PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: George Wei J
• Judgment Date: 30 January 2018
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Suit No 542 of 2012 (Summons No 5464 of 2017)
• Date: 30 January 2018

PT Sandipala Arthaputra

and

STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd

[2017] SGHC 20

George Wei J

Suit No 542 of 2012 (Summons No 5464 of 2017)

High Court

Contempt of Court — Civil contempt — Contemnors disobeying orders of court — Whether contemnors liable for contempt of court

Contempt of Court — Sentencing — Principles — Contemnors eventually complying with orders of court — Whether contemnors have purged contempt

Held, committing each contemnor to seven days' imprisonment for contempt of court:

(1) Since 1 October 2017, the law on contempt of court in Singapore was found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016) (“the AJPA”): at [41].

(2) It followed that the AJPA only applied to the second and third breaches of the EJD Orders on 11 October 2017 and 1 November 2017. The first breach, which was on 25 September 2017, remained governed by the former common law of contempt: at [42]

(3) The AJPA sought to state and consolidate the law of contempt of court. Its provisions prevailed over the common law to the extent of inconsistency. However, the common law rules would be preserved where they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the AJPA: at [43].

(4) The basic principles at common law and under the AJPA were similar. At common law, an action for civil contempt was directed at securing compliance with an order of court, to specifically and generally deter contemptuous behaviour and to protect and preserve the authority of the Singapore courts. The criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied for finding contempt of court. However, the AJPA repealed all common law defences to contempt of court that were not set out in the AJPA: at [44] and [45].

(5) The court would adopt a two-step approach in determining whether the alleged contemnor's conduct amounted to contempt of court. First, the court would interpret the plain meaning of the language used in the order of court to decide what exactly the alleged contemnor was required to do. Any ambiguity in the language would be resolved in favour of the person who had to comply with the order. Second, the court would determine whether the requirements of the order of court were fulfilled: at [46].

(6) The threshold to establish the necessary mens rea for a finding of contempt of court was a low one. The complainant only had to show that the relevant conduct of the alleged contemnor was intentional and that it knew of all the facts which made such conduct a breach of the order. This included knowledge of the existence of the order and its material terms. The complainant did not need to show that the alleged contemnor appreciated that he was breaching the order. Liability was strict in the sense that all that was required to be proved was service of the order and the subsequent omission by the party to comply with the order. The motive or intention of the alleged contemnor and his reasons for disobedience were only relevant to the question of mitigation: at [47], [48] and [65].

(7) It was clear that Paulus and Catherine had disobeyed the three EJD Orders. The terms of the EJD Orders were clear and unambiguous. Aside from attending the EJD hearings, Paulus and Catherine were required to produce relevant books and documents in their possession. They had full knowledge of the terms of the EJD Orders and what they were required to do. It was no defence for them to assert that they believed they were unable to answer the EJD questionnaires because of their bankruptcies in Indonesia. The EJD proceedings were simply to obtain information on the assets and income and could not amount to an interference with the Indonesian bankruptcies: at [50], [51], [63] and [64].

(8) The appropriate sanction had to depend on the facts of each case and the nature of the contempt. Imprisonment was usually a measure of last resort. Some of the relevant factors for sentencing included (but were not limited to) whether the applicant was prejudiced, whether the contempt was capable of being remedied, whether the breach was deliberate or unintentional, and whether the contemnor co-operated: at [68] and [69].

(9) That Paulus and Catherine finally provided their answers to the EJD questionnaires on 27 November 2017 did little to mitigate, let alone purge, the contempt. Those answers were nothing but bare denials of assets and income, and did not, for example, identify a single bank account in Singapore or elsewhere belonging to Paulus and/or Catherine over the past five years despite the fact that their family had moved to Singapore in 2012. Looking at the three breaches and the events thereafter, Paulus and Catherine had not shown any genuine remorse or taken real and substantial steps to address the breaches: at [77] and [83].

Case(s) referred to

Cartier International BV v Lee Hock Lee [1992] 3 SLR(R) 340; [1993] 1 SLR 616 (refd)

Global Distressed Alpha Fund I Ltd Partnership v PT Bakrie Investindo [2013] SGHC 105 (refd)

Ho Kok Cheong Bankruptcy No 1235 of 1987, Re [1995] SGHC 121 (refd)

Maruti Shipping Pte Ltd v Tay Sien Djim [2014] SGHC 227 (refd)

Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (refd)

Monex Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v E-Clearing (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 1169 (folld)

OCM Opportunities Fund II, LP v Burhan Uray [2005] 3 SLR(R) 60; [2005] 3 SLR 60 (refd)

Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518; [2007] 2 SLR 518 (refd)

Precious Wishes Ltd v Sinoble Metalloy International (Pte) Ltd [2000] SGHC 5 (refd)

PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 102 (refd)

PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 191 (refd)

Sembcorp Marine Ltd v Aurol Anthony Sabastian [2013] 1 SLR 245 (refd)

STX Corp v Jason Surjana Tanuwidjaja [2014] 2 SLR 1261 (refd)

Tahir v Tay Kar Oon [2016] 3 SLR 296 (refd)

Tan Beow Hiong v Tan Boon Aik [2010] 4 SLR 870 (refd)

Tan Khee Eng John, Re [1997] 1 SLR(R) 870; [1997] 3 SLR 382 (refd)

Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 (refd)

Facts

Oxel Systems Pte Ltd obtained judgment in a counterclaim against the second and third defendants in the counterclaim, Paulus Tannos (“Paulus”) and Catherine Tannos (“Catherine”) respectively (collectively, “the Tannoses”). It commenced examination of judgment debtor (“EJD”) proceedings against the Tannoses. However, despite three orders of court requiring them to do so (“the three EJD Orders”), the Tannoses failed to turn up in court for the EJD hearings on three occasions – 25 September 2017, 11 October 2017 and 1 November 2017. The Tannoses also did not answer the EJD questionnaires on their assets and income until 27 November 2017. On Oxel's application, leave was granted on 27 November 2017 for the commencement of committal proceedings against the Tannoses.

Legislation referred to

Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Commencement) Notification 2017 (S 541/2017)

Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (Act 19 of 2016)ss 4(1),8(1),8(2),8(3),12,21,28,29,35(1)

Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 45r 5(1), O 52 r 2(2)

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed)ss 7(1),7(3)

Davinder Singh s/o Amar Singh, Jaikanth Shankar, Jaspreet Singh Sachdev, Lin Xianyang TimothyandLow Wu Yang (Drew & Napier LLC)for the plaintiff in the counterclaim;

Govintharash s/o Ramanathan and Shafkat Fahmid Sifat (Gurbani & Co LLC) for the second and third defendants in the counterclaim.

30 January 2018

George Wei J:

Introduction

1 Summons No 5464 of 2017 arises out of High Court Suit No 542 of 2012 (“the Substantive Proceedings”). The Substantive Proceedings concerned a dispute over a contract entered into around 9 December 2011 between the plaintiff, PT Sandipala Arthaputra (“Sandipala”), and the second defendant, Oxel Systems Pte Ltd (“Oxel”), for the supply of microchips (“chips”) from the first defendant, STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (“ST-AP”). These chips were needed to fulfil Sandipala's obligations under an Indonesian Government contract or award to produce electronic identification cards for its citizens.

2 In the Substantive Proceedings, Oxel counterclaimed against Sandipala as well as Paulus Tannos (“Paulus”), Catherine Tannos (“Catherine”) and Lina Rawung (“Rawung”) for damages and sums due and owing to Oxel by Sandipala. The claim against Paulus, Catherine and Rawung was for conspiracy to injure Oxel by unlawful means.

3 I dismissed Sandipala's claims in the Substantive Proceedings on 12 May 2017. Oxel obtained judgment on the counterclaim for some US$21.822m plus interest against Sandipala, Paulus and Catherine. Oxel's counterclaim against Rawung was dismissed. The complete facts are set out in my earlier judgment, PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd[2017] SGHC 102 (“the Substantive Judgment”), and my supplemental judgment on interest, PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd[2017] SGHC 191.

4 Sandipala, Paulus and Catherine filed an appeal on 12 June 2017 against my substantive decision. No application was filed to stay the execution of the judgment in the Substantive Proceedings until 9 October 2017 (“the Stay Application”). By this time, Oxel had already applied for and obtained orders of court for the examination of Paulus and Catherine as judgment debtors.

5 The Stay Application was dismissed on 27 November 2017. Leave was granted to Oxel to commence committal proceedings against Paulus and Catherine for breaches of examination of judgment debtor orders (“the EJD Orders”). I heard Summons No 5464 of 2017, which was for an order of committal, on 12 January 2018.

6 After hearing the parties and considering the submissions, I found Paulus and Catherine to have committed wilful...