PP v Chua Wen Hao

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 26 March 2021
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeals Nos 9018 of 2020/01 and 9018 of 2020/02
• Year: 2021
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Public Prosecutor

and

Chua Wen Hao and another appeal

[2021] SGHC 70

Sundaresh Menon CJ

Magistrate's Appeals Nos 9018 of 2020/01 and 9018 of 2020/02

General Division of the High Court

Criminal Law — Offences — Contempt of lawful authority of public servants — Accused falsely stating he did not know person who committed mischief by fire — False statements causing police to spend additional time establishing person's identity — Whether accused caused public servant to do what such public servant ought not to do — Section 182 Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Sentencing — Appeals — Whether custodial threshold was crossed — Section 177 Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)

Held, dismissing the Prosecution's appeal, allowing the Defence's cross-appeal, substituting the s 182 charge with a s 177 charge, and sentencing Mr Chua to a fine of $2,500:

(1) To prove a s 182 offence, the Prosecution had to show that: (a) the accused person gave information to a public servant; (b) such information was false; (c) the accused person knew or believed that such information was false; and (d) the accused person intended thereby to cause, or knew it to be likely that he or she would thereby cause, the public servant to: (i) use his or her lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of another person; or (ii) do something which he or she ought not to do if the true state of facts were known to him or her; or (iii) omit to do something which he or she ought not to omit if the true state of facts were known to him or her: at [19].

(2) It was evident that s 182 was not concerned with simply any false statement made to a public servant, nor with simply any effect caused by a false statement made to a public servant. Section 182 was concerned with the situation where a public servant abused, misused or improperly withheld the use of his or her lawful powers as a result of a false statement made to him or her. At the core of this offence lay the exercise by a public servant of lawful powers that ought not to have been exercised or the omission by a public servant to exercise lawful powers that ought to have been exercised if the false information had not been provided to him or her, rather than to protect a public servant from the inefficient exercise of his or her lawful powers. This distinction between the misuse and the inefficient use of lawful powers by a public servant as a consequence of false information provided to him or her was consistent with the gradation of offences that was reflected in Chapter X of the Penal Code: at [20] to [23].

(3) On the facts of the present case, the s 182 charge against Mr Chua could not be made out. Although the police might not have had to conduct investigations into B1's identity for as long a period as they did if Mr Chua had not provided the false information, there was no question that the police were exercising their lawful powers properly in carrying out such investigations. There was no misuse of these powers, and the police would have had to investigate the setting of fire to the Hotel's towels even if Mr Chua had not provided any false information: at [21].

(4) On the question of sentence under the reframed charge, it was clear in the circumstances of this case that deterrence was the dominant sentencing consideration. The offence under s 177 of the Penal Code could not be said to be trivial and Mr Chua had not demonstrated such a strong propensity for reform that could displace the need for deterrence: at [33].

(5) Contrary to what the Defence submitted, it was not appropriate to order a conditional discharge. There was nothing that could fairly be described as exceptional either about Mr Chua or the nature of his offence. Mr Chua had not shown demonstrably good character and Mr Chua's offence was, by its nature, not one that could be said to be the result of inadvertent oversight: at [34] and [36].

(6) The relevant sentencing options were either a fine or a term of imprisonment or both. For the purpose of determining whether the threshold for imposing a custodial term had been crossed, the principles which pertained to sentencing for the offence under s 182 of the Penal Code applied with equal force to the offence under s 177 of the Penal Code. If appreciable harm might be caused by the offence, a custodial term should, as a starting point, be imposed. However, other relevant sentencing factors should then be taken into account to determine: (a) whether the starting point should be departed from; and (b) what the appropriate quantum of fine and/or length of imprisonment should be: at [37].

(7) The offence-specific and offender-specific factors relevant to a sentence for an offence under s 177 of the Penal Code included: (a) the complexity of the deceptive scheme employed to deceive the public servant; (b) the seriousness of the predicate offence that the offender sought to conceal; (c) the extent to which public resources were wasted as a result of the false information provided; (d) the offender's culpability; (e) the offender's antecedents; (f) the offender's plea of guilt; and (g) charges taken into consideration: at [45].

(8) The threshold for imposing a custodial sentence had not been crossed. First, although some harm was occasioned by Mr Chua's offence in that the police might not have had to spend as many man-hours attempting to establish B1's identity as they did if Mr Chua had not provided the false information, the harm occasioned was not of a high degree as the investigative inquiries undertaken by the police could not be said to be a complete waste of time and public resources. Second, the offence was not premeditated or planned. Third, Mr Chua's culpability was, on the whole, low, in so far as he had lied to shield his friend, as opposed to himself, from investigation. Fourth, Mr Chua was untraced and a first-time offender: at [46].

(9) A fine of a suitable quantum could have a sufficient and effective deterrent effect. It was wrong to think that whenever deterrence was the principal sentencing consideration, a term of imprisonment had to be imposed. Deterrence had to be applied with due regard for proportionality between the gravity of the offender's conduct and the punishment that was imposed as a result: at [47] and [48].

[Observation: In the precedents cited to the court, the quantum of the fines imposed clustered at the lower end of the permitted range. Sentencing courts in the future should consider calibrating the sentences under s 177 of the Penal Code in a way that better utilised the full sentencing range provided for in s 177: at [54].]

Case(s) referred to

A Karthik v PP [2018] 5 SLR 1289 (folld)

Chia Kah Boon v PP [1999] 2 SLR(R) 1163; [1999] 4 SLR 72 (folld)

Kalaiarasi d/o Marimuthu Innasimuthu v PP [2012] 2 SLR 774 (distd)

Koh Yong Chiah v PP [2017] 3 SLR 447 (folld)

Ng Kean Meng Terence v PP [2017] 2 SLR 449 (refd)

PP v Ahmad Ghuzaili bin Ismail SC 911234/2018 (refd)

PP v Chew Hoe Soon SC 904726/2017 (refd)

PP v Lau Xuanhong Louis SC 903532/2018 (refd)

PP v Lim Puay Kwang SC 903534/2018 (distd)

PP v Mugin Mariaras SC 910624/2017 (refd)

PP v Muhammad Danial bin Jalaludin SC 901589/2018 (refd)

PP v Siow Kai Yuan Terence [2020] 4 SLR 1412 (folld)

PP v Woo Tat Meng William SC 904871/2016 (refd)

PP v Zailani bin Madnam SC 910273/2015 (distd)

Pram Nair v PP [2017] 2 SLR 1015 (refd)

Siew Yit Beng v PP [2000] 2 SLR(R) 785; [2000] 3 SLR 773 (folld)

Sim Wen Yi Ernest v PP [2016] 5 SLR 207 (refd)

Tan Gek Young v PP [2017] 5 SLR 820 (refd)

Facts

An investigation officer (“the IO”) asked the accused person (“Mr Chua”) whether he knew a male subject (“B1”), who was Mr Chua's friend and direct supervisor in the Navy. B1 had set fire to some towels belonging to a hotel (“the Hotel”) at which Mr Chua had, for a brief period, occupied a room (“the Room”). Mr Chua stated falsely that he did not know B1 and had not allowed him to enter the Room. As a result of these falsehoods, the police spent a total of 21.9 man-hours trying to establish B1's identity.

Because the Prosecution and the Defence took different positions as to whether, as stated in the Statement of Facts, the IO had informed Mr Chua that B1 had set fire to the Hotel's towels, a Newton hearing was held to resolve this factual dispute. At the end of the Newton hearing, the district judge found that before recording a statement from Mr Chua, the IO had in fact informed Mr Chua that B1 had set fire to the Hotel's towels, and that such conduct constituted a serious offence. The district judge therefore accepted Mr Chua's plea of guilt. He convicted Mr Chua of the offence under s 182 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) and imposed a ten-day short detention order (“SDO”) on him.

In its appeal, the Prosecution sought an imprisonment term of at least two weeks. In the cross-appeal, the Defence submitted that the SDO sentence should be set aside in favour of either a conditional discharge or a fine. The Defence also contended that in any event, the s 182 charge that had been preferred against Mr Chua was defective because he had not known at the material time that the false information he had provided was likely to cause the IO to do something which he ought not to do if the true state of facts were known to him, namely, to investigate the identity of B1.

Legislation referred to

Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed) s 82(1)(a)

Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (Act 15 of 2019)

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) ss 10(1)(a), 22, 375, 390(3), 390(8)(a)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 182

Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) ss 177, 182 (consd); s 109, Chapter X

Poisons Rules (Cap 234, R 1, 1999 Rev Ed) rr 17(a), 17(d)

Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) s 6(b)

Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985 Rev Ed) s 8(1)

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