A nuclear weapon-free Southeast Asia and its continuing strategic significance.

• Author: Abad, Jr., M.C.

Introduction

It has been a decade since the ten countries of Southeast Asia declared the region a nuclear weapon-free zone and almost three and a half decades since the adoption of its broader policy framework, the declaration of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Many strategic developments have taken place since these two junctures. Southeast Asia has been transformed from an area of conflict into a dynamic economic region. A new pattern of relations among the major powers has emerged. At the same time, new sources of threats have surfaced. It is, perhaps, time to revisit this policy direction and ascertain its strategic relevance. In the new and fast evolving strategic environment, is the original purpose of establishing the zone still valid? What is now the strategic value of the zone?

Southeast Asia is a nuclear weapon-free zone encompassing the territories and exclusive economic zones of ten countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, herein referred to as the States Parties. The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was signed on 15 December 1995 and entered into force on 24 March 1997. (1) To date, SEANWFZ, also known as the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, is one of the seven treaty-based nuclear free zones in the world, namely the Outer Space Treaty of 1967; the Seabed Treaty of 1971; the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; Africa's Pelindaba Treaty of 1996; South America's Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967; and South Pacific's Rarotonga Treaty of 1985. The last four geographic zones almost cover the globe's southern hemisphere minus the South Asian region. These zones are alternative regimes to the nuclear deterrence posture of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which are all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), namely China, France, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States.

When a nuclear-free Southeast Asia was conceived in the mid-1970s, it was primarily meant to add to geographic areas where the activities of the NWS were to be constrained. The Treaty provides for a Protocol of accession by declared NWS to respect the Treaty and hot to contribute any act that would constitute a violation of the Treaty and its Protocol. The aim was for the States Parties to abstain from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons and for the NWS to spare the region from the risks of nuclear accidents or nuclear war among them.

While nuclear deterrence has worked so far among the declared NWS, a wider, faceless and unpredictable source of threat has emerged. The intensity of and groundwork for the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 altered the nuclear equation considerably (Ramberg 2003, p. 8). United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, writing then as National Security Adviser, described the possible nexus between outlaw regimes, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, as "the gravest threat of our time" (Rice 2003, p. A11). The ushering in of an "Age of Terror" is said to have left the international system in greater flux than at any time since immediately after World War II (Sheridan 2003, p. A11). This is one clear and present danger where SEANWFZ bas continued relevance, beyond the area denial sense for NWS, in contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or fissile material from which nuclear weapons could be developed. SEANWFZ's strategic value is bolstered by its challenging of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, in particular, and its contribution to a greater sense of security in the region in general.

The Making of SEANWFZ

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born at the height of the Cold War. A few months after its establishment, the Vietnam War reached its peak when, in the early hours of 31 January 1968, the Soviet-backed Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive and entered Saigon through Cambodia. In Europe, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, asserting its right to intervene in any communist state to thwart what it considered as counter-revolutionary tendencies, led neighbouring Warsaw Pact armies in a military invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968. China opposed this so-called Brezhnev Doctrine and accused the USSR of "social imperialism". On 16 January 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Far East and the Middle East, leaving its former colonies on their own. This ensued six months after the violent Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, which laid the foundation for future discord in the Middle East over the occupied territories. Meanwhile, Indonesia was in a drawn-out political transition with General Suharto eventually replacing President Sukarno on 27 March 1968 immediately following the country's "Confrontation" with Malaysia that involved Commonwealth forces. Interestingly, it was during this period when the Irish-sponsored Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was being debated at the United Nations and eventually opened for signature on 1 July 1968.

The concept of keeping Southeast Asia free from nuclear weapons originated from the idea of Southeast Asia as a neutral region. It was former Malaysian Foreign Minister Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman who originally called for the neutralization of Southeast Asia to be guaranteed by the major powers before the Malaysian parliament on 23 January 1968 in response to the British withdrawal and apprehensions about a "vacuum". Then in 1970, Tun Ismail raised this proposal at the UN General Assembly, arguing that it was "the only alternative" to the prospect of sustained and continuous conflict in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indochina. The proposal received a mixed reception even within Southeast Asia (Sopiee 1975, p. 137).

On 27 November 1971, ASEAN states issued the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Kuala Lumpur. The Declaration states that ZOPFAN aims to contribute in "bringing about relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia" and for every state "to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs". (2) ZOPFAN is a politically negotiated text that tried to accommodate the differences in allies and threat perceptions among the members of ASEAN. (3) The formulation of ZOPFAN was, in substance, an extension of ASEAN's founding document, the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, which attempted to declare the region free from foreign military bases, but finally settled for a provision stating that "all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area". (4)

Nevertheless, the ZOPFAN Declaration mandated ASEAN to exert efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. It was reported that the concept of neutralization under major power guarantees did not find favour with some countries in Southeast Asia. Thus, "neutrality" with its more positive connotation of self-imposition and capacity was substituted in its stead and the idea of "guarantees" by external powers was replaced by the notions of their "respect for" and "recognition of" such neutrality, thus conveying a sovereign choice of national and regional security policy (Haron 1991, p. 4). Furthermore, the ZOPFAN Declaration took cognizance of the trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone.

On 5 January 1975, the ASEAN Senior Officials (ASEAN-SOM) established the Working Group on ZOPFAN to define and elaborate what would constitute a violation of the Zone, to propose steps to deter violation of the Zone and measures to be taken in the event of such violation. The Working Group held its first meeting in Bangkok on 17-19 April 1975. In its Report, the Working Group recommended the 14-point Guidelines Constituting a Code of Conduct Governing Relations among States within the Zone and with States Outside the Zone and 10-point Expectations from Countries Outside the Zone in Recognition and Respect for ZOPFAN. The Report of the Working Group in the form of a "Conceptual Framework of the ZOPFAN" was adopted by the First ASEAN Summit, held in Bali in 1976. In May 1977, the ASEAN-SOM decided to focus on the denuclearization aspect of the Conceptual Framework. Another major proposal, a non-aggression pact, to be guaranteed by the major powers, received no consensus within ASEAN.

However, soon after the Second ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, ASEAN became preoccupied with the Indochina conflict following Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. ASEAN members round themselves debating whether or not SEANWFZ should be limited to its current members or to open it to the whole of Southeast Asia like the ASEAN's founding document, which opened the organization to participation by all countries in Southeast Asia. The primary advocates of SEANWFZ were in favour of an expansive coverage based on the argument that SEANWFZ was a component of ZOPFAN and "the only alternative" to proxy wars in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, some members did not want to extend any form of legitimacy to Vietnam by engaging it in the regional processes (Alagappa 1987, p. 2).

In 1982 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers established the ASEAN Task Force "to undertake a comprehensive review and appraisal of ASEAN cooperation". Included in the recommendations of the Task Force was the revival of the proposed denuclearization of Southeast Asia. In particular, the report recommended (a) intensifying collective actions on ZOPFAN...