Lim Ah Khee v Legal Representative of the Estate of Ong Koh Tee, deceased

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Kan Ting Chiu JC
• Judgment Date: 29 April 1994
• Neutral Citation: [1994] SGHC 122
• Plaintiff Counsel: Chang Set Chee (Seah Yap Leong & Pnrs)
• Date: 29 April 1994
• Year: 1994
• Subject Matter: Consent only a ground for order appointing him to represent estate,Administration of assets,No death certificate,Whether rebutted,Evidence,Person missing for more than seven years,Whether presumption operates where those who knew the person assert actual knowledge of his death,Presumptions,Consent to accept service of action against estate,s 109 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1990 Ed),Probate and Administration,Express order of appointment still required to accept service,Official Assignee,Wife and neighbour stating as fact the death of person in the 1970s but providing no details,s 110 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1990 Ed),Applicability,O 15 r 6(4)(a) Rules of the Supreme Court 1990,Proof of evidence,Presumption of being alive,Death,Wife and neighbour stating as fact the death of the person in the 1970s but providing no proof of it
• Docket Number: Suit No 1633 of 1993 (Originating Summons No 1262 of 1993)
• Citation: [1994] SGHC 122
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 19 September 2003

The plaintiff`s application is for an order that `Ong Koh Tee late of No 171 Yio Chu Kang Road, Singapore, be presumed dead for purposes limited to the appointment of the Official Assignee as the representative of his estate to accept service of a writ of summons ...` As stated in the title of the action, the application is made pursuant to s 110 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1990 Ed) and O 15 r 6A(4)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Two affidavits were filed in support of the application. The plaintiff Lim Ah Khee in her affidavit deposed that Ong Koh Tee passed away a few years after 1971. She went on to say that before filing this application her solicitors had searched the probate cause book from the years 1972 to 1993 without finding any record of any grant of probate or letters of administration in respect of Ong Koh Tee`s estate. The solicitors had also applied to the Registry of Births and Deaths to search the Register of Deaths for the years 1973 to 1977 and to obtain a copy of Ong Koh Tee`s death certificate, and were informed that it would take three to four months to carry out a search for each year. The plaintiff seeks to avoid the `very long time span required to trace the death certificate` by applying for the court order. In her affidavit, she exhibited a copy of a letter from the Public Trustee in which he confirmed that he was prepared to represent the estate for the purpose of accepting service, and asked for a copy of the death certificate.

The second affidavit was a short one made by Seah Hock Seng who said that he knew Ong Koh Tee as a former neighbour who died sometime between 1973 and 1977.

I found the plaintiff`s application difficult to understand in view of the assertions that she is relying on. She is not really seeking to establish Ong Koh Tee`s death by invoking the presumption in s 110 of the Evidence Act which operates when it proved that a person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard from him if he had been alive. She is asserting affirmatively that Ong Koh Tee is dead because she and Seah Hock Seng have personal knowledge of that fact. She is not saying that those who would have heard from Ong Koh Tee if he is alive have not heard from him for seven years. In such a situation, s 110 cannot help her, and she has to substantiate her assertion that he is dead.

On the facts alleged by the plaintiff, a very different presumption arises. This is the presumption under s 109...