Meeran bin Mydin v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 23 February 1998
• Neutral Citation: [1998] SGHC 50
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 288 of 1997
• Date: 23 February 1998
• Year: 1998
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: S Uthuman Ghani (G Raman & Partners)
• Citation: [1998] SGHC 50
• Defendant Counsel: May Lucia Mesenas (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether sentences in related cases relevant,Sentencing,Statutory offences,Whether sentence offends totality principle,Public servants convicted in related cases,Offence poses threat to national security -Whether deterrence at wider general level -s 6(b) Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Ed),Criminal Law,Many similar charges -Facts suggesting series of events as one transaction,Payments of reward to immigration officer to assist in obtaining social visit passes,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Accused already serving deterrent sentence on similar charges -Offence poses threat to national security -Whether sentence so manifestly excessive,Whether sentence offends 'one-transaction' rule,Prevention of Corruption Act

Judgment:

YONG PUNG HOW CJ

The appellant pleaded guilty to two charges under s 6(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Ed) (PCA). In each charge the appellant was alleged to have corruptly given a sum of money to one Abu Bakar s/o Koya Pattukudi (Abu Bakar), an immigration officer, as a reward for assisting him in obtaining social visit passes for various Indonesian nationals to enter Singapore through the Woodlands Immigration Checkpoint. Seven similar charges under s 6(b) PCA were taken into consideration in sentencing. The appellant was sentenced to nine months` imprisonment on each of the two charges, both sentences to run consecutively. This total of 18 months` imprisonment was to run consecutively with sentences currently being served by the appellant. Effectively, the appellant was to serve a total of 36 months` imprisonment. His appeal against sentence was dismissed by me. I now give my grounds.

2. Background

The statement of facts revealed that on 8 October 1996 at the Woodlands Immigration Checkpoint an immigration inspector noted that three vans carrying Indonesian nationals headed specifically for Counter No 23 for clearance. This drew his attention because there were other counters with no queue of vehicles waiting for clearance. The immigration inspector checked and found that the 18 Indonesian nationals in the vans had each been issued with a two-week social visit pass by Sharifah bte Daud (Sharifah), the immigration officer manning Counter No 23 when they should only be granted a pass for three days to one week. The three vans and 18 Indonesian nationals were detained.

3.Investigations exposed the involvement of Sharifah and five other immigration officers with two syndicates operating to assist Indonesian nationals in obtaining two-week social visit passes in return for bribes. The appellant acted as an intermediary between a `Fudin` who operated the syndicates and the immigration officers in the scheme. The immigration officers were recruited by the appellant`s cousin, Abu Bakar, on his behalf. Details of their respective shifts and counter duties would be provided by the immigration officers to Abu Bakar who would then inform the appellant who in turn would convey the information to Fudin whereupon Fudin would then make arrangements accordingly.

4.Upon clearance at the checkpoint, the Indonesian nationals would be driven to a car park to meet the appellant. They would then make a payment of between S$125 to S$130 to the appellant. The money collected would be shared between the appellant, Abu Bakar, Fudin and the immigration officers. Investigations also revealed that on two separate occasions in September 1996, the appellant had at a coffeeshop at Choa Chu Kang given two sums of $1,560 and $1,500 respectively to Abu Bakar for clearing 26 and 25 Indonesian nationals respectively. These transactions were the subject of the two charges proceeded with in the court below.

5. Decision below

In assessing sentence, on the application of the prosecution and with the consent of the appellant, the district judge took into consideration seven similar charges, brief details of which were as follows:

(1)	DAC 4887/97 (P3A)	$30
(2)	DAC 4888/97 (P4A)	$1,080
(3)	DAC 4889/97 (P5A)	$540
(4)	DAC 4890/97 (P6A)	$480
(5)	DAC 4891/97 (P7A)	$300
(6)	DAC 4892/97 (P8A)	$300
(7)	DAC 4893/97 (P9A)	$420

In all the above charges, over a period between June to August 1996, Abu Bakar received these bribes at a coffee shop in Choa Chu Kang Road. The court was also made aware that the appellant was serving sentences for four similar charges which he had been found guilty of and convicted after a trial and for which he was ordered to serve six months` imprisonment on each of the four sentences. Three of the sentences were to run consecutively while the fourth sentence was ordered to run concurrently. He was thus serving an 18 months` imprisonment sentence with effect from 30 September 1997.

6.The district judge took into account as mitigating the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty. He also considered that the appellant had no similar previous conviction. The district judge was of the opinion, however, that the nature of the offence called for a deterrent sentence and sentenced the appellant to nine months` imprisonment on each of the two charges, the sentences to run consecutively. He also ordered that this 18 months` term of imprisonment run consecutively to the sentence already being served by the appellant.

7. The appeal

Counsel`s main contention was that the district judge had erred in ordering a deterrent sentence since the appellant was already serving a deterrent sentence. He submitted that the district judge had exercised his discretion purely on the need for what he saw in effect to be `double deterrence`. It was true that the appellant was already subjected to a deterrent sentence of 18 months` imprisonment on the four charges in the first hearing. The prosecution in that case had applied for a deterrent sentence and the court had granted one. Counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution in the present case `did not press for a deterrent sentence for the obvious reason that he (the appellant) was already serving a deterrent sentence`.

8.A deterrent sentence is granted entirely within the court`s discretion. There is no requirement in law for the prosecution to apply for deterrence before a court may consider it in the exercise of its discretion. There is also no prohibition in law from judicial discretion being exercised in favour of ordering a deterrent sentence where the offender is already serving a deterrent sentence. The court must direct its mind to the nature of the offence and...