Myanmar's transition to democracy: new opportunities or obstacles for India?

• Author: Lee, Lavina
• Position: Essay

In November 2015, Myanmar will hold general parliamentary elections, representing the latest step in the country's slow transition to democracy that began with political reforms in 2008. More than many other countries going through similar transitions, there is strong interest around the world in whether democracy will take hold in Myanmar. Myanmar has a superb geostrategic position as a littoral state of the Bay of Bengal, between two competitive rising powers in Asia, i.e. India and China, and forms a land-bridge between South and Southeast Asia. As an immediate neighbour of Myanmar, India is one country that is particularly interested in the fate of Myanmar's democracy. At stake are tantalizing opportunities for trade and investment with and through Myanmar to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as core security interests in suppressing insurgencies, drug trafficking and arms smuggling in India's northeast region which borders Myanmar. In the period since gaining independence from Britain in 1948, the relationship between the two countries has swung from like-minded, to indifferent, to cold and, since the mid-1990s, to a form of pragmatic partnership.

This article focuses on attempts by India to engage with Myanmar since the mid-1990s and asks whether a more democratic Myanmar provides new opportunities or obstacles for the achievement of India's economic and security interests. It begins by briefly describing the history of India-Burma/Myanmar relations before moving on to analyse India's interests in engaging Myanmar, and vice versa. It then assesses the extent of the democratic transition that has taken place thus far and describes India's latest initiatives to engage Myanmar in the areas of security cooperation, trade and energy security. Finally, it assesses whether and how Myanmar's transition to democracy affects the likely success of these initiatives.

Background

India's relationship with Myanmar begins with their common history as colonies of the British Empire, with Burma being absorbed within the British Raj from 1826-1937. Over time, a significant number of Indians were brought into the country by the British to run the colonial administration, police and military while others established businesses, including as moneylenders. By 1942, Indians made up approximately 6-7 per cent of the population. (1) After both countries achieved independence, their shared history as subjects of colonial domination brought their then Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu, together as leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. During this time, India assisted the fragile U Nu government in the light against emerging communist insurgencies within the country by providing arms and helping to raise financial assistance from Commonwealth countries. However, the initial promise in the relationship dimmed after General Ne Win seized power in a military coup in 1962. The coup ushered in an era of xenophobic "Burmanization" of society and the imposition of the "Burmese Way to Socialism" which included policies of nationalization of private businesses and expropriation of property without compensation that spurred the exodus of around 300,000 people of Indian origin during 1962-65. (2) As the junta withdrew from the world, relations between the two countries became distant.

Burma's mass-movement for democracy, beginning with the "8888" protests in August 1988 forced New Delhi to grapple with the question of how far the world's largest plural, multi-ethnic democracy should go in promoting democracy abroad. The engagement of authoritarian states posed the greatest challenge to these values, particularly those with the capacity to do great harm to India's core interests, or to close off game-changing opportunities. India's first reaction to the brutal suppression of the mass uprising in Burma in September 1988 was, however, unambiguous: democratic forces were provided with rhetorical and substantive support. India was one of the first countries to officially condemn the junta's repression, was the only neighbour to clearly offer refugee status to fleeing dissidents, and permitted the All-India Radio Burmese service to be used by them to organize protest activities within Burma. (3) In December 1992, India was a sponsor of a UN resolution that called on the military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), to honour the results of the 1990 election and to take all necessary steps to restore democracy. (4) In 1993, much to the displeasure of the Burmese generals, the Indian government gave the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to Aung San Suu Kyi, in recognition of her "promotion of international understanding, goodwill and friendship among people of the world". (5) The bilateral relationship between the two countries had never been colder.

From this idealistic high point, however, India's approach to democracy promotion in Myanmar took an abrupt turn. With the junta successfully suppressing democratic forces and taking steps to consolidate its position within the country, New Delhi took the pragmatic approach of dealing with the reality of authoritarian rule. Overt support for democratic forces and the rule of law was avoided in favour of pursuing a number of key security, economic and geostrategic interests that were unachievable without the junta's cooperation. There were several reasons for this turn.

First, India has long struggled to contain a plethora of armed secessionist ethnic insurgencies in the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Assam, Tripura and Manipur, which share a long and porous 1,600 km border with Myanmar. Many of these Indian insurgent groups (IIGs) have made use of the jungles along Myanmar's borderlands as a safe haven from which to launch attacks in the northeast. The military junta had already shown a willingness to turn a blind eye to the presence of these IIGs to punish New Delhi for supporting pro-democracy forces.

Second, it had become clear to New Delhi that joining with Japan and the West to ostracize the generals had pushed Yangon into Beijing's embrace. From 1990 onwards, China had become increasingly indispensable to the regime as one of the few available suppliers of military hardware, investment capital and soft loans for infrastructure development. Its economy was also becoming deeply entwined with that of Yunnan Province. (6) Since its defeat in a brief border war with China in 1962, India has viewed China's growing strategic relationships with its immediate neighbours with suspicion and considers the possibility of its hostile encirclement as a core security threat. Given China's warm relationship with Pakistan, a similar partnership between China and Myanmar was something to be keenly avoided.

Third, as a net gas and oil importer with ever-increasing domestic demand, India looked to gain direct access to Myanmar's abundant natural gas reserves. These could potentially be accessed more cheaply and securely than alternative pipeline routes from Central Asia that would need to travel through Iran, or Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the country's proven gas reserves are only estimated to account for 1 per cent of the world's known deposits, (7) considerable untapped exploration potential is believed to exist on the basis of the large gas volumes being extracted in the Shwe, Yadana and Yetagun fields. (8)

Finally, as a direct "land-bridge" to the booming economies of Southeast Asia, strong relations with Myanmar became crucial to the success of India's "Look East" policy launched in the early 1990s, which aimed to tap economic growth opportunities beyond the confines of South Asia. (9) In addition, greater trade between India's northeast with Myanmar, and then onwards to ASEAN countries, held out the prospect of bringing prosperity to one of the most unstable and neglected regions of the country, potentially undercutting the lure of insurgency and alleviating the considerable drain on internal security resources. (10)

From 1992-93 onwards, India prioritized engaging the junta diplomatically, economically and militarily (discussed further below]. High-level political and military exchanges began, as did institutionalized bilateral cooperation on counter-insurgency and drug smuggling. India continued to allow dissidents to seek refuge in India and called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, but its rhetoric became deliberately vague and abstained from calling for clear and decisive democratic outcomes in Myanmar. Instead, as Sudha Ramachandran has observed, by 2002 official statements took a less strident tone, calling for "reconciliation" and "moves towards restoration of democracy" in Myanmar. (11)

From the mid-1990s, Myanmar became more receptive to renewing a relationship with India, in pursuit of a number of foreign policy interests of its own: trade and economic development, diplomatic support, and defence cooperation at a time when the military regime was under increasing diplomatic pressure internationally to end internal political repression. Diplomatic support by India--the world's largest democracy--in places like the UN Commission on Human Rights, lent at least a veneer of legitimacy to its drawn out "seven step roadmap to democracy". In security terms, the ostracized junta was able to initiate limited defence cooperation with India, including officer-training places at various Indian defence academies. Unable to source military hardware from the West, India also became a valuable military supplier for Yangon's counter-insurgency campaigns, along with countries like China, Russia, Pakistan, Singapore and Ukraine. (12)

Third, as Western and Japanese economic sanctions began to bite, India too became more valuable as a potential source of capital and credit for infrastructure and resource development. While bi-lateral trade with India stood at a modest US$323...