Mak Kok Weng v Ng Teck Soon
| Jurisdiction | Singapore |
| Judge | Leslie Chew |
| Judgment Date | 25 November 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] SGDC 352 |
| Court | District Court (Singapore) |
| Published date | 09 January 2009 |
| Year | 2008 |
| Plaintiff Counsel | Vijay Kumar (Vijay & Company) |
| Defendant Counsel | See Chern Yang (Premier Law LLC) |
| Citation | [2008] SGDC 352 |
| 25 November 2008 |
|
District Judge Leslie Chew:
Background
1. This was an appeal by the Defendant against the decision of the Deputy Registrar in ordering interlocutory judgment in favour of the Plaintiff judgment pursuant to the usual O 14 application. The action is based on what the Plaintiff contends are defamatory remarks made by the Defendant.
2. The defamatory remarks made by the Defendant which the Plaintiff relies upon to found his current action are essentially contained in the letter dated 4 Dec 2006. Specifically by paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs asserted that “…the Defendant falsely and maliciously wrote and published or caused to be written and published of and in relation to the Plaintiff the following words: “You have selective dementia”.
3. The Plaintiff claimed that by addressing the letter to the Plaintiff’s firm, the Defendant knew that the letter with the allegedly defamatory remarks, was likely to be opened by the Plaintiff’s staff. As it turned out the letter was opened by the Plaintiff’s secretary.
4. The Plaintiff contended that in their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of meant and were understood to mean that the Plaintiff is dishonest devious and lacking in integrity.
5. In the Defence filed by the Defendant, he simply denied the claims. Subsequently the Defendant applied in Sum No 5884/2007 to strike essential parts of the Statement of Claim. The application amounted to an application to strike the action as a whole. The Deputy Registrar dismissed the application and in turn granted the application by the Plaintiff in SUM No 5838/2007 for interlocutory judgment.
6. After hearing submissions by Counsel, I reserved my decision. I now give my decision and reasons for my decision.
My Decision
7. With respect to the Defendant’s appeal against the decision of the Deputy Registrar to dismiss his application to strike out the action, I would dismiss the appeal. I therefore confirm the decision of the Deputy Registrar.
8. It is trite that the discretion to strike out an action based on the grounds in O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court and indeed under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, should only be exercised where it is clear that the Plaintiff have no case or where the action is bound to fail – see generally, Gabriel Peter & partners v Wee Chong Jin [1998]1 SLR 374 and The Osprey
9. In the present case, the Defendant chose not to file any affidavit to support their application to strike out the action. The Defendant took the position that there was clearly no sustainable action on the face of the Statement of Claim. He relied purely on legal submissions to argue in support of his application. In that sense, the Defendant must be taken to have relied purely on O 18 r 19 (1) (a) of the ROC. I therefore disregarded the application ostensibly based on the other limbs of O 18 r 19 since in any event there is no evidence on affidavit to support any claim the Defendant might make that the action was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or that the relevant paragraphs were prejudicial or embarrassed or delayed the fair trial of the action or that the action was an abuse of process.
10. Seen the above perspective, I found on the facts before me and in particular the impugned words relied upon by the Plaintiff that the action was not bound to fail. The words were in my view defamatory in the sense it tended to disparaged the reputation of the Plaintiff as a lawyer in that the words clearly meant in the context of the letter as a whole that the Plaintiff had dishonestly disregarded the true bases for which he could charge for his services. An imputation of dishonesty against a professional man such as the Plaintiff as a lawyer was a serious imputation. Whether the words at issue are in their natural and ordinary meaning defamatory is something to be determined by the court objectively in the context in which they are uttered. Nor is the court constrained by the literal or strict meaning of the words. Indeed the court is to take into account what the ordinary reasonable person may reasonably infer from the words – see Oei Hong Leong v Ban Song Long David
11. It cannot in my judgment be seriously contended that the impugned words do not ‘lower the reputation of the person in the eyes of right thinking persons” – see Aaron v Cheong Yip Seng [1999] 1SLR 623 which adopted the formulation laid down in Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 at [51]. It seemed to me clear having regard to the context of the Defendant disputing the bases upon which the Plaintiff had charged for his services to the Defendant that the implication was that the Plaintiff had dishonestly billed the Defendant for services he was not entitled to charge. By any account such an imputation was a serious one and clearly defamatory. Moreover, the imputation must also been seen in the context of the letter of 4 Dec 2006 being sent to the Law Society. I shall return to this below.
12. Up to this point it might be said that in the present application since the words complained of have been found by this court to be defamatory then it followed that he Plaintiff’s interlocutory judgment obtained before the Deputy Registrar ought to be confirmed. This is especially so since I have also found that the action ought not to be struck out.
13. In the present case, however, the Defendant relied on a number of defences based on the following:
a. Qualified Privilege
b. Fair Comment
c. Justification
Qualified Privilege
14. The crux of the Defendant’s defence based on this ground is that the letter which contained the defamatory remarks were opened by the Plaintiff’s secretary. The Defendant contended that in that context he was entitled to qualified privilege and publication of the letter to the secretary...
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