Neo Mei Lan Helena v Long Melvin Anthony (Yeo Bee Leong, co-respondent)

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Woo Bih Li JC
• Judgment Date: 29 July 2002
• Neutral Citation: [2002] SGHC 162
• Date: 29 July 2002
• Subject Matter: Husband engineering job relocation and termination to avoid paying maintenance,Family Law,Maintenance,Division,Factors in determining whether lump sum payment appropriate,Whether correct to determine proportion of division first and then adding premium to wife's share to take into account her and the children's needs,Whether proceeds from sale of property a matrimonial asset,Needs of children to be taken into account,Matrimonial assets,Husband's pre-marital CPF moneys,General rule in determining currency of maintenance,Husband's onus of proof,Wife's insurance policy, jewellery and shares,Whether such moneys matrimonial assets,s 112 Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Ed),Lump sum payment,Whether property bought with such moneys a matrimonial asset,Whether subject to division,Currency of maintenance
• Docket Number: Divorce Petition No 1678 of 2000
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: MP Rai (Cooma & Rai)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Palakrishnan SC and Malathi Das (Palakrishnan & Partners)

JUDGMENT Cur Adv Vult GROUNDS OF DECISION

INTRODUCTION

1. Melvin Anthony Long and Neo Mei Lan Helena were married on 14 July 1984. They have three children. After about 16 years, their marriage failed, and the wife petitioned for a divorce. A Decree Nisi was granted on 21 November 2000. However, for convenience, I will refer to the parties as ‘the Husband’ and ‘the Wife’ respectively.

2. At the hearing of the ancillaries, the District Court made various orders. The Husband is appealing to the High Court against some of the orders. I set out below only those orders which he has appealed against:

‘2. The parties shall be entitled to the following properties:

(a) Chesters

(b) Hensman

(c) Murdoch

in the proportion of 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband;

But (i) the Chesters property shall be transferred to the wife upon her paying the husband 40% of the value (40% of A$225,000)

(ii) the husband shall have the option to purchase the share of the wife in Hensman by paying the wife 60% of the net value (60% of A$67,000)

(iii) the wife shall have the option to purchase the share of the husband in Murdoch by paying the husband 40% of the value (40% of A$185,000)

5. The wife shall be entitled to the amount of S$187,000 of the husband’s CPF monies in his ordinary account and usual consequential orders as per the standard CPF charge terms.

6. The husband shall pay the wife the amount of S$4,500 a month for the maintenance of the three children.

7. The husband shall pay the wife the lump sum maintenance of S$240,000; the amount shall be satisfied from the husband’s share of the three properties from the amount due to him by the wife or his share of the sale proceeds; the balance shall be in instalments of S$1,000 a month provided that should the husband withdraw any monies from his CPF account, he shall pay the wife the balance of the lump sum maintenance immediately after such withdrawal.’

THE THREE PROPERTIES: CHESTERS, HENSMAN AND MURDOCH

3. The District Court granted the Wife 60% of each of the above three properties Chesters, Hensman and Murdoch in Australia and the Husband 40% . The reason for this is stated in para 26 of the Grounds of Decision (‘GD’):

‘26 This was a marriage of 16 years. For 9 years until 1993, both parties worked full time and they pooled their resources. They operated a joint account. They made many joint purchases of assets. After 1993, only the husband was working. The wife took care of the home. For a number of years, she alone took care of the children in Australia as the husband was working in Singapore. Parties also had the assistance of the wife’s family. The indirect contribution of the wife had to be given due recognition. All except two of the properties they bought were in joint names. Even for the properties in the sole name of the husband, a substantial portion of the repayments were made through rentals earned from the properties. The wife, being physically in Australia, was managing and maintaining the properties. I also attributed the financial assistance obtained by the wife from her family members as her contributions to the family. In respect of the financial and non-financial contributions, it would be an appropriate case for equal division, whether or not the assets were paid by the wife or the husband and whether or not they were in joint or sole name. However, the wife had to provide not only for her but also a roof for the three children. I therefore felt it fair that she be given a 10% premium in the division in respect of the three real properties in Australia.’

4. Mr M P Rai, Counsel for the Husband, submitted that the Husband did not dispute that the matrimonial assets should be divided equally between the Husband and Wife. However, he submitted that the District Court erred in granting the Wife a further 10% of the three properties. The Wife’s indirect contributions had already been taken into account in reaching an equal apportionment. To grant a further 10% was a duplication. The interest of the children of the marriage could be met by ordering a transfer of one property to the Wife, upon her paying the Husband’s share, which was in fact ordered. There was no reason for the division of all three properties to be affected.

5. Mr Palakrishnan SC, Counsel for the Wife, submitted that under s 112(2)(c) Women’s Charter, the District Court was entitled to take into account the needs of the children in the division of matrimonial assets. He submitted that in arriving at the equal division initially, the District Court had taken into account the past non-financial contributions of the Wife whereas the further 10% was to take into account the future needs of the children. There was no duplication.

6. He also relied on a lecture given by Justice Prakash at the Eighth Singapore Law Review Lecture to support his submission.

THE WIFE’S ENTITLEMENT TO S$187,000 IN THE HUSBAND’S CPF ACCOUNT

7. Aside from the three properties, the District Court divided the rest of the matrimonial assets equally, between the Husband and the Wife as stated in para 26 of the GD which I have cited above.

8. As each of the parties had monies in his/her account with the Central Provident Fund (‘CPF’), the District Court divided these monies equally and found that the Husband had $187,000 more than the Wife in his CPF account.

9. Paragraph 29 of the GD states:

‘29 …. For the CPF funds, I divided the entire balance of both parties in the ordinary, special and medisave account equally. As a result, there was an amount of $187,000 which the husband had in (sic) access of the wife and I accordingly ordered that this amount be charged against the husband’s monies in his CPF ordinary account as the wife’s share of his CPF assets. The usual CPF standard clauses on the charge was incorporated.’

10. However, as it turned out, these two sentences were not accurate.

11. First, the District Court took into account not only the balance in the respective CPF accounts of the parties. It had also taken into account the Wife’s shares which had been bought with monies from her CPF account. The details were as follows:

	The Wife	The Husband
Shares (CPF investment account)	S$ 99,117
Monies in CPF account	S$132,000 (ordinary)	S$563,000 (ordinary)
	S$ 14,725 (special)	S$ 35,000 (special)
	S$ 10,532 (medisave)	S$ 24,000 (medisave)
	S$265,374	S$622,000

12. Secondly, the Husband’s excess was S$182,813, say S$182,000, and not S$187,000. This was conceded by Mr Palakrishnan.

13. Having said that, I note that the GD had also listed some monies in the Wife’s bank accounts and the Husband’s. The Husband had slightly more i.e between S$2,000 to S$2,500 more, depending on the exchange rate of some of the foreign currencies in the Husband’s bank accounts. However, this could not account for the difference of $5,000 between $187,000 and $182,000. Besides, the District Court did not say it had taken the monies in the bank accounts into consideration. It may also be that the $187,000 figure was a typographical error and should have read $182,000 instead.

14. Accordingly, the $187,000 granted to the Wife should be amended to $182,000.

15. Besides this point, Mr Rai submitted that the pre-marital balance in the Husband’s CPF account should not have been taken into account as matrimonial assets. For this purpose, he relied on Lam Chih Kian v Ong Chin Ngoh [1993] 2 SLR 253. However, there was no evidence about the pre-marital balance in the Husband’s CPF account and Mr Rai sought leave to adduce fresh evidence in respect of that balance.

16. Mr Rai also submitted that monies in CPF accounts should be treated differently from other matrimonial assets because such monies were forced savings meant for retirement. Accordingly, he submitted that there should not be an equal division of the combined monies in the CPF accounts but rather that the Wife should be entitled to 30% only. For this point, Mr Rai relied on an unreported judgment of Prakash J in Divorce Petition No 1147 of 1995, Yah Cheng Huat v Ong Bee Lan in which the wife was granted 30% of the combined monies in the CPF accounts. However, he accepted that there were other High Court cases in which the wife was granted 50% of such monies.

17. Mr Palakrishnan objected to fresh evidence being admitted in respect of the Husband’s pre-marital balance in his CPF account. He stressed that there was a long history of litigation on the present disputes. The Husband did not raise this point at the first hearing before the District Court on 2 July 2001. It was only at the adjourned hearing of 4 July 2001, when the District Court was about to give its decision, that the Husband’s Counsel applied to adduce such fresh evidence and seek an adjournment. This was refused by the District Court.

18. In addition, Mr Palakrishnan submitted that the additional evidence would not be material as there was a difference between the old s 106 Women’s Charter and the current s 112 Women’s Charter.

19. The current s 112(10) Women’s Charter states:

‘(10)

For the purposes of this section, "matrimonial asset" means -

(a) any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage -

(i) ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while the parties are residing together for shelter or transportation or for household, education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes; or

(ii) which has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage; and

(b) any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage,

but does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired by one party at any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially improved during the marriage by the other...