Ng Teng Yi Melvin v PP

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 09 December 2013
• Date: 09 December 2013
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 130 of 2013
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Ng Teng Yi Melvin

Plaintiff

and

Public Prosecutor

Defendant

[2013] SGHC 267

Chao Hick Tin JA

Magistrate's Appeal No 130 of 2013

High Court

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing—Appeal—Appellant suffering from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder—Appellant sentenced to four months' imprisonment term for assisting in business of unlicensed moneylending—Whether imprisonment term was manifestly excessive

The appellant had been assessed to be at high risk for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (‘ADHD’) from as early as when he was 13 years old. When he was 20 years old, he was apprehended for splashing paint on a unit door and writing graffiti on a wall at a staircase landing of a housing block. The two charges of harassment on behalf of an unlicensed moneylender brought against the appellant were eventually reduced to two charges of assisting in the business of unlicensed moneylending (‘AUML’) together with the two other persons whom he was found with, in furtherance of the common intention of them all. The appellant was 22 years old when he pleaded guilty to one charge of AUML with the other charge of AUML being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. He was 23 years old when he was sentenced to four months' imprisonment and fined $30,000 (in default, four weeks' imprisonment). The appellant appealed against the imprisonment term on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) The appropriate starting point should have been an imprisonment term that fell somewhere between the sentences passed in PP v Chia Kok Hua(DAC 12494/2012) (six months' imprisonment) and PP v Tan Lian Tong(DAC 31036/2012) (four months' imprisonment). A starting point of five months' imprisonment term was a fairer reflection of the gravity of the appellant's acts: at [16] .

(2) The appellant was actuated more by social pressure than the monetary reward which was offered to him. His ADHD was probably the real explanation for his behaviour. The promise of a monetary reward, which in the ordinary circumstances would have been an aggravating factor, should thus have been given less weight. The appellant's overall culpability had to be assessed in the light of his ADHD. The deterrence principle, while certainly valid, should not be applied indiscriminately in the present case: at [18] to [20] .

(3) The fact that the appellant was assessed and recommended for probation (although his age at the time of his conviction ultimately disqualified him) strongly suggested that rehabilitation was both possible and relevant as a dominant consideration. The court also took into consideration the fact that the appellant was a first-time offender, was still relatively young, and had expressed remorse for his actions: at [21] .

(4) The consideration of deterrence should not be applied indiscriminately here. On the contrary, the general principle was that rehabilitation had to be the dominant consideration in cases involving young offenders. Moreover, the appellant had no antecedents. Having considered all the relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the balance tilted towards rehabilitation: at [22] .

(5) It was undisputed that the appellant needed continued treatment for his ADHD, and while this could be arranged with the prison authorities, the court gave due weight to the real risk that any improvements achieved thus far in respect of the appellant's psychiatric condition might deteriorate if he was exposed too long to the negative elements of the prison environment. The court was also mindful of the fact that in view of the appellant's impulsivity and misguided sense of peer loyalty linked to his ADHD, the longer he served in prison the higher the risk that he would be corrupted, rendering him particularly vulnerable: at [22] .

(6) A four weeks' imprisonment term was appropriate, sufficient to punish the appellant and make him realise the error of his ways, but not of a duration which was so long as to undermine the prospects of his rehabilitation: at [23] .

(7) The court was keenly aware of the interests of society and of Parliament in dealing with people who were involved in unlawful moneylending activities sternly and firmly. Still, justice demanded that the degree of culpability of the offender should always be given due weight: at [24] .

Ong Chee Eng v PP [2012] 3 SLR 776 (refd)

PP v Chia Kok Hua DAC 12494/2012 (refd)

PP v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR (R) 684; [2008] 2 SLR 684 (refd)

PP v Mohammad Al-Ansari bin Basri [2008] 1 SLR (R) 449; [2008] 1 SLR 449 (refd)

PP v Mok Ping Wuen Maurice [1998] 3 SLR (R) 439; [1999] 1 SLR 138 (refd)

PP v Nelson Jeyaraj s/o Chandran [2011] 2 SLR 1130 (refd)

PP v Quek Li Hao [2013] 4 SLR 471 (refd)

PP v Tan Lian Tong DAC 31036/2012 (refd)

Tan Kay Beng v PP [2006] 4 SLR (R) 10; [2006] 4 SLR 10 (refd)

Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 2010 Rev Ed) ss 5, 14 (1) (b) (i) , 14 (1 A) (a)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 34

Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985 Rev Ed) s 5

Zaminder Gill Singh (Hillborne & Co) for the appellant

Timotheus Koh (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the respondent.

Judgment reserved.

Chao Hick Tin JA

1 The appellant was sentenced to four months' imprisonment and fined $30,000 (in default, four weeks' imprisonment) upon his guilty plea to a charge of assisting in the business of unlicensed moneylending (‘AUML’) together with two other persons, in furtherance of the common intention of them all, by splashing paint on a unit door and writing graffiti on a wall at a staircase landing of a housing block. This was an offence under s 5 of the Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 2010 Rev Ed) (‘the Act’), punishable under s 14 (1) (b) (i) and s 14 (1 A) (a) of the same read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). A similar charge was taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. The appellant filed the present appeal against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.

Background facts

2 The appellant's friend, one Gerald Tan (‘Gerald’) had defaulted on his $500 loan from an unlicensed moneylender, one Jason. Gerald asked Jason to give him more time to make repayment, which request Jason refused. Instead, Jason offered Gerald the job of harassing debtors for which the latter would be paid $80 per unit harassed. On 6 July 2010 at about noon, Gerald...