Lim Siong Hoe Lawrence v Wong Chong Hui and Heng Hong Development Pte Ltd

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeLee Li Choon
Judgment Date21 December 2018
Neutral Citation[2018] SGMC 78
CourtMagistrates' Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberMagistrate’s Court Suit No. 19075 of 2014
Published date03 May 2019
Year2018
Hearing Date07 August 2018,08 February 2018,09 October 2018
Plaintiff CounselRamesh (M/s Straits Law Practice LLC)
Defendant CounselFendrick Koh (M/s Tan Chin Hoe & Co.)
Subject MatterDischarge of Liability,Unilateral Mistake,Actual Knowledge
Citation[2018] SGMC 78
District Judge Lee Li Choon: Background Facts

In this suit, the Plaintiff’s (Plaintiff’s name is Lim Siong Hoe Lawrence) claim is for damages for personal injuries arising from a road traffic accident along the Ayer Rajah Expressway on 15 October 2011 involving the Plaintiff’s vehicle, SGP 7332D and vehicle number GBB 6328G owned by the 2nd Defendant (2nd Defendant is Heng Hong Development Pte Ltd) and driven by the 1st Defendant (“the Defendants’ vehicle”). The insurers for the Defendants are NTUC Income.

After the accident, the Plaintiff had sent his vehicle to Poon Poong Motors Pte Ltd (“the Workshop”) to effect repairs to it. The Workshop then lodged a claim with NTUC Income on his behalf. The claim was settled and the Plaintiff was asked by a Workshop’s representative to go to the Workshop’s premises to sign a document pertaining to the said settlement. The document was a Discharge Voucher (“DV”) issued by NTUC Income and dated 1 March 2012 and the Plaintiff signed on the DV on the said date. On the face of the DV1, the Plaintiff’s signature was witnessed by one Robin Poon Joo King whose “signature” at the relevant signature portion of the DV appears to have the name “Michelle” in it.

The Plaintiff thereafter made a claim in respect of personal injuries arising from the accident and filed this suit on 10 October 2014.

Defendants’ Case

In their Defence, the Defendants, through their insurers, NTUC Income, say that the Plaintiff is precluded from making this claim as the Plaintiff had executed the DV dated 1 March 2012 and had accepted the sum of S$9052.20 in full and final settlement of all his damages arising out of the accident against the Defendants. As parties have reached an agreement on apportionment of liability should the Defence fail, at trial, the sole defence of the Defendants is that they are not liable by virtue of their liability having been fully discharged by reason of the Plaintiff having executed the DV.

Plaintiff’s Case

In the Plaintiff’s initial Reply, the Plaintiff pleaded that the sum of $9,052.20 was only in respect of the Plaintiff’s property damage claim. The Plaintiff averred that the Defendants had dealt with the workshop directly and negotiated a settlement with respect to the Plaintiff’s property damage only2. The Plaintiff also pleaded that there was no consideration from the Defendants with respect to the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim, when the Plaintiff executed the DV and thereby there is no full and final settlement of all of the Plaintiff’s damages arising out of the accident3. The Plaintiff further pleaded that the Defendants and the Defendants’ insurers had not at any point explained to the Plaintiff that the DV also applied to the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim, nor had the Plaintiff sought legal advice in respect of the DV4.

After the 1st tranche of the trial, the Plaintiff applied to amend his Reply. In the Plaintiff’s Amended Reply, the Plaintiff further pleaded that he had executed the DV under a unilateral mistake of fact and the Plaintiff relies on the following as particulars in support of this unilateral mistake: The Plaintiff’s demand for cost of repair and loss of rental (“property damage claim”) was submitted to NTUC Income by the Workshop only. There was no claim for personal injury submitted to NTUC Income by the Plaintiff through the Workshop. NTUC Income’s offer pertained to the property damage claim only. The Plaintiff accepted NTUC Income’s offer for the property damage claim and executed the DV. The Plaintiff did not obtain legal advice in executing the DV. NTUC Income effected payment of the negotiated settlement sum for the Plaintiff’s property damage claim directly to the Workshop and there was no consideration for the personal injury claim. NTUC Income had either actual and/or constructive knowledge of the fact that the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim was not submitted by the Workshop based on the supporting documents submitted by the Workshop for the property damage claim5.

Facts That Are Not In Dispute

The following facts are not in dispute: The Workshop’s claim lodged with NTUC Income contained claims for cost of repairs based on the Repair Invoice TP20303 and loss of use for 18 days only. There was no mention of personal injuries in the Workshop’s claim. The DV was sent by NTUC Income to the Workshop via a cover letter with NTUC Income’s letterhead6. The settlement sum was paid directly to the Workshop via a cheque issued by NTUC Income with the Workshop as the payee7. There is also no dispute that the Plaintiff did sign on the DV.

Plaintiff’s Evidence

The Plaintiff gave evidence that he had only authorised the Workshop to submit a property damage claim and had never authorised the Workshop to submit his personal injuries claim. The Plaintiff also testified that when he executed the DV, he was still undergoing medical treatment8: Sure. Please answer the question, Mr Lim. When you signed the voucher on 1st March 2012, did you notify NTUC that you’re making a personal injury claim? No, I’m still seeking treatment at that material time.

The Plaintiff therefore says that as far as he is concerned, at the time he executed the DV, he only had reasons to believe that it was a direct settlement of the property damage claim between the Workshop and NTUC Income.

Defendant’s Evidence

The Defendants’ evidence is adduced through their sole witness, Mr Yon Kai Jie (“Mr Yon”), an employee of NTUC Income. He was not the officer who processed the Workshop’s claim. It is my understanding that Mr Yon only became involved after the Plaintiff, through his solicitor, served his letter of demand dated 2 July 2014 on the 1st Defendant.

Mr Yon gave evidence on the usual process for the processing of claims arising from motor accidents. With regard to this case, Mr Yon maintained NTUC Income’s position on the effect of the DV – that it discharges the Defendants from all liability for all claims arising from the same accident. As he was not the officer who dealt with the Plaintiff’s earlier claim, there was no evidence on the circumstances surrounding the processing of that claim. The Defendants did not, through Mr Yon, adduce any evidence of any other communication or correspondence between NTUC Income and the Workshop save for the Workshop’s letter dated 27 February 2012 submitting the claim for cost of repairs and loss of use9 and NTUC Income’s letter dated 1 March 2012 confirming NTUC Income’s offer to settle the claim at $9,052.20 and attaching the DV10. There was certainly no evidence of any communication between NTUC Income and the Plaintiff.

Decision The terms in the Discharge Voucher

The terms of the DV state:

I/We, LIM SIONG HOE LAWRENCE (i.e., the Plaintiff) hereby acknowledge and agree that payment by NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Limited of the sum of S$9,052.20 to POON POONG MOTORS PTE LTD (i.e., the Workshop) shall be full satisfaction liquidation and discharge of all claims whatsoever competent upon HENG HONG DEVELOPMENT PTE LTD (the 2nd Defendant) &/or AUTHORISED DRIVER in respect of all loss injury or damage whether now or hereafter to become manifest arising directly or indirectly from the above-captioned accident.

(Words in italics added)

It is to be noted that the date indicated on the DV at the portion where the Plaintiff had signed is 6 February 2012. No explanation has been given for the discrepancies in the dates. As it is not disputed that the Plaintiff had signed the DV, unless the doctrine of mistake applies to render the DV inoperative as regards its discharge of the Defendants’ liability, it is clear to me that parties are bound by what is stated in the DV.

The case of Ter Yin Wei v Lim Leet Fang distinguished

In written closing submissions, counsel for the Defendants drew the Court’s attention to the case of Ter Yin Wei v Lim Leet Fang [2012] SGHC 82 (“Ter Yin Wei”)11, which concerned a settlement for a property damage claim by the respondent therein. In that case, the appellant’s insurers, HSBC Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“HSBCI”), had also issued a standard Discharge Voucher, which was signed by a Workshop employee and returned to HSBCI. The respondent’s lawyers failed to stamp “without prejudice to any personal injury claim” on the DV. When the respondent commenced proceedings for a personal injury claim, the appellant and HSBCI contested the claim on the basis that the respondent had compromised all her claims as a result of the DV. The High Court in that case held at [16] that “(t)here was no other construction of the DV other than that, with the payment, it was a full and final settlement of, and full discharge from all claims that the recipient had or may have had against the insurer and the insured driver….The phrase “may have” in the DV clearly referred to claims that had not been put forward at that time, or claims that might arise in the future.”

The High Court in Ter Yin Wei also held that the fact that the correspondence between the respondents’ lawyers and HSBCI only mentioned property damage and loss of use was insufficient to displace the unambiguous meaning of the words “all claims we/I have or may have in respect of the incident” in the DV12.

The DV in Ter Yin Wei had very similar wording as the DV in this case. As in this case, the execution of the DV was done without any indication of reservation of rights as regards personal injury claims.

While the broad holdings in Ter Yin Wei as regards the legal effect of the wording in the DV and that the fact that the correspondence between the claimant and the insurers only mentioned property damage and loss of use is by itself insufficient to displace the unambiguous meaning of the words in the DV apply also to this case, there are material factual differences between Ter Yin Wei and this case. It is therefore important to highlight these...

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