Lee Soon Beng v Wee Tiam Sing

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Kew Chai J
• Judgment Date: 29 July 1986
• Neutral Citation: [1986] SGCA 9
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 67 of 1985
• Date: 29 July 1986
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1986
• Plaintiff Counsel: Karuppan Chettiar (Murphy & Dunbar)
• Citation: [1986] SGCA 9
• Defendant Counsel: M Karthigesu and Anne Loke (Cooma, Lau & Loh & M Kathigesu)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Principles followed,Interest on damages,s 9 Civil Law Act (Cap 30, 1970 Ed),Measure of damages,Personal injuries cases,Damages

This is an appeal against the judgment of FA Chua J in an action by the appellant for damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the respondent in the driving, use and management of motor vehicle No AU 203 J on 17 September 1979.

The respondent at the date of the trial admitted liability and on that admission a consent judgment for the appellant was granted by FA Chua J in the sum of $65,000 and costs. As the parties could not agree on the question of interest, the learned judge was asked to decide whether interest should be awarded on a sum of $30,000 which was the agreed sum as damages for pain and suffering and on a sum of $16,250 which was the agreed sum for special damages. After hearing counsel FA Chua J declined to award interest in respect of both these agreed sums.

In his grounds of judgment FA Chua J said:

I held that on principle no interest should be awarded on damages in running-down cases.

Section 9 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 30) empowers the court to award interest on damages. The power is discretionary.

In Ban Pet Hock v Ong Ah Ho [1966] 2 MLJ 253 Choor Singh J held that on principle interest should not be allowed when damages are awarded in running-down cases. I respectfully agree with Choor Singh J.

The power of the court to award interest in personal injury cases is contained in s 9 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 30) which reads as follows:

In any proceedings tried in any court of record for the recovery of any debt or damages, the court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment:

Provided that nothing in this section -

(a) shall authorize the giving of interest upon interest; or

As FA Chua J recognized, the power of the court is discretionary but, in our judgment, he failed to exercise his discretion judicially by failing to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles which should be applied when considering whether or not interest should be awarded in personal injury cases. We think it is now generally accepted since Jefford v Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202 that the principles that should be applied in awarding interest in personal injury cases are that interest should not be awarded as compensation for the...