Breaking the mould: Japan's subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism.

• Author: Mulgan, Aurelia George
• Position: Report

The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance under the KoizumiAbe governments has prompted a neorealist argument that Japan is aligning even more closely with the United States in order to balance China. (1) In practice, Japan's strategy for dealing with Chinese power is more complex than simply bandwagoning with the United States, which has been the foundation of its security policy for more than five decades. (2)

The shift in Japanese strategy became evident under the Abe administration. Key differences can be discerned in the responses of the governments of Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe to China's rise. Although Prime Minister Abe sought to go even further than Prime Minister Koizumi in strengthening security ties with the United States, (3) the Koizumi administration gave sole priority to the United States, while the Abe administration adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. A stronger US-Japan alliance was complemented by the buildup of much broader and deeper security ties with other countries in the Asia Pacific, with the aim of constructing a containment coalition against the growth of Chinese power. (4)

The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Japan's more complex balancing strategy. It should not be viewed in isolation but in concert with other similar initiatives taking place at the same time: parallel overtures to India and the promotion of concepts of security trilateralism (Japan-India-US/Japan-Australia-US) and quadrilateralism (Japan-US-Australia-India), backed by the overt rhetoric of "shared values" and references to "strategic partnerships" based on common security interests.

These manifestations of Prime Minister Abe's "assertive diplomacy" and his desire for closer security relations with like-minded states are quite distinct from the multilateral initiatives that have been an enduring feature of Japan's regional policy in the finance, trade and diplomatic spheres. In dealing with China, the Abe government did not just turn to multilateral initiatives as a means of shaping Japan's security environment in Asia. (5) In fact, the burgeoning security ties with countries outside the US-Japan alliance exemplified a minilateral rather than a multilateralist approach, which sought to formalize and regularize security relations among a small number of regional partners and establish a new grouping with a closed rather than open membership. (6) In this respect, the revamping of security ties with other Asia-Pacific states by the Abe government marked a subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. (7)

The new approach also had divergent implications for Japan's security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, it reinforced the US alliance where the United States was also an invited player in minilateral frameworks. The Australia-Japan Security Declaration, for example, foreshadowed stronger Japan-Australia-US trilateral security cooperation in the future. On the other hand, the Abe administration's willingness to sign a security declaration with Australia and overt security approaches to India appeared to reflect a desire to take independent steps to shore up Japan's security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

In March 2007, Japan took the unprecedented step of signing a security declaration with a third country outside the framework of its bilateral alliance with the United States. It was the first security agreement Japan had signed since the 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and signalled a clear departure from Japan's exclusive security bilateralism centring on the United States.

The declaration affirmed the existence of a Japan-Australia strategic partnership and committed each nation to close security consultation, enhanced cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disarmament and peace keeping operations, and the provision of international public goods such as maritime security, and humanitarian and disaster relief. (8) The declaration also anticipated enhanced functional cooperation between the Australian and Japanese defence forces for purposes such as personnel exchange, joint exercises and training and peacekeeping (9) The legal constraints under which the Japanese defence forces normally operate explained the absence of mutual security commitments in the agreement and the Abe administration's reluctance to take the next step to a formal defence treaty. In September 2007, six months after the original agreement was signed, the Japanese and Australian governments agreed to major elements of an Action Plan to implement the joint declaration.

Analysts had long forecast that the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific was conducive to the formation of an Australia-Japan security dyad. Tow and Trood pointed to American preoccupation with the "war on terror" and China's increasing diplomatic prowess in regional security politics as a source of new imperatives for Japanese-Australian strategic collaboration. (10) Ball drew attention to incrementally expanding military and defence cooperation between Japan and Australia since the late 1990s. (11) Viewed from this perspective, the security declaration represented the logical next step in an evolutionary path marked by increasingly closer security ties between the two countries.

The rather grandiose language of the declaration also made reference to "shared values" and "shared security interests", "mutual respect, trust and deep friendship", "on-going beneficial cooperation in meeting regional and global security challenges", and "increasing practical cooperation" between the Australian and Japanese defence forces. (12) Japan and Australia had undoubtedly enjoyed a deeply embedded relationship of trust built up over a period of decades, which held out the prospect of genuine cooperation in security affairs. Underpinning the emerging security partnership were long-standing trade, cultural and diplomatic ties. Both trade and history converged in Prime Minister's Abe's desire to reaffirm his grandfather Prime Minister Kishi's legacy of being the first Japanese prime minister to formalize the re-establishment of trade relations with Australia in the 1957 Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce. Almost twenty years later the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provided further testimony to the Japanese view of Australia as a trusted friend with a mutual ally in the United States.

Complementing the well-established friendship based on trade and other links were demonstrations of Australian solidarity with Japan over more recent issues of vital strategic concern to the Japanese side. The security declaration was undoubtedly another quid pro quo for Australian protection of Japanese troops in Iraq alongside Japan's agreement to begin negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia. In addition, Australia had separately expressed support for a number of Japan's foreign policy causes. The Australian government adopted a hard-line stance towards North Korea on the abductees issue and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the wording of the security declaration made explicit reference to Japan-Australia cooperation on North Korean issues, including the abduction of Japanese nationals. Japan was also grateful for Australia's consistent and open expression of support for realizing its ambition to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which was mentioned in the agreement.

Explaining the significance of the bilateral agreement in the context of Japan's security strategy, however, requires more than a survey of the recent history of the Australia-Japan relationship and reference to the stated rationales found in the rhetoric of the declaration. In this article, I explore how the Japanese media and policy community interpreted the larger strategic purpose of the agreement, while also outlining the officially articulated positions of former Prime Minister Abe and Japan's new Ministry of Defense (MOD). This commentary prefaces my own analysis of how the agreement connects with Japan's alliance with the United States, its broader strategic significance as a key element of the Abe government's neorealist strategy of balancing China, and its implications for Australia as a potential participant in a Japan-sponsored containment coalition.

Japanese Media, Policy Community and Official Government Positions on the Security Declaration

When the security declaration with Australia was signed, a flurry of commentary appeared in the Japanese media about the larger security purpose and significance of the agreement. Newspapers on both the left and right depicted the new Australia-Japan relationship as having attained the level of a "quasi-alliance". (13) The conservative Yomiuri Shinbun also proclaimed that the declaration was an important document for the security of the Asia-Pacific region because it gave momentum to the idea of creating a future cooperative framework among Japan, the United States, Australia and India. (14)

Commentary on the strategic motivations of the Japanese Government included discussion of Japan's intention to become more deeply involved in the maintenance of order in the Asia Pacific. The Mainichi Shinbun observed that the declaration aimed to combine Japanese and Australian efforts for stability in the region and was certain to supplement the Japan-US and US-Australia alliances by helping to strengthen one side in the Japan-US-Australian triangle. (15) From a more critical perspective, the Japan Communist Party newspaper, Akahata agreed, asserting that the agreement would strengthen Japan-US-Australia tripartite cooperation and thus the Japan-US military...