Leow Li Yoon v Liu Jiu Chang

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Aedit Abdullah JC
• Judgment Date: 04 November 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] SGHC 290
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ramesh s/o Varathappan (M Rama Law Corporation)
• Docket Number: HC/ Registrar’s Appeal from the State Courts No 7 of 2015
• Date: 04 November 2015
• Hearing Date: 31 July 2015
• Subject Matter: Mental Disorders and Treatment,Mental capacity
• Year: 2015
• Citation: [2015] SGHC 290
• Defendant Counsel: Tay Kang-Rui Darius (TSMP Law Corporation) as amicus curiae.,Respondent-in-person
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 14 November 2015

Aedit Abdullah JC: Introduction

This case concerned the validity of a Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) nomination made pursuant to s 25(1) of the Central Provident Fund Act (Cap 36, 2013 Rev Ed) (“CPF Act”). The question arose as the deceased person, who was in the midst of divorcing his wife, nominated someone other than his immediate family members as the beneficiary of the funds in his CPF account. The wife and some of the rest of the family took issue with that nomination as there were indications that the deceased was not of the right mind when the nomination was made. The District Judge (“DJ”) found in favour of the nominated beneficiary. As the issue has apparently not been considered before, I allowed leave to appeal against the decision below. Having heard the arguments, including those of the young amicus curiae, and having considered all the circumstances of the case, I conclude that the nomination should be set aside, and that the funds in the account be distributed according to the Intestate Succession Act (Cap 146, 2013 Rev Ed) (“ISA”). I give the detailed reasons for my decision below.

Background

The appellant, Mdm Leow Li Yoon (“the Appellant”), was married to Mr Saw Eng Soon (“Mr Saw”) in 1970. Sometime in 2012, the Appellant commenced divorce proceedings, with interim judgment granted in February 2013. On 1 June 2013, before final judgment could be granted in the divorce proceedings, Mr Saw passed away, in circumstances raising the suspicion of suicide. The Appellant filed a notice of abatement in respect of the divorce proceedings.

Subsequently, the Appellant and her children discovered a CPF nomination form dated 31 October 2011 drawn up by Mr Saw (“CPF Nomination Form”) when they went through his documents. In that form, he nominated the respondent, Ms Liu Jiu Chang (“the Respondent”), as his sole beneficiary to receive monies in his CPF account (“CPF Monies”) upon his death. The Respondent was described in that form as Mr Saw’s “God-daughter”.

Mr Saw’s interaction with the Respondent

The Respondent, a Chinese national pursuing a degree in Hotel Management at the East Asia Institute of Management (“the Institute”), met Mr Saw while she was interning as a waitress at a hotel. The two of them started talking and meeting up to go for meals and visit various sights in Singapore. When the Respondent’s mother visited her in December 2010, the Respondent introduced Mr Saw to her mother, who, as the three of them got along well, suggested to Mr Saw to take the Respondent as his “god-daughter”. Mr Saw agreed with the suggestion.

Sometime in July or August 2011, Mr Saw started confiding in the Respondent about problems he was having. The Respondent states that he told her that he was encountering difficulties with his business and that as a result, “he was experiencing dizzy spells and mood swings and this left him feeling depressed almost every day”.¹ Sometime in 2012, he also told her that his wife had filed for a divorce and that he had started taking sleeping pills to go to sleep. During this time, the Respondent started calling Mr Saw more frequently to check up on him. The Respondent states that Mr Saw started showing suicidal tendencies soon after. It should be mentioned that by this time, the Respondent had graduated from the Institute and had secured a job as a Service Attendant at the casino at Marina Bay Sands.

Mr Saw drove the Respondent to the airport in March 2013 as she was going back to China for a short trip. That was the last time the Respondent saw Mr Saw. After the Respondent returned to Singapore, she tried contacting Mr Saw but was not able to reach him. Mr Saw got in touch with her some time thereafter and told her he had been admitted to the hospital and suggested that they meet sometime in April 2013. The meeting they planned never materialised. Sometime in April 2013, Mr Saw called the Respondent to inform her that he had been admitted to the hospital again.

Thereafter, sometime in July 2013, the Respondent was contacted by the police who asked her to assist with their investigations into Mr Saw’s death.

Application to set aside the CPF Nomination Form

The Appellant sought to have the CPF Nomination Form declared “null and void” and for the CPF Monies to be declared part of Mr Saw’s estate. The Appellant initially commenced proceedings in the High Court but the matter was eventually transferred by consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the State Courts. The Appellant also applied for an injunction to restrain the CPF Board from paying the Respondent the CPF Monies. An interim injunction was granted on 6 August 2013. The substantive matter was heard on 24 October 2014.

Before the DJ, the Appellant relied on three alternative arguments as to why she should be granted the remedies she sought. First, she argued that Mr Saw lacked “capacity” within the meaning of ss 4 and 5 of the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“MCA”) at the time he executed the CPF Nomination Form. Second, she argued that the Respondent might have taken advantage of Mr Saw’s vulnerability to unduly influence him into nominating her as the sole beneficiary of his CPF Monies to the exclusion of his own family. Third, she pointed out that r 1A(2) of the Central Provident Fund (Nominations) Rules (Cap 36, R 1, 1998 Rev Ed) (“CPF Nomination Rules”) states that all forms used for the purposes of CPF nominations shall be “completed … in accordance with such direction as may be specified in the form or by the Board”. The instructions on the CPF nomination form states: “You must sign against any cancellation or alteration. The use of any correction fluid/tape or not signing against amendments will void the application” (see (accessed on 29 October 2015) for the currently existing version of the CPF nomination form). She argued that Mr Saw’s nomination was void because he failed to countersign against a cancellation he made on the CPF Nomination Form.

The DJ delivered his judgment on 28 November 2014. The DJ dismissed the Appellant’s application and the interim injunction was discharged. In addition, the Appellant was ordered to pay the Respondent $7,000 in costs.

The Appellant applied for leave to appeal against the DJ’s decision. She also applied for a stay of execution of the DJ’s orders until her application for leave to appeal was heard. The DJ heard the stay of execution application on 12 December 2014, granting a stay limited to the discharge of the interim injunction on condition that the Appellant pay the Respondent the $7,000 that she was ordered to pay in costs in the main application. No payment was forthcoming from the Appellant. The DJ heard and dismissed the application for leave to appeal on 19 December 2014. The Appellant informed the DJ that she would be filing an originating summons in the High Court for leave to file a notice of appeal against the DJ’s decision in the main application and asked for the stay of the discharge of the interim injunction to be extended. The DJ granted an extension of the stay on condition that the Appellant pay the Respondent all costs ordered against her up to that point which came up to a total of $8,900. The stay was to be effective up to the date of the hearing of the originating summons in the High Court if the Appellant in fact filed the originating summons. Again, the Appellant did not make payment of the costs ordered against her.

The Appellant filed and sought leave from the High Court to file a notice of appeal against the DJ’s decision in the main application. She also sought a stay of execution of the DJ’s orders. I heard this application on 13 January 2015 and granted the Appellant an unconditional interim stay of the DJ’s orders in the main application pending the hearing of the application for leave to file a notice of appeal. Subsequently, I granted leave and also extended the stay pending the disposal of the appeal. The Appellant then filed the present appeal.

The hearing of the appeal was fixed on 31 July 2015. I appointed Mr Tay Kang-Rui Darius (“Mr Tay”) of M/s TSMP Law Corporation as amicus curiae under the Young Amicus Curiae Scheme to assist the court.

The Appellant’s case

In the course of the hearing before me, it became evident that the Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the DJ had erred in rejecting her argument that Mr Saw lacked mental capacity at the time he executed the CPF Nomination Form.

The Appellant argues that the rules on the allocation of burden of proof in the context of a dispute concerning the testamentary capacity of a testator should be applied where a deceased person’s CPF nomination form is challenged on the ground that he lacked mental capacity at the time he made the nomination. She points out that the legal burden of proving testamentary capacity lies on the propounder of the will. A presumption of capacity arises in favour of the propounder if he can show that the will was duly executed and appears rational on its face. The person opposing the will may rebut the presumption by adducing evidence to raise doubts as to the propounder’s testamentary capacity. If the objector manages to do so, the evidential burden would shift back to the propounder to establish capacity nonetheless. She argues that the same rules should apply mutatis mutandis in the present case

If the Appellant’s argument set out in the preceding paragraph concerning the rules on the allocation of burden of proof is accepted, then she would only have to raise doubts regarding Mr Saw’s mental capacity when he executed the CPF Nomination Form. She would not have to prove on a balance of probabilities that Mr Saw lacked capacity at the material time. Nevertheless, the Appellant argues that she has adduced sufficient factual and medical evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that Mr Saw suffered from a mental disability, namely reactive depression...