacts the provisions of Part II of the Road Traffic Ordinance …

By way of historical background, Part II of the Road Traffic Ordinance contained the provisions found in Part II of the Road Traffic Ordinance of the Straits Settlements 1941 (“1941 Ordinance”). Part II of the 1941 Ordinance dealt with compulsory third-party liability insurance connected with the use of motor vehicles. The 1941 Ordinance repealed the Straits Settlements Road Traffic (Third-Party Insurance) Ordinance 1938 and reproduced the provisions of the 1938 Ordinance in Part II of the 1941 Ordinance. It was the 1938 Ordinance which first introduced the principle of compulsory third-party insurance to the Straits Settlements, based on the United Kingdom model. (David Chong Gek Sian, Cross-Border Motor Accidents and the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act, (1998) 10 SAcLJ 370 at 383).

Policy behind section 3 of the Act

Having briefly examined the Act’s genesis, what is the policy behind the interpretation of section 3?

At its heart, section 3 seeks to achieve the dual aims of ensuring that victims of traffic accidents are not left without any compensation, and also to deter irresponsible motorists from driving without the appropriate insurance coverage: Er Kee Jeng v Public Prosecutor [2006] 2 SLR(R) 485 at [39]. Bringing this to sharper focus is the fact that Parliament has deemed it fit to make the offence one of strict liability with only a limited defence in s 3(4): Muhammad Faizal bin Rahim v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 116 (“Muhammad Faizal bin Rahim”) at [39].

For the background behind s 3(4) of the Act, see the remarks of the Minister for Labour and Law, Mr K.M. Byrne, during the second reading of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Bill [Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 January 1960) vol. 12 at col 19].

The Act’s raison d'etre is to protect third-party road users, not the insured driver: Public Prosecutor v Lee Hong Hwee [2004] 1 SLR(R) 39 at [31]. In other words, s 3(1) seeks to ensure that compensation would be available to persons involved in accidents on the road. For that reason, contravening s 3(1) is a serious offence: Stewart Ashley James v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 106 at [17].

The seriousness of the offence finds expression in the mandatory 12-month disqualification order and a possible custodial sentence that avail the judge in sentencing the offender: Muhammad Faizal bin Rahim at [40].

At this juncture, I paused to observe that the gravity of s 3 is underscored by the mandatory imprisonment for such offences in England in the past: Wilkinson’s Road Traffic Offences (Thomson Reuters, 28th Ed, 2017) at [21-11]:

“Prior to 1965, disqualification or, at one time, imprisonment was obligatory for using a motor vehicle without insurance, or causing or permitting such use” (emphasis added).

The policy behind the mandatory 12-month disqualification order is deterrence: Muhammad Faizal bin Rahim at [40]. This is because a 12-month disqualification order would mean that for the entire year in which the order is in effect, the offender is reminded every day of her offence and the unwarranted risks in which she had placed ordinary members of the public: Sivakumar s/o Rajoo v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 SLR(R) 265 (“Sivakumar s/o Rajoo”) at [28]. As stated in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Isa [1963] MLJ 135, the most satisfactory penalty for most motoring offences is disqualification because a fine is paid once and then forgotten.

In sum, it would be repugnant to the Act’s legislative intention if motorists do not face the criminal consequences of driving without appropriate insurance coverage: Saimonn Teo Rong Zhi v Public Prosecutor [2013] SGHC 185 at [27].

Submissions on sentence Prescribed punishment

The prescribed punishment for s 3(1) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Act is: A fine not exceeding $1,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or to both and A driving disqualification for a period of 12 months or longer from the date of the conviction, unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise.

An offence’s statutory maximum sentence signals the gravity in which Parliament views such offences. A sentencing judge ought to take this into account when determining precisely where the offender’s conduct falls within the entire range of punishment set by Parliament: Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR(R) 684 at [44] (Benny Tan, Assessing the Effectiveness of Sentencing Guideline Judgments in...