Letchme v Gopal

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: A P Rajah J
• Judgment Date: 09 November 1978
• Neutral Citation: [1978] SGHC 59
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1978
• Citation: [1978] SGHC 59
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Cur Adv Vult

The respondent (husband) and the appellant (wife) were married on 21 March 1970. Sometime in January 1972 she discovered that her husband was cohabiting with another woman and had a child by her, and in consequence she left the matrimonial home on 20 January 1972.

On 20 November 1976 the Legal Aid Bureau filed a petition on her behalf for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground of her husband`s adultery. There was no prayer in the petition for maintenance. The petition stated that there had been no previous proceedings in any court with reference to her marriage either by herself or her husband. However, on 28 December 1976 she started maintenance proceedings under s 60 of the Women`s Charter (Cap 47, 1970 Ed) against her husband in the magistrate`s court and on 7 March 1977 there was a consent order that the husband pay her monthly as from 1 March 1977, through the registrar of the subordinate courts, the sum of $80 for her maintenance.

Her petition for dissolution of marriage, which was uncontested, was heard on 27 June 1977 when a decree nisi to be made absolute in three months was pronounced in her favour. The maintenance order obtained in the magistrate`s court was not brought to the attention of the judge. The decree nisi was made absolute on 7 October 1977.

In the meantime the husband had been paying her $80 per month. He stopped payment as from October 1978 and started proceedings on 15 March 1979 under s 62(1) of the Women`s Charter on the basis that, `Since the marriage to my former wife was dissolved and the decree was made absolute I therefore pray that the said maintenance order be rescinded as it deems fit in accordance with s 62(1) of the Women`s Charter.`

Section 62 of the Women`s Charter reads:

(1) On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance under this Part and on proof of a change in the circumstances or such person, his wife or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court, the court by which such order was made may rescind the said order or may vary it as it deems fit.

(2) Without prejudice to the extent of the discretion conferred upon the court by sub-s (1) or this section the court may, in considering any application made under this section, take into consideration any change in the general cost of living which may have occurred between the date of the making of the order sought to be varied and the date of the hearing or the application.

From this judgment the wife now appeals. The ground for the appeal is that the learned magistrate erred in law in the interpretation of s 62(1) of the Women`s Charter when he decided that the husband, who at the date of the hearing was no longer her husband, was entitled under the said s 62(1) to rescission of the maintenance order merely because the appellant (wife) and the respondent (husband) had ceased to be wife and husband.

At the outset of his judgment the learned magistrate in his grounds of decision says that `the issue in this case is as regards the liability of the complainant (husband) to continue to maintain the respondent (wife) who since the order absolute was no longer the wife of the complainant` (10E of the record). He deals with this question towards the end of his judgment (13B) as follows: `Section 60 of Part VII of the Women`s Charter is very clear. As for a woman...