Muslim Law
Author | MOHAMED FAIZAL Mohamed Abdul Kadir SC LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); Attorney and Counsellor-at-law (New York); Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Crime Division, Attorney-General's Chambers; Member of the MUIS Appeal Board. |
Publication year | 2019 |
Citation | (2019) 20 SAL Ann Rev 642 |
Date | 01 December 2019 |
Published date | 01 December 2019 |
23.1 It is sometimes suggested that procedural rules must never be used as a trap for the unwary, such that they end up hindering the ends of justice or have the effect of allowing substance to become subservient to form. While such an unexceptional statement of principle is hard to disagree with, it is also similarly axiomatic that such rules of procedure are often designed precisely to meet the ends of justice by allowing for the fair resolution of disputes. In order to balance these countervailing considerations, which, at times, can lean towards coming to diametrically opposed conclusions, the courts have been careful not to unthinkingly allow parties to deviate from procedural norms, for such non-compliance may, at times, themselves potentially hasten an unfair outcome that is at odds with notions of fair play and equity.
23.2 Appeal No 11 of 2018 reflects an application of these trite principles in the Muslim law context for proceedings under the Administration of Muslim Law Act1 before the Syariah Court and the Appeal Board.
23.3 Appeal No 11 of 2018 involved an appeal from a decision of the Syariah Court on the division of matrimonial assets pursuant to the dissolution of a Muslim marriage, with the primary asset between the parties being a fully-paid for Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat which served as the matrimonial home (“the matrimonial flat”) for which the two parties and their son (“the intervener”) were tenants in common with equal shares. Significantly, for reasons that will become apparent at a later part of this chapter, the matrimonial flat had been bought just a few years prior to the proceedings and the five-year minimum occupation period (before such flat could be sold on the open market) had not yet been satisfied.2
23.4 The respondent and appellant had been married for close to three decades before the former commenced divorce proceedings in the
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