Low Meng Chay v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 14 January 1993
• Neutral Citation: [1993] SGHC 9
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeals Nos 5 and 66 of 1992
• Date: 14 January 1993
• Year: 1993
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lim Kia Tong (Teo & Lim)
• Citation: [1993] SGHC 9
• Defendant Counsel: Palaniappan Sundararaj (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Default sentences,Penalties,Sentencing,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Inability to pay fines,Totality principle,Fines,Whether sentences manifestly excessive

Cur Adv Vult

On 2 January 1992 the appellant, having discharged two counsel in succession and being then unrepresented, pleaded guilty to 12 charges punishable under the previous s 73 of the Trade Marks Act (Cap 322) (`the Act`), ie for having in his possession for sale various goods marked with a counterfeit trade mark. He also pleaded guilty to 13 charges under the new s 73, which came into operation on 1 March 1991. Nine other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. These were all private prosecutions. The appellant admitted that he had failed to heed the successive summonses brought against him. He would engage counsel and claim trial when he was charged in court, then fail to appear in court on the trial date, for which warrants of arrest were issued with no bail granted, to no avail. Eventually he only appeared in court on the day of his plea of guilt because he had been remanded under a committal order for violating an injunction issued against him. Prosecuting counsel pressed for a deterrent sentence. The appellant asked for leniency and said that he had committed the offences because he and his family needed money, and that he had no money to pay any fine.

He was fined the maximum of $2,000 on each of the 12 charges under the old s 73, amounting to a total of $24,000, with a default term of imprisonment of one month for every $1,000 remaining unpaid, ie a total of 24 months, to run consecutively. For the 13 charges under the new s 73, in respect of which 299 infringing items were involved, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of between one and six months for each charge, based on a formula tagged to the number of articles stated in each charge (one month`s imprisonment for ten articles or less, two months` imprisonment for 11 to 20 articles, etc), making a total of 32 months` imprisonment. All these sentences were ordered to run consecutively as each of the charges was in respect of a separate and distinct offence, all of which were originally scheduled to be tried at different trials. The appellant was unable to pay the fine of $24,000 and therefore faced a period of 56 months` imprisonment. In Magistrate`s Appeal No 5 of 1992 he appealed against these sentences as being manifestly excessive.

On 24 February 1992 the appellant pleaded guilty to another 27 charges, 19 of them under the old s 73 and eight under the new s 73. 1,683 infringing items comprising at least 12 different varieties of goods were involved. In respect of the 19 charges under the old s 73, he was fined varying amounts making a total of $26,800, with a total default imprisonment term of 19 months and 29 days. In respect of the eight charges under the new s 73, he was again fined varying amounts making a total of $39,800 with a total default imprisonment term of 12 months and 24 days. Nine similar charges were taken into consideration for the purposes of sentence. The appellant was unable to pay the fines and therefore faced imprisonment for a total period of 32 months and 23 days. In Magistrate`s Appeal No 66 of 1992 he contended that the sentences were manifestly excessive.

On 22 April 1922 the appellant pleaded guilty to six charges under the current s 73, with 40 similar charges taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. He was fined a total of $25,900, with a default term of imprisonment of seven months. He does not appeal against the sentences imposed on this occasion but refers to them in support of his contention that the sentences on the two previous occasions were manifestly...