Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA
• Judgment Date: 09 March 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] SGCA 14
• Date: 09 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 154 of 2015
• Published date: 25 June 2016
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lee Eng Beng SC, Paul Tan and Amy Seow (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
• Hearing Date: 07 March 2016
• Defendant Counsel: Melanie Ho, Chang Man Phing, Joycelyn Ngiam and Tan Kia Hua (WongPartnership LLP)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Costs,Taxation

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the oral judgment of the court): Introduction

This appeal was brought by Dr Susan Lim Mey Lee (“the Appellant”) against the decision of the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) in Singapore Medical Council v Lim Mey Lee Susan [2015] SGHC 129 (“the Judgment”), concerning the party-and-party costs payable by her to the Respondent, the Singapore Medical Council (“the SMC”), in a Bill of Costs which was rendered for work done for hearings before two Disciplinary Committees. The issue on appeal is a narrow one: it concerns the fees of the second legal assessor (“2nd LA”) to the second Disciplinary Committee (“2nd DC”) appointed by the SMC for the disciplinary inquiry of the Appellant.

Our decision

It is settled law that, on a taxation of costs on a standard basis, a party shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred and that doubts will be resolved in favour of the paying party (see O 59 r 27(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules”)). However, every exercise of this nature is necessarily granular, fact-sensitive and context-sensitive.

We now turn to examine the decisions of the assistant registrar (“the AR”) and the Judge, respectively.

The AR’s decision

In respect of the 2nd LA’s work, the AR awarded $22,000 in costs against the Appellant. In our view $22,000 was, with respect, an overly low figure.

First, we think that the hourly rate to be applied should have been $1,050 (which was the rate agreed between the SMC and the 2nd LA) and not $570 which was the rate charged by the first legal assessor (“1st LA”) and which the AR seems to have taken into consideration in arriving at her decision. Both the 1st LA and the 2nd LA are Senior Counsel. The agreed hourly rate of $1,050 which was charged by the 2nd LA was, in our view, a reasonable one, taking into account his seniority. It was apparent from the Respondent’s solicitors’ letter dated 23 May 2014 (which was in response to the Appellant’s solicitors’ letter dated 4 March 2014 requesting more information about the SMC’s disbursement items) that the 1st LA had given the SMC a discounted hourly rate instead of “his usual charge out rate of $1,000/hour”. Counsel for the Appellant, Mr Lee Eng Beng SC (“Mr Lee”), accepts that $1,000 per hour for a Senior Counsel would be reasonable if a matter is between a solicitor and his client. Counsel for the Respondent, Ms Melanie Ho, points out that the 2nd LA was acting as solicitor for his client, the SMC, in the disciplinary proceedings. We think that is correct and that the agreed rate of $1,050 cannot therefore be said to be unreasonable. We should add that we do not see any reason in principle why a distinction in the hourly rate charged should vary between court work on the one hand and work performed as a legal assessor on the other. Further, as the Judge pointed out in [81] of the Judgment, the Appellant had to bear the risk of a higher hourly rate because she, being the paying party, also stood to benefit from any lower hourly rates.

Secondly, in our view, this was a complex case from both legal and factual perspectives – both of which were inextricably connected with each other. The 2nd LA would therefore have spent a lot of time on preparatory work. This ought to have been taken into account, but was not reflected in the $22,000 that the AR awarded. On the twin assumptions that the AR applied an hourly rate of $570 and that 32 hours were spent in the hearings proper, it would mean that only 6.6 hours of time was catered for the 2nd LA’s preparatory work. With respect, we do not feel that this was a reasonable figure, even though the 2nd LA did not assist in the writing of the 2nd DC’s decision. The AR’s decision may have been partly due to her view that the Appellant should not be made to bear the cost of work done by the 2nd DC which duplicated the work done by the first Disciplinary Committee (“1st DC”). However, we agree with the Judge’s view at [82] of the Judgment that the Appellant is liable for all the costs associated with the recusal of the 1st DC and must therefore bear the cost of any duplicative efforts.

The Judge’s decision

We now turn to the Judge’s decision. On a...