Liew Ah Hock v Malayan Railway

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 03 August 1966
• Date: 03 August 1966
• Docket Number: Suit No 365 of 1966
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Liew Ah Hock

Plaintiff

and

Malayan Railway

Defendant

[1966] SGHC 34

A V Winslow J

Suit No 365 of 1966

High Court

Civil Procedure–Injunctions–Judgment obtained against occupier–Whether injunction restraining execution of judgment could be granted–Equity–Estoppel–Promissory estoppel–Land held on expired temporary permit–Whether there was agreement to grant occupier a permit on compliance with certain conditions

The plaintiff was in occupation of land belonging to the defendant. He initially had a temporary permit to do so but when it expired, he continued to occupy the land without a permit. The defendant obtained judgment against the plaintiff to recover possession and, in execution of that judgment, it issued a writ of possession against the plaintiff. The plaintiff took out the present proceedings to, amongst other things, obtain an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with the execution of the judgment and a declaration that he was entitled to remain in possession of the land. He founded his entitlement on a purported agreement between the parties that the defendant would grant him a temporary permit if he paid the costs of certain legal proceedings, which he did.

Held, dismissing the application:

A court could not grant an injunction against the execution of its own judgment since the fusion of law and equity. Since there was already a valid subsisting judgment in favour of the defendant for possession against the plaintiff of the land in question, an injunction to restrain the execution could not be granted: at [5] and [6].

[Observations: The principle laid down in Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 WLR 212, that where a person had expended money on the land of another in expectation, induced or encouraged by the owner of the land, that he would be allowed to remain in occupation, an equity was created such that the court would protect his occupation of the land, only applied if money was directed towards physical or structural improvements to the land: at [12].

The application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel was limited to matters of defence but could not create a cause of action. Furthermore, a person who sought to rely on the doctrine must do equity himself, otherwise equity would not assist him: at [16] and [18].]

Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (distd)

Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 (refd)

Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29; [1965] 1 All ER 446; [1965] 2 WLR 212 (distd)

Wright v Redgrave (1879) 11 Ch D 24 (folld)

J B Jeyaretnam (Donaldson & Burkinshaw) for the plaintiff

P Mooney and J Y P Chia (J Y P Chia & Co) for the defendant.

Judgment reserved.

A V Winslow J

1 The plaintiff in this action claims:

1. (a) Adeclaration that he is entitled to remain in occupation of the land and premises situated at 354, 8 milestone Bukit Timah Road vested in the defendant.

2. (b) An injunction to restrain the defendant by itself, its servants or agents from proceeding with the execution of the judgment against the plaintiff obtained by the defendant in Civil Suit No 1759 of 1960 or otherwise obstructing or interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of the said land.

3. (c) An order that the defendant do comply with the terms of the agreement reached between the plaintiff and the defendant in or about 1960.

2 It is admitted by the defence that the plaintiff was, in fact, in occupation of the land in question under a temporary permit from 1953 to 1960 and that he has continued to occupy it thereafter albeit without a permit. The plaintiff claims that the defendant agreed in 1960 to grant the plaintiff a temporary permit if he would pay the costs of proceedings to be brought in the defendant's name to evict other occupiers of the land and contends that he has paid such costs but that the defendant refuses to evict one of the occupiers of the land and also refuses to renew the permit as promised.

3 The defendant denies these allegations and contends that it obtained judgment against the plaintiff and others in Civil Suit No 1759 of 1960 in the High Court by virtue of which it is entitled to recover possession of the land in question and that, in execution of that judgment, it has issued a writ of possession against both the plaintiff and the other occupier mentioned above. The present claim has been brought to prevent such execution.

4 Before I proceed to analyse the evidence adduced in this case, it may be useful, at this stage, to deal with the submission which was made by Mr Mooney, counsel for the defendant, in connection with the contention set out above. He submitted that the present action was not maintainable in law on the ground that there is no precedent for asking a court to grant an injunction against the execution of its own judgment...