Leng Kah Poh v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Choo Han Teck J
• Judgment Date: 18 September 2013
• Neutral Citation: [2013] SGHC 180
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Magistrate’s Appeal No 50 of 2013/01-02
• Year: 2013
• Published date: 11 October 2013
• Hearing Date: 16 August 2013
• Plaintiff Counsel: S K Kumar ( S K Kumar law Practice LLP)
• Defendant Counsel: Sandy Baggett, Sherlyn Neo and Ang Feng Qian (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Subject Matter: Criminal Law,Corruption,Prevent of Corruption Act
• Citation: [2013] SGHC 180

Choo Han Teck J:

The appellant was the Food and Beverage (“F&B”) Manager at IKANO Pte Ltd (“IKEA Singapore”), a Singapore company that operates the IKEA furniture stores in Singapore. His present appeal is against conviction and sentence for 80 charges of corruption under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, Rev Ed 1993) (“PCA”) read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, Rev Ed 2008) for having received a reward for awarding F&B supply contracts to AT35 Services (“AT35”), a sole proprietorship registered by Andrew Tee Fook Boon (“Andrew”), and Food Royale Trading (“FRT”), also run by Andrew.

Section 6(a) of the PCA reads as follows:

Punishment for corrupt transactions with agents

6. If —

(a) any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business;

…

he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to both.

The charges of corruption concern IKEA Singapore’s dealings with two companies, namely, AT35 and FRT. AT35 was a waste management company registered under Andrew’s name. Andrew was approached by Gary Lim Kim Seng (“Gary”) sometime in October 2002 to convert AT35 into a food supply business. Andrew met Gary and the appellant in a coffee shop in the Bishan area in October 2002 and a plan was devised to supply food to IKEA Singapore through AT35. Gary and Andrew each contributed $30,000 in cash to start AT35’s new food supply business but the appellant made no direct cash contribution. It was agreed that the appellant’s contribution would be in the form of ploughing back $20,000 of his share of the initial profits into AT35 for its continued business. Andrew was the primary manager of AT35 and later, FRT. AT35 and FRT were the exclusive suppliers of chicken wings and dried food products to IKEA Singapore. Over a period of seven years, through AT35, Gary, Andrew and the appellant gained a profit of $6.9 million from the food supply contracts with IKEA Singapore. The appellant’s one-third share of that profit was $2.3 million.

It was undisputed (both at trial and now on appeal) that AT35 had no other business or clients besides IKEA Singapore. Andrew had testified during trial that AT35 broke even and started making a profit in January 2003; a mere three months after it was set up. Business picked up when IKEA opened a second branch in the Tampines Area. Andrew and Gary set up a second company, FRT, under the name of one of Gary’s employees, to supply dried goods to IKEA Singapore. AT35 then concentrated on supplying poultry products to IKEA Singapore. The modus operandi of AT35 and FRT was simple: they obtained food supplies from a food supplier with instructions for that supplier (Tenderfresh, in AT35’s case) to package its products in unmarked clear plastic bags and sold these products on to IKEA Singapore at a marked up rate. This mark-up started out as a 10% mark-up (which the trial judge noted in his judgment was the norm in that industry) when AT35 first began its business but had become a 30-35% mark-up within a year of its commencement of operations. AT35 and FRT did not add value to its products. It merely transported the products straight from its supplier to IKEA Singapore. Where storage of items was necessary, AT35 stored the products in rented cold rooms in Jurong and Defu industrial estates. AT35 did not have any cold rooms or storage facilities of its own.

The appellant’s role in this arrangement was also straightforward: he would give AT35 insider tips on how to make AT35’s and FRT’s products palatable to IKEA Singapore and he would exercise his influence to approve AT35 and FRT as the exclusive food suppliers of dried goods and chicken wings to IKEA Singapore. The District Judge (“the judge”) found that a key part of the appellant’s duties involved approving suppliers to IKEA Singapore. There was ample evidence to support this, in particular, from the appellant’s supervising managers, who testified at the trial. I do not think the appellant’s role is really the issue in the present appeal. The appellant has pointed to no evidence to controvert the judge’s findings in this regard beyond pointing out that the appellant did not have the final say in the formal chain of command. The judge did consider the manner in which food suppliers were selected, and he believed the testimony of the appellant’s supervising managers that in practice, it was the appellant who made the selections. Where the appellant was not directly responsible for the selection of the food supplier, there was also evidence that the appellant gave AT35 instructions on what it should do in order to ensure that it would be selected. I find that there is nothing wrong with the judge’s findings in this respect and I see no reason to overturn his finding of those facts on appeal.

Following a 25-day trial, the judge also found that the elements under s 6(a) of the PCA had been proved, viz, that the appellant had received gratification as an inducement or reward with a corrupt element and with corrupt intent; see Kwang Boon Keong Peter v PP [1998] 2 SLR(R) 211 at [32]. At issue in this appeal are the judge’s findings in relation to the corrupt element of the transaction and the appellant’s corrupt intent or guilty knowledge.

A corrupt element must be ascertained according to an “ordinary and objective standard”; see Chan Wing Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR(R) 721 (at [25]) (“Chan Wing Seng”). The court should first ascertain that the accused had intended to do an act which was objectively corrupt and then it has to...