Lock Yeng Fun v Chua Hock Chye
| Jurisdiction | Singapore |
| Judge | Chan Sek Keong CJ |
| Judgment Date | 26 June 2007 |
| Neutral Citation | [2007] SGCA 33 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Singapore) |
| Published date | 13 July 2007 |
| Year | 2007 |
| Plaintiff Counsel | Lim See Wai Victor (Hoh Law Corporation) |
| Defendant Counsel | The respondent in person |
| Subject Matter | Family Law,Matrimonial assets,Division,Principles governing division of matrimonial assets,Significance of (direct) financial contributions,Whether equal division warranted on facts |
| Citation | [2007] SGCA 33 |
| 26 June 2007 |
|
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):
1 This is an appeal by the petitioner wife against the ancillary orders made by the trial judge (“the Judge”) in Lock Yeng Fun v Chua Hock Chye
2 The respondent husband did not file any notice of appeal against the Judge’s decision.
3 We allowed the appeal in part (in so far as the issue relating to the division of matrimonial assets was concerned). In particular, we ordered an equal division of all the matrimonial assets available for distribution. However, in so far as the issue of maintenance was concerned, we found it appropriate, in the circumstances, to rescind the order made by the Judge. We now give the detailed grounds for our decision.
Background
4 The facts are not in dispute and can be simply stated.
5 The parties were married for almost 30 years. Their marriage was registered on 4 September 1975, the divorce petition was filed on 12 May 2005, and the decree nisi was granted subsequently, followed by the decree absolute.
6 The appellant is currently 55 years old and the respondent is 56 years old.
7 There are two children of the marriage, a daughter (aged 29) and a son (aged 28). They are both working adults and are not dependent on their parents. They do not provide any form of financial support to the respondent, but give the appellant about $400 a month in total.
8 The appellant has been a homemaker from the start of the marriage and only ventured to work (and even at that, merely a temporary job) for four months when the respondent was retrenched in 1992.
9 The respondent, on the other hand, enjoyed a successful career as a vice-president of three foreign banks. His employment required him to be based overseas for a substantial period of time, and during this period, the appellant single-handedly cared for the household and children.
10 After the respondent was retrenched in 2000 from his position at an insurance group, he started a training and consultancy business, which, unfortunately, did not succeed and incurred losses amounting to some $25,000.
11 In 2002, the respondent, together with a partner, started another training and consultancy business, which, as with the previous start-up, suffered severe losses and was eventually wound up in 2005.
12 The respondent currently operates a training and consultancy business from home, from which he claimed to be earning a monthly income of approximately $600 to $800.
13 The respondent also claimed (which was accepted by the Judge and was not challenged by the appellant, on appeal) that he had made various investments in the stock market and had made a loss of approximately $300,000 on these investments.
The circumstances surrounding the divorce
14 The ground for divorce was that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The acrimony and bitterness between the parties were clearly evident from the (hurtful) allegations and accusations they hurled against each other. However, whilst this was unfortunate, we found that all this was irrelevant to the decision of this court in the present appeal, not least because these allegations and accusations cast no real light on the legal issues before us. At this juncture, it is apposite to make a brief note of the matrimonial assets available for division between the parties, after which we will proceed to set out the significant factors that were integral to and formed the basis of our decision to award, between them, an equal division of the assets acquired throughout the 30-year marriage. We will then consider each of the main issues, viz, the division of matrimonial assets and maintenance, in relation to the relevant facts and legal principles.
Matrimonial assets available for division
15 The matrimonial assets to be divided comprise the following:
(a) the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home at 16 Namly Garden;
(b) the wife’s assets including, but not limited to, investments and the surrender value of insurance policies; and
(c) the husband’s assets.
16 It would suffice to note that the value of assets (a) and (c) are not in dispute. However, the parties hotly contested the total value of assets in the wife’s name. We will deal with the respective values of these assets at [25]–[31] below.
17 We now proceed to set out the unusual features of this case which, as we shall see, impact significantly on the resolution of the issues in the present appeal.
Unusual circumstances of the present case
18 Admittedly, the appellant was a homemaker throughout the marriage and did not contribute financially (in any significant respect) to the acquisition of the matrimonial home. The respondent was the sole breadwinner throughout the marriage and supported the appellant and their children financially. Although the respondent did not have a tertiary education, he was undoubtedly very successful in his career, rising steadily through the ranks and eventually reaching the position of vice-president in three foreign banks.
19 However, and this is the first unusual circumstance in the present case, we note that the family never employed any domestic help and hence the appellant shouldered, solely, the burden of looking after the household and the growing children. This was particularly so during the relatively long periods between 1984 and 1985 and between 1992 and 1998, when the respondent was based overseas in Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively.
20 Secondly, apart from caring for the respondent (when he was in Singapore), the home, and the children of the marriage, the appellant also managed to amass a sizable sum of close to $500,000 from her investments (albeit from the moneys given to her by the respondent for household and miscellaneous expenses). On the other hand, based on the disclosed investments in the husband’s name, it would appear that he was a poor investor or saver, having only accumulated $230,000 “after almost a lifetime of work”: see GD at [20].
21 Thirdly, another pertinent fact to be noted is that the respondent, being 56 years old and suffering from arthritic limbs and vision problems, has little or almost no prospect of a higher earning capacity. The monthly income from his training and consultancy business of approximately $600 to $800 can hardly be considered a steady source of revenue, bearing in mind the fact that the business itself has no intrinsic value. This was a relevant factor in our decision to rescind the maintenance order made by the Judge.
Ancillary orders made by the trial judge
22 In the court below, the Judge made the following ancillary orders:
(a) The matrimonial property is to be sold in the open market within 12 months of the Judge’s order. The net proceeds of sale, but before Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) deductions, are to be divided in the ratio 60% to the respondent and 40% to the petitioner. The respondent is to refund his own CPF moneys from his share of the proceeds of sale.
(b) For the other assets, the division of such assets shall also be in the ratio of 60% to the respondent and 40% to the petitioner. The net difference is to be deducted from the division of the sale of the matrimonial home from the petitioner’s share of proceeds.
(c) The respondent is to pay the petitioner maintenance of $60,000 in a lump sum. This amount may be paid from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
23 We turn now to consider the two main issues raised in this appeal, viz, the division of matrimonial assets and maintenance.
Division of matrimonial assets
Introduction
24 Counsel for the appellant, Mr Victor Lim, and the respondent (who appeared in person) agreed that the case law supported the decision arrived at by the Judge in giving the husband and the wife in the present proceedings 60 per cent and 40 per cent of the matrimonial assets, respectively.
25 However, Mr Lim argued that the appellant wife should be entitled to retain her own assets. In this connection, we should take another look at the precise value of these assets. They were assessed by the Judge to have a value of $577,000. This amount included a sum of $127,000, being the total value of various insurance policies. However, the Judge valued one of these policies at $70,000. As the respondent argued (correctly, in our view), this amount of $70,000 was the insured value of the policy and not its surrender value, which was the relevant value the court ought to have taken into account. The surrender value was, in fact, only $21,457.12, as confirmed by a letter from the insurer itself, which the respondent tendered to the court.
26 On a related point, the appellant also sought to argue that two other insurance policies purchased by the appellant using money from her CPF were double-counted and their total value should be deducted from the sum of $127,000 referred to in the preceding paragraph. We find, however, that apart from mere assertion, the appellant produced no evidence to support this point.
27 In the circumstances, we find the total value of the insurance policies to be $78,457.12 (taking into account the fact that the value of one of the policies was only $21,457.12 instead of $70,000, as noted above). The total amount of the appellant’s assets would accordingly have a value of $528,457.12 (instead of $577,000).
28 It is also appropriate, in this connection, to describe the other assets that would form part of the pool of matrimonial assets available for division under s 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) (“the Act”).
29 The first comprises the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial property (less the expenses connected with the sale). The matrimonial property was...
To continue reading
Request your trial