Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 21 November 2012
• Date: 21 November 2012
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 116 of 2012
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Nathan Edmund

Plaintiff

and

Law Society of Singapore

Defendant

[2012] SGHC 232

Chao Hick Tin JA

,

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA

and

V K Rajah JA

Originating Summons No 116 of 2012

High Court

Legal Profession—Disciplinary procedures—Application for reinstatement to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (‘the Roll’)—Whether applicant fit to be restored to the Roll—Section 102 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)

The applicant (‘the Applicant’) applied to be restored to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (‘the Roll’) after having been struck off 14 years ago, on 14 July 1998. He had been convicted for attempted cheating under s 420, read with s 24 and s 511 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). Following this, the Applicant was struck off the Roll pursuant to s 83 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1994 Rev Ed).

The Applicant first applied for reinstatement in 2010, but he withdrew his application on the day that it was fixed for hearing. At the time of the hearing of his second application, he was 64 years of age and had been working as a paralegal at the firm of M/s Tan Rajah and Cheah (‘TRC’) for about five years. In support of his rehabilitation the Applicant averred to the duration of time which had elapsed since his disbarment as well as to his conduct since disbarment. He also contended that his reinstatement would not pose any risk to the public interest or the reputation of the profession.

Neither the Law Society nor the Attorney-General opposed the application. Indeed, the Law Society also urged the court to consider that if redemption was to be meaningful then reinstatement onto the Roll had to not be so late that the Applicant would not have enough time to resume practice, bearing in mind the Applicant's age and health.

Held, granting the application:

(1) It was well-settled that the court had to be satisfied that the Applicant had been kept off the Roll for a long enough period for him to appreciate the full consequences of his misconduct. In this case, this threshold factor had been clearly met: at [15].

(2) One of the major factors that evidenced the rehabilitation of the Applicant was the fact that he had taken positive steps to rebuild his legal practice, which demonstrated a genuine conviction of his part to be restored to the profession. Further, the Applicant's evident success at winning over the trust and favour of his employers at TRC spoke forcefully of his rehabilitation. It was also telling that the Applicant had mustered enough courage to join TRC as a paralegal only after a decade of exile, during which he would have had much time to reflect over his misconduct. It was most unlikely that someone who had waited ten years before renewing his involvement with the profession, although in a much lesser capacity, would lightly lapse into the same misconduct which warranted his initial expulsion: at [17] and [18].

(3) In assessing the rehabilitation of any applicant, the court had to also be cognisant of the severity of the misconduct which led to the applicant being struck off the Roll. It stood to reason that the more serious the misconduct, the more difficult it would be to convince the court that the applicant had been fully rehabilitated. Given the mitigating factors which were noted in both the Applicant's appeal against conviction and the proceedings to strike him off the Roll, the criminality of the Applicant should not be overstated. Having considered the nature of the Applicant's misconduct and his journey from disbarment to the application for reinstatement, the court was satisfied that the Applicant was fully and completely rehabilitated: at [20] to [23].

(4) While the court had to jealously guard the honour of the profession, it should not be to such an extent as to deny meritorious applicants an opportunity at redemption. It was always a question of balance which the court would have to consider and determine in every replacement application. In the premises, the court was minded to accord greater weight to the element of redemption given the length of the Applicant's disbarment and the mitigating factors which were considered in his conviction and striking-off: at [25] and [26].

(5) The court was most concerned with the litany of regulatory offences which the Applicant had amassed between 1998 and 2009. A very serious view was taken of such infractions, and the court was entitled to expect those who seek reinstatement to stay on the right side of the law. While regulatory breaches did not indicate dishonesty or character defect, the court was concerned as to whether the Applicant was a person who would observe the law in both spirit and form. As the Applicant had not fallen foul of the law for the last two years (the period between his first application for reinstatement and the current application), he had proven that he could and would and also showed that he had learned his lesson: at [27], [28] and [30].

[Observation: While the value of redemption might be substantially negated if an applicant was not reinstated at a juncture where he might still have the opportunity to practice actively for a meaningful length of time, this could not be an overriding factor. It would be plainly anomalous if time remaining could constitute a determinative factor for reinstatement when time elapsed did not: at [26].]

Gnaguru s/o Thamboo Mylvaganam v Law Society of Singapore [2008] 3 SLR (R) 1; [2008] 3 SLR 1 (refd)

Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR (R) 1018; [2009] 4 SLR 1018 (refd)

Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR (R) 704; [2007] 3 SLR 704 (refd)

Law Society of Singapore v Nathan Edmund [1998] 2 SLR (R) 905; [1998] 3 SLR 414 (refd)

Narindar Singh Kang v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 4 SLR (R) 641; [2007] 4 SLR 641 (refd)

Nathan Edmund v PP [1997] 2 SLR (R) 926; [1997] 3 SLR 782 (refd)

Nirmal Singh s/o Fauja Singh, Re [2001] 2 SLR (R) 494; [2001] 3 SLR 608 (refd)

Nirmal Singh s/o Fauja Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 645 (refd)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1994 Rev Ed) ss 83, 86, 94 A (1)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed) s 78 (1) (a)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) s 102 (consd)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) ss 34, 420, 511

Ang Cheng Hock SC, Rajan Sanjiv Kumar, Tan Kai Liang (Allen & Gledhill LLP) for the applicant

NSreenivasan (Straits Law Practice LLC) for the respondent

Denise Wong for the Attorney-General's Chambers.

Chao Hick Tin JA

(delivering the grounds of decision of the court):

Introduction

1 This was an application by one Edmund Nathan (‘the Applicant’) to be restored to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (‘the Roll’) after having been struck off 14 years ago, in 1998. The Applicant was 64 years of age at the time of the application, and since 2008 had been working as a paralegal at the firm of M/s Tan Rajah and Cheah (‘TRC’). This was his second attempt at reinstatement, having previously withdrawn an application made in Originating Summons No 851 of 2010.

2 After hearing submissions of the respective parties, we allowed the application. We now give the reasons for our decision.

Background facts

3 On 30 May 1997, the Applicant was convicted together with one Allosius Bernard Fernandez (‘Fernandez’) of attempted cheating under s 420, read with s 34 and s 511 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (Nathan Edmund v PP [1997] 2 SLR (R) 926 at [1]). The facts leading to the conviction are as follows. In mid-1991, the Applicant was retained by Fernandez to effect the purchase of an apartment for S$135,000. He also acted for the vendors of the apartment. With the aim of obtaining a higher housing loan for Fernandez and his wife, Margaret Angela Fernandez, the Applicant drafted an agreement which set out the ‘sale price’ as S$190,000. He then drafted a second document which clarified that this ‘sale price’ of S$190,000 was only for the purposes of obtaining the housing loan, and that the correct sum to be paid upon completion of the purchase of the apartment was S$135,000. Following this, the Applicant referred Fernandez to one Joseph Han, a branch manager at United Overseas Bank Ltd (‘UOB’ or ‘the bank’ as may be appropriate), who duly filled in the bank's requisite forms stating that the purchase price was S$190,000. A loan of S$110,000 was subsequently approved by the bank, and a letter of offer was made to Fernandez and his wife. UOB also instructed the Applicant to act for them in relation to the loan. Thus, the Applicant represented all three parties to the transaction, namely, the buyers, the sellers and the bank.

4 Fernandez was unable to complete the purchase of the property due to his failure to obtain the approval of the Central Provident Fund for the release of money from his account towards the purchase. The sale was eventually aborted. The loan of S$110,000 was never disbursed by UOB. The Applicant's misdeeds only came to light...