Murugason v The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua F A J
• Judgment Date: 21 February 1984
• Neutral Citation: [1984] SGHC 3
• Date: 21 February 1984
• Subject Matter: Innuendoes,Tort,Onus on plaintiff to prove special facts capable of being understood in secondary and defamatory sense by persons to whom special facts are known,Libel,Newspaper publication imputing conduct unethical and unbecoming an advocate and solicitor,Legal Profession,Claim for damages for publication in newspaper
• Docket Number: Suit No 812 of 1981
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: AP Godwin (Godwin & Co)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: JB Jeyaretnam (JB Jeyaretnam & Co)

The plaintiff in this case claims damages against the defendants for a libel contained in a report headed `Woman claims T Blangah election was rigged` and published by the defendants in the issue of The Straits Times newspaper of 22 January 1981.

The facts are these. The plaintiff is and was at all material times an advocate and solicitor practising under the style of Murugason & Co in Singapore. The defendants are the proprietors and publishers of The Straits Times , a newspaper with a wide circulation in Singapore and is one of two English language newspapers delivered in the morning in Singapore. In the 1980 General Election the Telok Blangah constituency was contested by Rohan bin Kamis of the People`s Action Party and by JB Jeraretnam of the Workers` Party. Rohan bin Kamis was elected. On 17 January 1981, an election petition (Election Petition No 1/81) was presented to the High Court on behalf of Mdm Chiew Kim Keat by Murugason & Co in which she stated that she was not satisfied with the election of Rohan bin Kamis on the grounds that there were certain irregularities at a polling centre and at the polling stations in her constituency Telok Blangah and prayed that it might be determined that Rohan bin Kamis was not duly elected or returned and that the election was void. On 22 January 1981, the defendants published in The Straits Times the following report:

Woman claims T Blangah election was rigged

A Telok Blangah voter has filed a petition in the High Court alleging that the election of Rohan Kamis last 23 December as PAP MP for that constituency was rigged.

This voter identifies herself as Mdm Chiew Kim Keat of Depot Road in the petition, which was filed by her lawyer, Mr R Murugason, on Saturday at noon. She paid in cash the $2,000 deposit as required by election law. She is asking the court to declare as void the election, in which Mr JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers` Party lost by 1,046 votes. She cites a number of grounds, one of which relates to an incident over the collection of ballot boxes at the Kampong Jagoh Primary School polling station.

In that incident, a bus despatched to collect the six ballot boxes from the school for a counting centre took off with only five of them on board, and only returned later for the remaining one.

`Substituted`

Mdm Chiew claims the bus came back only after 20 minutes and says she `has reason to believe` that during the time lapse, either the box left behind or one of the other five was substituted with another box containing ballot papers marked for Mr Rohan but not cast for him by voters. Alternatively, she claims in her petition, ballot papers marked for Mr Rohan were inserted into one or more boxes. She does not say who was responsible for the alleged rigging; nor does she name anyone as respondent to the petition.

Other grounds cited by her are:

THAT presiding officers at some booths marked ballot papers for some voters even when those voters were capable of doing this themselves.

THAT a voter on the register was `refused permission` to vote, and

THAT, one voter was allowed to vote twice. Mdm Chiew was said to be not at home when two Straits Times reporters and a photographer called at the Depot Road address listed in her petition last night at 10 o`clock. The people answering the door acknowledged that they were her relatives and declined to answer questions.

Own accord

When pressed, one of them a woman in her late 40s, told the Straits Times reporters to `use their heads` to decide if Mdm Chiew had acted on her own accord.

The best person to answer questions was either Mr Jeyaretnam or Mr Murugason, she said, and added:

`After all, she is only a washerwoman and they are lawyers.`

Mr Murugason, a WP candidate who lost in Jalan Kayu in the December general election, confirmed that he was acting for Mdm Chiew but declined to discuss the petition. Under election law, a person who has filed such a petition and paid the deposit to the Returning Officer is required to name the respondent upon whom the petition is to be served.

Once the respondent is served with the petition, the court will fix a date for hearing.

The words in the report which the plaintiff complained of as defamatory are in the paragraphs headed `Own accord`.

In para 4 of the amended statement of claim it is pleaded:

4 By the said words the Defendant meant and was understood to mean that the Plaintiff had acted improperly and or unethically in the conduct of his practice and an Advocate and Solicitor of this court.

Particulars of what the words meant and were understood to mean

(i) Mdm Chiew Kim Keat had not instructed the Plaintiff`s firm to present the petition.

(ii) The Plaintiff had presented or caused to be presented the petition to the court without getting proper instructions to do so from the Petitioner and was acting for her as her Solicitor.

(iii) Such conduct was improper unethical and unbecoming an Advocate and Solicitor of this Honourable Court.

Facts and matters on which the Plaintiff relies in respect of such meaning

(1) The Plaintiff repeats para 1 of the Statement of Statement of Claim herein.

(2) The Plaintiff is required in the practice of his profession as an Advocate and Solicitor to have a brief from any client before instituting any proceedings or acting in any way whatsoever on behalf of the client.

(3) The Plaintiff was not a voter in the election in respect of which the Election Petition was presented.

The action of the plaintiff is based entirely upon the innuendo pleaded in para 4 of the amended statement of claim supported by particulars under O 78 R 3(1). This rule provides that the plaintiff must give particulars of the extrinsic facts relied on as importing the additional (or altered) meaning and the existence of such facts is essential to the cause of action. Para 4 complains that by innuendo, those words are defamatory. They are alleged to be understood to mean that the plaintiff had acted improperly and or unethically as a solicitor. It is not alleged that the words are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning.

The principles applicable here are to be found in (1) Gatley on Libel and Slander , 8th ed, pp 446, 447, 448, 449, paras 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078; (2) Duncan & Neill on Defamation (1978), pp 17, 18, 19, 20, paras 4.17 to 4.22.

In Hough v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 507, 513, 515 Slesser LJ said:

The burden on the plaintiff is to give evidence of special circumstances which would lead reasonable persons to infer that the words were understood in a defamatory meaning provided such circumstances were known to those persons to whom the words were published: Capital and Counties Bank v Henty. The evidence required is evidence of special facts causing the words to have a meaning revealed to those who knew the special facts but not revealed by the words in the absence of such knowledge: Tolley v JS Fry & Sons, Ltd: but as Greer LJ points out in the same case in the Court of Appeal: `It is not proof of a special fact in this sense merely to call a number of people to say that they understood the words in a defamatory sense; they would have to prove some fact known to them which would be sufficient to entitle any reasonable man with such knowledge to interpret the words in a defamatory sense.

And Goddard LJ said:

The question of law that arises in this case may thus be stated. Where words are not defamatory in their ordinary meaning, but by reason of special facts are capable of being understood in a secondary and defamatory sense by persons to whom the special facts are known, is it necessary to prove more than that there are people who know the special facts and so might understand the words in a defamatory sense or must there be evidence that

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