Nalini d/o Ramachandran v Saseedaran Nair s/o Krishnan
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Judge | Tay Yong Kwang J |
Judgment Date | 29 March 2010 |
Neutral Citation | [2010] SGHC 98 |
Citation | [2010] SGHC 98 |
Docket Number | Divorce Suit No 5253 of 2006 |
Hearing Date | 24 February 2010 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Udeh Kumar S/O Sethuraju (S K Kumar & Associates) |
Defendant Counsel | K Mathialahan (Guna & Associates) |
Subject Matter | Family law,Matrimonial assets |
Published date | 13 March 2012 |
This was an appeal by the plaintiff/appellant, Nalini D/O Ramachandran Mrs. Saseedaran Nair (“the Wife”) against the decision of the District Judge on 12 November 2009 dismissing the Wife’s application and allowing the application of the defendant/respondent, Saseedaran Nair S/O Krishnan (“the Husband”). Both applications related to a consent order made on 22 January 2008. I dismissed the Wife’s appeal but varied the District Judge’s order.
BackgroundThe parties’ matrimonial home was a Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat in Bukit Batok East Avenue 3 (“the Property”). The Wife’s appeal related essentially to the Property although she also sought to vary the terms concerning the two children’s maintenance before me.
The parties were married on 14 March 1990 and their marriage was dissolved on 27 February 2007. On 22 January 2008, they settled all ancillary matters at mediation before a district judge and a consent order was made accordingly (“the consent order”). A certificate making the interim judgment final was granted on 9 March 2008. Under the consent order, the parties had joint custody of the two children aged 11 and 13, with care and control given to the Wife and reasonable access given to the Husband every weekend. The Husband agreed to pay the Wife a nominal $1 per month as her maintenance and $300 per month for each of the two children. The following orders were also made by consent:
In or around September 2007, the Husband sought medical attention for his visual problems. Subsequently, on 13 February 2008 (
He was covered under the Home Protection Insurance Scheme (“HPIS”) established by the Central Provident Fund Board (“CPF Board”) pursuant to section 29 of the Central Provident Fund Act (Cap 36, 2001 Rev Ed) (“CPF Act”). The HPIS provided that on his death or incapacity, his liability to repay his housing loan shall be discharged by the CPF. Therefore, on 15 July 2008, he applied to the CPF Board for a payout due to his disability. On 16 December 2008, he was certified to be legally blind. On 26 December 2008, pursuant to the HPIS, the CPF Board paid a sum of money to the HDB to discharge the outstanding housing loan on the Property. Various amounts were stated in the documents but the amount paid to the HDB was later confirmed to be $165,922.60 (“the HPIS payout”).
Subsequently, the Wife decided against buying over the Husband’s share in the Property. In November 2008, the Wife asked that the Property be sold in the open market. The Husband informed her that he might lose his eyesight and proposed that she transfer her title in the Property to him upon him reimbursing her CPF money used for the purchase of the Property together with accrued interest. Negotiations then took place between the parties. In February 2009, the Husband spoke to the Wife and told her that the CPF Board had paid the outstanding loan on the Property to the HDB under the HPIS. He then proposed that $20,000 be paid by him to the Wife in addition to what he had offered her earlier. After asking for time to consider the proposal, the Wife did not revert to the Husband.
On 18 June 2009, the Wife filed an application for her to have sole conduct of the sale of the Property, for the Husband to vacate it within one month and for the Registrar of the Subordinate Courts to be conferred the power to execute all documents in respect of the sale of the Property on the Husband’s behalf should he fail or refuse to do so. On 10 September 2009, the Husband applied for increased access to the two children and variation to the consent order pertaining to the sale of the Property. One of his prayers was for an order enabling him to buy over the Wife’s share in the Property upon him refunding the Wife’s CPF money used for the Property together with accrued interest and paying her $20,000. In the alternative, the Husband asked for the following order:
He also prayed for an order declaring him to be solely entitled to the HPIS payout.The [Wife] to transfer all her right, interest and title to the flat to the [Husband] upon the [Husband] refunding the [Wife’s] CPF moneys with accrued interest to the [Wife’s] CPF account. The [Husband] shall pay a sum being 60% of the net value of the flat to the [Wife] which net value shall be calculated by deducting from the price of the flat fixed at $460,000.00, both parties’ CPF monies as at date of transfer of the flat together with accrued interest and after deducting the [HPIS payout] and the sum of $43,000 being the cash payment made by the [Husband] towards the purchase of the flat. The [Husband] shall bear the costs of the transfer. The transfer of the flat to be completed within six (6) weeks from the date of this Order of Court.
After hearing both applications together, the District Judge dismissed the Wife’s application and varied the consent order to give the Husband more liberal access to the two children. In respect of the Property, she ordered that:
The District...The [Wife] shall transfer her rights, title and interest to the flat to the [Husband] upon the [Husband] refunding the [Wife’s] CPF monies with accrued interest to the [Wife’s] CPF account and also payment by the [Husband] to the [Wife] of a sum equivalent to 60% of the value of the flat after deducting both parties’ CPF monies used for the flat as at the date of transfer together with accrued interest and after deducting [the HPIS payout]. The value of the flat shall be based on the valuation done by the Housing Development Board. The transfer to be done within three (3) months from the date of the HDB valuation.
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