Law Society of Singapore v Syn Kok Kay
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Sundaresh Menon CJ |
Judgment Date | 10 January 2023 |
Neutral Citation | [2023] SGHC 7 |
Court | Court of Appeal (Singapore) |
Docket Number | Originating Application No 2 of 2022 |
Published date | 13 January 2023 |
Year | 2023 |
Hearing Date | 11 October 2022 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Sean Francois La'Brooy and Faustina Joyce Fernando (Selvam LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Giam Chin Toon SC and Teo Hui Xian Astrid (Wee Swee Teow LLP) |
Citation | [2023] SGHC 7 |
This is an application by the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) for the respondent, Mr Syn Kok Kay, to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”), in respect of:
Having heard the parties and having considered their submissions, we find that there is due cause for the respondent to be sanctioned and that the appropriate sanction is a term of suspension of three years and nine months.
This case offers a timely opportunity for this court to consider a number of issues:
The respondent is a solicitor of 29 years’ standing, having been called to the Singapore Bar on 22 March 1993. At all material times, he was the sole proprietor of Patrick Chin Syn & Co.
In or around 2015, the respondent was engaged by JWR Pte Ltd (“JWR”) to sue Mr Edmond Pereira (“Mr Pereira”) and Edmond Pereira Law Corporation in HC/S 992/2015 (“Suit 992”) for professional negligence relating to a previous suit in which Mr Pereira had represented JWR. The amount claimed against Mr Pereira was $8.9bn. Suit 992 was dismissed by the High Court in May 2019.
For his services in Suit 992, the respondent charged JWR a total of $1,364,089.80, comprising $24,089.80 in disbursements and $1,340,000 in professional fees. Bills were rendered on a regular, approximately monthly basis to JWR over a period from December 2015 to April 2019. Almost invariably, the bills relating to professional fees were not itemised, and comprised only round dollar figures which were merely described as being charged “[t]o account for … further costs”. Nevertheless, JWR paid these disbursements and fees in full.
Subsequently, JWR filed HC/OS 989/2019 to seek an order to tax the rendered bills. On 24 October 2019, Tan Siong Thye J ordered taxation of the professional fees, and the respondent was ordered to deliver a bill of costs within 14 days (
The respondent failed to do so, instead he filed an appeal against Tan J’s decision on 8 November 2019. This appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 January 2020 for want of leave to appeal. A request by the respondent on 16 January 2020 to make further arguments was denied on 30 January 2020.
Still, the respondent did not file his bill of costs until 18 November 2020 – more than a year after the deadline of 7 November 2019 stipulated by Tan J. This was followed by an amended, more detailed bill of costs on 5 February 2021.
At the taxation hearing before Assistant Registrar Crystal Tan on 9 February 2021, the costs for work done other than for taxation were taxed down to $288,000 from $1,340,000. Given that JWR had paid the fees in full previously, the respondent was to refund the difference of $1,052,000. The respondent’s application for a review of AR Tan’s decision was dismissed by Tan J on 12 April 2021.
To date, the respondent has yet to return the $1,052,000. To enforce the repayment of this sum, JWR served the respondent with a statutory demand on 2 June 2021. After failing to reach a satisfactory compromise, JWR applied for a bankruptcy order against the respondent on 30 July 2021. The respondent was adjudged bankrupt on 30 September 2021, and has yet to discharge his bankruptcy.
The hearing and the Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision From this background, arising out of a complaint made by JWR, the Law Society formulated and proceeded with three charges against the respondent. Summarised, these are:
The legislation referred to in the charges is set out below:
ss 83(2)( b ) and 83(2)( h ) of the LPA
83. — ……
…
…
…
rr 17(7) and 17(8) of the PCR 2015
17. — ……
The respondent pleaded guilty to all three charges. In
As for the Third Charge, it was the respondent’s position before the Disciplinary Tribunal that he was unable to make repayment at the material time. The Law Society did not dispute this position. However, it argued that the respondent’s ability to make repayment was irrelevant to the charge as it was his legal obligation to do so. Further, it noted that these facts were not within its knowledge, and that it was not for the Law Society to speculate. The Disciplinary Tribunal ultimately took the view that the respondent’s failure to pay was “due to his impecuniosity when his obligation to repay crystallised”, which alone did not present a
The Law Society proceeded to file the present application for the respondent to show cause, in respect of the First and Second Charges, as to why he should not be made to suffer sanction under s 83(1) of the LPA. It is the Law Society’s position that the overall sanction that should be imposed is a term of two years’ suspension, with immediate effect.
The issues in this application The following questions are to be answered in relation to each charge:
Further, if we find that a term of suspension is warranted, we must consider the effect the respondent’s undischarged bankruptcy has on that term of suspension.
Finally, the consideration of whether due cause has been made out in respect of the respondent’s overcharging and his non-compliance with an order of court provides an opportunity for a more comprehensive review of...
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Law Society of Singapore v Syn Kok Kay
...Society of Singapore and Syn Kok Kay [2023] SGHC 7 Sundaresh Menon CJ, Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Steven Chong JCA Originating Application No 2 of 2022 Court of Three Judges Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings — Commencement of period of suspension — When period of suspension should com......