Public Prosecutor v Charan Singh

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tay Yong Kwang J
• Judgment Date: 27 May 2013
• Neutral Citation: [2013] SGHC 115
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Magistrate’s Appeal No 259 of 2012
• Year: 2013
• Published date: 31 July 2019
• Hearing Date: 12 April 2013
• Plaintiff Counsel: Edward Ti (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Defendant Counsel: Ramesh Tiwary (Ramesh Tiwary)
• Subject Matter: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing
• Citation: [2013] SGHC 115

Tay Yong Kwang J: Introduction

This was an appeal by the Prosecution against the fine of $10,000 (in default 8 weeks’ imprisonment) imposed on the accused (“the Respondent”). The Respondent was at the material time a senior investigation officer in the Land Transport Authority (“LTA”). The Respondent had claimed trial to one charge alleging an offence punishable under s 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“the PCA”) but after two and a half days of trial, he decided to plead guilty. At the conclusion of the appeal, I allowed the appeal and doubled the fine. I now set out my reasons.

The Charge

The Respondent pleaded guilty before the learned district judge and was convicted on the following charge:

You, Charan Singh ... are charged that you, on 15 January 2008, at 10 Sin Ming Drive Singapore 575701, being an agent, to wit, a Senior Investigation Officer in the employ of the Land Transport Authority (LTA), did knowingly use with intent to deceive your principal, LTA, a receipt, to wit, a “Cash Sale” receipt bearing No. 1096 from ‘Ong Motor Trading’ dated 9 April 2007, in respect of which LTA was interested, and which contains a statement to the effect that Ong Motor Trading had sold a Honda TA200 motorcycle bearing registration No. FBA272C for a sum of $3264.20 to you, which is false in a material particular and which to your knowledge was intended to mislead your principal, LTA, and you have thereby committed an offence under section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap.241.

The Background

At the material time, the Respondent was a senior investigation officer attached to the Investigations Department of the LTA. On 11 February 2008, the LTA referred a case of suspected corruption involving the Respondent to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”). The referral by the LTA stated, among other things, that the Respondent had bought a motorcycle from a company called Super Bike Centre Pte Ltd (“Super Bike”). At the time the Respondent purchased the motorcycle from Super Bike, he had been assigned as Investigating Officer (“IO”) to investigate into possible offences committed by Super Bike.

Sometime in March 2007, the Respondent met Tan Sock Cheng Jennifer (“Tan”), a director of Super Bike and they discussed the purchase of a Honda Phantom motorcycle by the Respondent from Super Bike. Tan informed the Respondent that Super Bike had a second hand Honda Phantom motorcycle for sale. It was agreed between Tan and the Respondent that the sale price would be $3264.20 and that the Respondent would pay for the motorcycle in cash.

In early April 2007, the Respondent contacted Tan and told her that he did not want a sales receipt to be issued by Super Bike in respect of the motorcycle. Instead, he wanted a sales receipt by another company. The Respondent explained to Tan that he did not want a Super Bike receipt as he was Super Bike’s IO and his superiors would be unhappy if they found out that he had purchased a motorcycle from Super Bike.

By that time, Tan had already written a purchase order bearing No 11471 in respect of the motorcycle in Super Bike’s official receipt book and listed the Respondent as the buyer. As the Respondent had informed Tan that he did not want a sales receipt from Super Bike, Tan did not issue the Super Bike purchase order to the Respondent. To accede to the Respondent’s request, Tan asked her co-director, Lee Hock Hui (“Lee”), whether he could help obtain a sales receipt in respect of the motorcycle from another shop selling motorcycles.

Lee contacted his long-time acquaintance, Ong Ting Hui (“Ong”), the owner and sole-proprietor of Ong Motor Trading (“Ong Motor”) and asked him whether he could issue a false invoice in respect of the sale of the motorcycle. Ong agreed to help Lee and subsequently liaised with Tan to obtain the Respondent’s name and address before issuing a cash sale receipt bearing No 1096 which stated to the effect that the Respondent had purchased the motorcycle from Ong Motor.

Although the Respondent knew that he had purchased the motorcycle from Super Bike and not Ong Motor, he kept the receipt from Ong Motor so that he could, if asked, “prove” that he had purchased the motorcycle from Ong Motor and not Super Bike.

Sometime on 14 January 2008, the Respondent’s supervisor and head of investigations, Tan Tai Guan Roger (“Roger”), came to know that according to LTA’s records, the said motorcycle had been transferred to the Respondent from Super Bike on 4 April 2007. In the morning of 15 January 2008, Roger together with his own superiors, Peter Leong (Manager of Investigations) (“Leong”), Patrick Phoa (Deputy Manager) (“Phoa”) and Karine Jeow (Deputy Manager) (“Jeow”) confronted the Respondent with this information. The Respondent denied purchasing the motorcycle from Super Bike and said that he had bought the motorcycle from Ong Motor. The Respondent said that he could substantiate his claim with a receipt from Ong Motor but as he did not have the receipt with him at that point in time, he said that he would show the group the receipt from Ong Motor that same afternoon.

In the afternoon of 15 January 2008, the Respondent met Leong in Leong’s office at the LTA and handed to Leong the cash receipt from Ong Motor and lied again to Leong that he did not purchase any motorcycle from Super Bike and had instead bought the motorcycle from Ong Motor, as “evidenced” by the receipt. The Respondent added that the receipt was proof of what he had claimed in the morning of 15 January 2008. He then left Leong’s office. Soon after the Respondent left Leong’s office, Leong showed the receipt from Ong Motor to Roger, Phoa and Jeow. After looking at the receipt, Roger believed the Respondent’s claim that he had purchased the motorcycle from Ong Motor since the Respondent was a senior IO who had been with LTA for many years. Upon further consideration, Leong decided to inform Leong’s own superior, Alvin Chia (Deputy Director) (“Chia”). Chia decided to conduct a further interview session with the Respondent that evening.

At about 5.20pm on 15 January 2008, Chia, Leong, Phoa, Jeow and Roger met the Respondent in a meeting room in LTA to ask him again whether he had purchased or otherwise obtained the motorcycle from Super Bike. At the start of the interview, the Respondent maintained his lie that he had bought the motorcycle from Ong Motor sometime in April 2007. Upon further questioning by Chia however, the Respondent admitted that he had lied and that the motorcycle had been bought from Super Bike.

The Law

Section 6 of the PCA reads:

6.— If —

(a) any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business;

(b) any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gratification to any agent as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business; or

(c) any person knowingly gives to an agent, or if an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested, and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead the principal,

he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to both.

It should be noted that the Respondent was charged under s 6(c) of the PCA which, unlike ss 6(a) and 6(b), does not contain the word “corruptly”. In Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR(R) 523 (“Knight Glenn”), Thean J clarified s 6(c) in relation to ss 6(a) and 6(b) at [20]:

The charge under s 6(c) of the Act does not imply any corruption at all. The word “corruptly” which is present in para (a) and (b) of s 6 is absent in para (c). But the offence under s 6(c) does imply an element of dishonesty. In effect, it is an offence of cheating under a different statutory provision. On the facts admitted by the appellant, he could be charged for cheating under s 417 or s 420 of the Code. The Prosecution, however, has brought this charge under s 6(c) of the Act and is fully entitled to do so. A charge under s 6(c) of the Act is more serious than that under s 417 of the Code. This is clearly evident from the penalty provided in s 6 as compared to that provided in s 417 of the Code. Under s 6, the maximum penalty is a fine of $100,000 or a term of imprisonment of five years or both, whereas under s 417 the maximum term of imprisonment is one year or a fine or both. In my opinion, the second charge is more serious than the first. ...

Further, the court in Ong Beng Leong v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SLR(R) 766 (“Ong Beng Leong”) noted at [50] that s 6(c) of the PCA was silent on the issue of actual deception and merely focused on the intent to deceive.

In Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR(R) 684 at [14], it was held that an appellate court would interfere with the sentence imposed if it was satisfied that: the sentencing judge had made the wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for sentence; there had been an error on the part of the trial judge in appreciating the material placed before him; the sentence was wrong in principle; ors the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive...