Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v AG

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 19 August 2013
• Date: 19 August 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 28 of 2013
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh and another

Plaintiff

and

Attorney-General

Defendant

[2013] SGCA 45

Chao Hick Tin JA

,

Judith Prakash J

and

Andrew Ang J

Civil Appeal No 28 of 2013

Court of Appeal

Administrative Law—Disciplinary tribunals—Application to review refusal to revoke appointment of disciplinary tribunal—Whether Chief Justice had abdicated his duty to revoke appointment of disciplinary tribunal—Section 90 (3) (a) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)

Administrative Law—Judicial review—Continuation of disciplinary proceedings after withdrawal of complaint—Whether refusal to revoke appointment of disciplinary tribunal was Wednesbury unreasonable

Administrative Law—Judicial review—Reasons not given for administrative decision—Whether there was general duty to provide reasons for administrative decisions

Legal Profession—Disciplinary proceedings—Revoking appointment of disciplinary tribunal—Whether Chief Justice's discretion was unfettered—Section 90 (3) (a) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)

The appellants (‘the Appellants’) were advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore who were being investigated following two complaints by a former client. A Disciplinary Tribunal (‘DT’) was appointed to investigate into the alleged misconduct of the Appellants. Upon the unreserved withdrawal of both complaints, the Appellants wrote on multiple occasions to the Chief Justice seeking a revocation of the DT's appointment pursuant to s 90 (3) (a) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (‘LPA’). On 4 February 2013 the Appellants commenced an action (Originating Summons No 443 of 2012 (‘the OS’)) for a mandatory order compelling the Chief Justice to exercise his power to revoke the appointment of the DT. On the same day, the Chief Justice replied to inform the Appellants that the disciplinary proceedings should take their course.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The evidence clearly demonstrated that the Chief Justice had reviewed the matter before declining to revoke the appointment of the DT, which was contrary to the Appellants' contention that the Chief Justice had made no decision at all: at [4] .

(2) The Chief Justice was under no obligation to conclude that the DT's appointment had to be revoked. Prima facie, the Chief Justice's discretion under s 90 (3) (a) of the LPA, which was in the nature of an enabling provision, was unfettered. Further, it was settled law that a DT onced seised of jurisdiction would be unaffected by the withdrawal of the initial complaint: at [5] .

(3) It followed for the same reasons that the Chief Justice's decision could not have been Wednesbury unreasonable: at [7] .

(4) It continued to be the position of Singapore law that there was no general duty to give reasons for administrative decisions. While there might, in some circumstances, be a requirement for administrative decision-makers to furnish reasons, this would invariably be dependent on the operative statutory context and factual matrix of each case: at [10] and [13] .

(5) The Chief Justice's power under s 90 (3) (a) of the LPA, being a corollary of his power to appoint a DT under s 90 (1) of the same statute, was primarily of an administrative nature: at [11] .

[Observation: The disciplinary process could not be held hostage to the whims of complainants, who might, in the nature of things, have a multitude of personal reasons for choosing to submit and then withdraw a complaint. The fact that a complaint had been withdrawn did not necessarily mean that there was no truth to the complaint: at [5] .

Under the scheme of the LPA, it would be exceptional for the Chief Justice to provide reasons for declining to revoke the appointment of a DT, given the possibility that this might interfere with the DT's investigations: at [11] .

The proper course would be for the Appellants to make their representations to the DT should the CJ decide not to revoke the appointment of the DT: at [11] .]

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (refd)

Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 (refd)

Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR (R) 525; [1988] SLR 132 (refd)

Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] 4 SLR (R) 308; [2006] 4 SLR 308 (refd)

Law Society of Singapore, The v Rajagopal Shan [1994] SGDSC 2 (refd)

Mallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59 (refd)

Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v AG [2013] 2 SLR 844 (folld)

Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 (refd)

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (refd)

Shan Rajagopal, Re [1994] 2 SLR (R) 60; [1994] 3 SLR 524 (refd)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) ss 90 (1) , 90 (3) (a) (consd) ;s 89 (1)

Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)...